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European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation (ERPL) 
 
A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz for 
the project “European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (ERPL).  
The focus of the socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self-
sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems. The project 
aims at a new–orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its 
transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. It suggests the 
emergence of a self-sufficient European private law, composed of three different layers (1) the 
sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles – provisionally termed competitive contract 
law – and (3) common principles of civil law. It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and 
national private law systems around four normative models: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict 
and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) convergence. It analyses the new order of values, enshrined in 
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The working paper collects the research presented in the second annual external workshop of the 
ERPL Project that took place on 16 and 17 May 2013 at the EUI in Florence. The second year of the 
project was devoted to the collection of empirical evidence in the various sub-projects, as well as in 
further elaboration of the theoretical and conceptual parameters that frame the project research. The 
theoretical parts of the working paper collects contributions on the relation between private autonomy 
and regulation (in Part I) as well as on the transformation of private law, including the drivers of the 
transformation in the public/private divide that in turn affects the purview of private law, as well as the 
transformation in the form and function of contract law and tortious liability (in Part III). The 
empirical part of the working paper contains contributions investigating the topics of remedies, 
standardisation of services, and telecommunications, analysed from the perspective of the parameters 
of hybridization, convergence and self-sufficiency, as elaborated in the previous working paper of the 
project LAW 2012/31 ERPL-01. 
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This working paper collects the research contributions presented in the second annual external 
workshop of the ERPL Project that took place on 16 and 17 May 2013 at the EUI in Florence. The 
second year was devoted to the collection of empirical evidence in the various sub-projects, as well as 
in further elaboration of the theoretical and conceptual parameters that frame the project research. 
The first section of the working paper contains a contribution on regulated autonomy by Guido 
Comparato which examines the relationship between private autonomy and regulation in the context 
of European Union law and more precisely in the case-law of the Court of Justice. It suggests that, 
with a view to the construction of the internal market, autonomy has been regulated under EU law in a 
twofold way. Thus, while on the one hand EU law provides for an extension of private autonomy for 
actors, on the other hand it simultaneously imposes a set of conditions on that extended autonomy. 
Such conditions have the function of building and regulating the internal market. The result of this 
combination of both extending autonomy, as well as regulating it, is termed regulated autonomy. 
The second section of the paper contains a summarised version of some of the empirical results in the 
fields studied in the project. This includes a contribution on remedies and hybridisation by Betül Kas, 
which shows how the law of the European Union shapes Member States’ procedural and substantive 
law, resulting in the elaboration of hybrid remedies for the protection of EU law rights in domestic 
settings. The field of standardisation of services is discussed in the contribution by Barend van 
Leeuwen through the perspective of ‘convergence’. The contribution suggests that ‘the triangular 
relationship between free movement of services, European standardisation and private law will not 
work unless there is a degree of compatibility between each of the three components’. Finally, Marta 
Cantero Gamito’s contribution provides a study of the telecommunications sector from the perspective 
of self-sufficiency of sectoral regulation. Her contribution analyses the institutional design of the 
telecom and electronic communications sector, suggesting that it is based on executive federalism 
whereby the Commission holds strong supervisory powers, while at the same time it relies on a 
collaborative approach (including the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications – 
BEREC) aiming at the removal of divergences in the performance of different national authorities. 
The final section includes papers that provide some preliminary steps towards addressing the overall 
project question of the transformation of private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition 
and regulation. In a first contribution, Rónán Condon focuses on the issue of the transformation of 
liability, and in particular state liability in the context of an increasing regulatory role for the State. 
The contribution examines the role that new EU liability doctrines, such as the one elaborated in the 
seminal case Francovich, can influence and shape that process. In the last paper, Hans-W. Micklitz 
and Yane Svetiev address the topic of the transformation of private law from autonomy to 
functionalism in regulation and competition providing possible tools for the analysing that 
transformation emerging from the literature from two seminars organised at the EUI within the scope 
of the project, one on Autonomy and Regulation and another one on the Transformation of Private 
Law. The first part of that contribution examines the drivers of transformation that have been 
identified in the literature, including changes in the economy (transnational integration and changing 
patterns of production), in technology, as well as in civil society (self-organisation beyond politics). 
This part departs from and focuses principally on developments within the EU. The second part 
examines how the issue of transformation of private law has been dealt with in the American 
literature, reinterpreting this literature more explicitly through the prism of the drivers of 





SECTION I: FOUNDATIONS 
 
PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND REGULATION IN THE EU CASE-LAW 
Guido Comparato 
Regulation and Autonomy 
The modern design of private law in modern states revolves around two concepts, apparently opposite 
to each other and therefore possibly hard to reconcile, on the one hand autonomy and on the other 
hand regulation. Private autonomy, in its traditional understanding, embodies the freedom of 
individuals to determine their legal relationships according to their free will and reveals itself in a 
series of well-establish private law principles such as, most notably, freedom of contract. It is therefore 
at least ideally linked to the overarching idea of personal and economic freedom and as such 
represents a basic fundamental principle in the modern legal systems of those countries which are 
considered to belong to the Western legal tradition. On the other hand, regulation is an expression of 
the opposite idea of heteronomy, and consists in the overcoming of the individual will by the unilateral 
determination of legitimated public powers, although recent developments in regulation, 
corresponding to the evolution of the very nature of administration over the years, hint to an 
intensification of the delegation of powers to an increasing number of subjects with regulatory 
competences. Such practices have clearly blurred the distinction between private and public law to a 
large extent, therefore posing new challenges to the legal analyst. 
As such, the two concepts of autonomy and regulation are traditionally regarded in contrast to each 
other and are therefore seen as the core elements of two different fields of the legal system: private and 
public law. Private law, in this reading, is the realm of the free choice of the individual, while any 
encroachment of that freedom can be determined only by the intervention of a legitimate power, as 
described by public law. Such interventions by state powers are dictated by reasons of public interest, 
although the notion of public interest is (sometimes dangerously) undetermined and vague enough to 
comprehend a vast number of very diverse things. This can even cover the need to ensure that all 
individuals enjoy freedom and have sufficient autonomy, which might lead to, at first look, quite 
bizarre but only seemingly contradictory situations in which both legislative and judicial limitations on 
freedom of contract are justified by the need to empower the autonomy of the individual.1 Inasmuch as 
it gets delimited, nonetheless, autonomy is not just the prey of regulation, but it becomes a regulatory 
instrument of itself, as it ensures that the action of the private party conforms to the objectives of the 
legal order. 
These latter considerations hint to the fact that, even if understanding regulation and autonomy as 
necessarily opposed principles might be a rational conceptualization as a starting point, this might also 
not be entirely appropriate to grasp the complexity of modern legal systems, since those two concept 
rather appear to be strongly interlinked in several ways. This interlink emerges more clearly where the 
state assumes a more active role in the social and economic structure of the society, instead of posing 
just the external limits of the action of otherwise free individuals. A restrained interventionist 
approach characterizes the traditional norms of private law which invalidate legal acts concluded for 
                                                     
1 See for instance the German Suretyship-case, BVerfG NJW 1994, 36. 
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instance against good morals. Those are limits which even a libertarian and non-interventionist state 
could accept to pose, besides of its role of enforcer of the agreements freely reached by individuals. 
Regulation, however, goes beyond that approach and assumes different connotations derived from the 
particular social and economic rationality which permeates public actions, allowing for the 
configuration of different instrumental purposes such as alleviation of market failures, distributive 
justice, restrictions to private powers, welfare goals and so on, which become goals for contract law as 
well.2 Rather than purely external limits, it poses the conditions for the exercise of autonomy. The 
regulatory state, the welfare state, the ordoliberal state, the market-state to name just a few are all 
models of state administration which rely on regulation to achieve their social and economic goals and 
may all require a more rigorous intersection of regulation and autonomy, meant not only to completely 
strike down autonomy whenever this conflicts with the external limits posed by the state (in private 
law terms, this determines the extreme consequence of the nullity of the act, which is indeed the 
traditional remedy posed by civil law for agreements which conflict with mandatory rules) but more 
pervasively to steer it towards the achievement of the particular goal of the regulator. As the 
scholarship which inquired the link between autonomy and regulation in the national context already 
identified years ago,3 the traditional legal consequence of the infringement of a limit posed by private 
law is the exclusion of legal effects of the act (which is often just ‘not satisfactory’ for the economic 
public order),4 while regulation can be more pervasive and, rather than just eliminating legal effects, it 
rather conforms them or even directly attributes rights to individuals. This appears as a stronger 
regulatory practice than just granting legal validity to an expression of private autonomy provided that 
this is compatible with the overall interest of the state and denying it when it is not. 
From this point of view, although it is certainly correct to affirm that absolute freedom of contract has 
never existed in legal history so that autonomy has always been somehow ‘regulated’, the kind of 
relationship which has emerged between autonomy and regulation since the emergence of the 
mentioned models of the state is peculiar, more recent, and could be even regarded as a transformation 
of the role or even nature of private law in modern societies. Such a transformation of private law, 
which is closely linked to a more fundamental transformation of public law and possibly the state,5 
poses challenges and can even unsettle the scholar, as it does away with categories and distinctions 
which also have a valuable safeguard function, making new conceptualisations compulsory. 
In order to express the complementary nature of autonomy and regulation in this context, the term 
regulated autonomy is adopted here. The notion builds upon a series of other terminologies and 
concepts which are known in legal literature, but is used here in a more general meaning. More 
fundamentally, regulated autonomy is the result of regulatory interventions on private autonomy, 
which are not exclusively meant to limit this latter, but rather to empower and at the same time steer it 
towards a particular public goal, making it a regulatory tool itself.  
These dynamics appear clearly in the regulation of those economic sectors which have undergone a 
process of liberalisation in the last decades in Europe, whereby new regulations (should) affect 
activities which were earlier attributed to the administration rather than to private subjects. Needless to 
say, the concrete manifestations of regulated autonomy might be as diverse as those of private 
autonomy, and substantively change in different regulatory contexts. For instance, an ordoliberal state 
aims at protecting autonomy but at the same time infringes upon it whenever this might lead to the 
                                                     
2 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, University Press, 1999) 8. 
3 P. Barcellona, Intervento statale e autonomia privata nella disciplina dei rapporti economici (Milan, Giuffrè, 1969) 54. 
4 G. Ripert, ‘L’ordre économique et la liberté contractuelle’ in Recueil d’études sur les sources du droit en l’honneur de 
François Gény, II, Les sources générales des systèmes juridiques actuelles (Paris, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1934) 350, 
353. 
5 The topic of transformation is discussed by H.-W. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev, ‘The transformations of private law’, in this 
working paper. 




creation of a private power, elaborating a system of competition law; the welfare-state accepts that in 
order for everyone to enjoy a set of freedoms and social rights acknowledged by the state the 
autonomy of some individuals might be strongly limited; the market-state intends to expand the room 
of the market, but must counterbalance this with a series of duties posed on those individuals that 
perform functions once reserved to the public authority. While these issues have emerged and 
discussed in various countries throughout the whole last century, today’s clearest instance of such 
development is offered peculiarly in the context of the European Union. 
As such, interventions on regulated autonomy are more invasive of traditional public law limits on 
private autonomy. While these latter, as already pointed out, involve traditionally a yes/no regulatory 
answer, which admits or denies the legal validity of an expression of private autonomy regulated 
autonomy means a more subtle steering action, whereby the contract – and by consequence the 
economic behaviour of the parties – is conformed rather than censured. 
If autonomy is also traditionally considered as an expression of freedom, it is evident that regulation 
might be perilous in that respect. It is not a coincidence and it cannot be omitted that the capacity of 
the state to intrude and regulate private contracts with regulatory measures was most clearly 
recognised in those civil codifications inspired by state-centred ideologies,6 and that beliefs as to the 
importance of the state influenced, at least among other cultural influences, the leading reflexions on 
the limits of private autonomy7 in open contrast to liberal scholarly elaborations distrustful of 
economic steering by the state.8 In the historical development of the past century, the political flavour 
of the state action repeatedly and drastically changed, without a noticeable alteration in the structure of 
the legal instruments elaborated to legitimize state functionalization of private autonomy. In this sense, 
literature has already highlighted the risks connected to a debate as to the functionalization of 
individual autonomy, as it might offer the technical justifications for repression of individual freedoms 
in the name of general issues whose concrete determination would in the end be almost fully attributed 
to the discretion of the regulator. Facing this non-trivial risk and, in other terms, in order to ensure a 
balance between the otherwise opposed elements of autonomy and heteronomy, it is necessary that 
regulated autonomy as it is elaborated here incorporates further elements. An analysis of the judicial 
elaboration of the concept in the European courts reveals that those elements currently already include 
– at least potentially – the need that the intrusion on autonomy is justified and proportionate, as well as 
respectful of fundamental rights. Admittedly, these are categories which derive, and so far have been 
discussed, mainly in the realm of public law, while private law has been traditionally isolated from 
them, protected exactly by the principle of private autonomy, so that in practice the individual is 
allowed to do what is precluded of the state. It is neither necessary nor useful to mention once again 
the theoretical discussion as to the impossibility of clearly distinguish between public and private law, 
here it rather suffices to mention that such distinction is attenuated in the context of European law, as a 
consequence of the very hybrid nature of that regulatory system, which does not restrain from 
addressing directly private parties. In that context, the distinction has been nuanced to the level that the 
classical division between public and private seems to continuously flow into just a distinction 
between vertical and horizontal relationships, even if such a conversion may pose delicate questions of 
legitimacy and convenience.9 In this sense, some typically administrative and public law categories 
such as effectiveness, balancing and proportionality have been identified as emerging general 
                                                     
6 Notably, article 1339 of the Italian civil code of 1942 ‘Le clausole, i prezzi di beni o di servizi, imposti dalla legge o da 
norme corporative sono di diritto inseriti nel contratto, anche in sostituzione delle clausole difformi apposte dalle parti’. 
7 See for instance, E. Betti, Teoria generale del negozio giuridico (Torino) 1943. 
8 See G. Stolfi, Teoria generale del negozio giuridico (Padova) 1947. 
9 M. Claes, ‘The European Union, its Member States and their Citizens’, in The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law 
Relationships, D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds) (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 29-52. 
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principles of European civil law, which concur in ‘framing’ the principle of autonomy.10 Traces of this 
development are therefore visible and can be descriptively identified in the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. The normative and doctrinal elaboration should put a major emphasis 
on those aspects: to make one example, in particular fundamental rights, in this light, could be 
conceptualized instead of as pure external limits, as concomitant constitutive goals. 
A detailed analysis of these elements in the concept of regulated autonomy cannot be conducted here 
and must be left for another occasion, together with an analysis of the national scholarly discussion 
and a more accurate doctrinal elaboration of the concept. However, it is nonetheless important to 
highlight that these dynamics can be detected, even if they are not explicitly uttered, in the judicial 
treatment of private autonomy and regulation by the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is at 
the same time important to highlight that the transformation of private autonomy to regulated 
autonomy is not a process which is taking place solely in European Union and is not therefore a 
distinctive feature of the EU legal order only. As it has been touched upon earlier, the link between 
regulation and autonomy is an aspect which can be found in nation-states earlier and independently of 
EU law as well as in other jurisdictions outside Europe. Supposing a strong opposition between 
regulatory practices at both sides of the Atlantic, in particular, could easily be an excessive and 
possibly ideological representation.11 In the European context and in comparison with the member 
states, nonetheless, the law produced by the European Union is most clearly linked to the idea of 
regulated autonomy, more than the law of the member states, for the very reason that the EU, as a 
regulatory system, has taken over the competence of most of those specific areas of the economic 
system that are considered as in a particular need of regulation. In the European Union, at any rate, 
another and crucial reason for functionalization of autonomy is added: the creation of a well-
functioning internal market. It can be affirmed that historically the purpose of establishing internal 
markets has been always present also in the development of unified national systems of private law, 
but the degree of functionalization of autonomy required by a liberal bourgeois state was certainly 
different from the one requested by contemporary regulatory states. 
This contribution therefore limits itself to sketching out the contours of regulated autonomy in the 
European Union as it has been developed in a series of decisions of the Court of Justice. In so doing, 
the contribution deals only with one – though crucial – aspect of regulated autonomy, i.e. its quasi-
constitutional dimension in the normative architecture of Europe and how it stands in relation to the 
general objectives of the Union as well as fundamental rights. 
Extension and limitation 
As touched upon, the most characteristic feature of regulated autonomy in the law of the European 
Union is the co-existence in it of two elements, extension and limitation, which represent the 
projection of the categories of autonomy and regulation in the context of the European internal market. 
While most literature as well as political and social debates about European law focuses alternatively 
on one of those two elements, highlighting either the liberal connotation or the intrusive character on 
individual freedoms of that law, it is submitted here that those two readings need to be integrated in 
order to illustrate the whole picture. The recognition of personal and economic freedoms is not 
absolute but has a necessary complement in the regulation of those freedoms. In private law 
categories, that autonomy that individuals enjoy under the granted freedoms requires particular 
regulations, not only to be counter-balanced, but also to be constituted. 
                                                     
10 N Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014) 
11 See the considerations in D Caruso, ‘Black Lists and Private Autonomy in EU Contract Law’, in The Involvement of EU 
Law in Private Law Relationships, D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds) 291-316, 298-301. 




There are various ways in which it can be spoken of an extension of private autonomy. The first 
extension of autonomy is brought about through its stretching beyond the national borders:12 the 
recognition of the four freedoms entail the possibility for parties to enter in economic transactions with 
a much wider number of individuals around Europe. In this sense, a direct link is established between 
the four freedom and freedom of contract, and, as a scholar of the internal-market may characterize it, 
‘If a party wishes to enter the market of a certain Member State, that is another way of saying that he 
or she wishes to conclude contracts with persons within that market’.13 In any case, not only the four 
freedoms have this goal, but even much of the projects of directives and regulations with the clearest 
implications for private law are justified by the need of giving businesses and consumers in Europe a 
better chance to contract across borders, as it most remarkably was the case of the proposed Common 
European Sales Law. More importantly, however, extension has involved so far an elimination of rules 
constraining private economic freedom, allowing individuals to engage in activities that were earlier 
precluded or limited. In this sense, the first extension-aspect of regulated autonomy in the EU mostly 
consists in ‘liberalisation’, that is to say the recognition of the possibility for the private to perform 
activities that were previously reserved to the public sector. Examples of these activities are very 
numerous and inhomogeneous: communications, energy, transport, financial services and even, more 
recently, health care. It is self-evident that while those sectors become liberalised they also need to be 
regulated for a series of different reasons. 
In this sense, while they have been liberalised, those sectors have become more or less deeply 
regulated, although it is matter of political debate whether those rules are so far adequate for that 
purpose. While this kind of regulation is sectorial, it has a few common features, such as, for instance, 
the demand to establish independent authorities in the liberalised fields or to establish ADR 
mechanisms to solve possible disputes arising in that area especially b2c relations. Regulation, 
however, does not limit itself to the institutional organisation of those activities, and rather strongly 
impacts private law relationships. Examples are numerous and include provisions that cover the scope 
of the relevant manifestations of the traditional concept of private autonomy, notably the person with 
whom to contract (the case of access to universal services) the contents of the contract, even including 
its economic contents. Incidentally it can also be noticed that even an apparently restrictive measure 
may have on the contrary a deregulatory effect, as might be the case with black-lists of prohibited 
contract terms, such as those laid down in the annex of the Unfair Terms directive. According to a 
view,14 these might one day even engender oppositions based on efficiency concerns and consequently 
lead to the establishment of a more liberal legal framework than the status quo ante. But even without 
considering future political developments, it is clear that laying down mandatory rules might be an 
appropriate market-design tool to define a contrario a wider sphere of legitimate activities, while the 
imposition of duties on one parties might have the effect of including in the market categories of 
subjects who would otherwise be excluded, extending the autonomy of these latter, as in the case of 
non-discrimination. For these reasons too, it is necessary to consider mandatory rules not as the simple 
rejection of autonomy, but rather as just one side of the coin of regulated autonomy. 
It would also be erroneous to assume that the primary role of EU law in the internal market has been 
the deregulation of each and every sector. The Court of Justice in particular has not always been keen 
to interpret the market freedoms as to produce a full liberalization of particular activities which are the 
                                                     
12 P.-C. Müller-Graff, ‘Basic Freedoms – Extending Party Autonomy across Borders’ in Party Autonomy and the role of 
Information in the Internal Market, S. Grundmann, W. Kerber, S. Weatherill (eds) (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2001) 133-
150. 
13 G. Davies, ‘Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Effect of Free Movement Law’, in The Involvement of EU Law in 
Private Law Relationships, D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds) 53. 
14 D Caruso, ‘Black Lists and Private Autonomy in EU Contract Law’, in The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law 
Relationships, D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds) (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 291-316. 
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object of strict regulation in Member States due to their public relevance or nature and which are 
therefore protected by the public interest proviso.15 
Similar developments are so relevant that they could be considered hardly justifiable if they were not 
anchored in a particular legal and even constitutional framework, in which this kind of regulated 
autonomy is, if not recognised, at least protected under super-primary rules. Such recognition too 
represents a form of extension since, at least theoretically, it safeguards autonomy at the constitutional 
level. In reality, such quasi-constitutionalisation leads to the necessity of counter-balancing that 
principle with other fundamental rights, which, in concrete, has an opposite effect than the one that 
some advocates of constitutionalisation of private autonomy might aspire to. For the purposes of the 
paper, therefore, the attention will now turn to the evolution of the concept in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice which has contributed to vest regulated autonomy with a quasi-constitutional status.16 
Evolution of a concept in the CJEU case-law 
The constitutionalisation of private autonomy has already taken place in several countries, even if with 
substantial differences, and the constitutional status of autonomy has been discussed also with regard 
to the legal architecture of the European Union.17 The term ‘constitutionalisation’ can indeed 
encompass such a high number of solutions that in the end it even appears as misleading. So for 
example, the idea that private autonomy is a principle which should be protected from the State being 
laid down in national constitutions is a liberal one, which in the conceptualization of the German 
Ordoliberal School nonetheless admits strong intrusions by the state when this is necessary to avoid 
the concentration of private power. But it is exactly in Germany that constitutionalisation of autonomy 
was judicially acknowledged in a completely different fashion, as protection of private autonomy by 
the State in light of the principle of social state. When discussing the issue in the context of European 
Union law, it is therefore not enough to refer to the more or less recognised link between private 
autonomy and the constitutional freedoms – recognised most clearly very recently by the Court of 
Justice in the Sky Österreich case – but is also necessary to highlight what kind of autonomy this is 
and in which terms this is linked to the overarching constitutional dimension. The hypothesis here is 
that at the European level private autonomy gets quasi-constitutionalised in order to be extended, both 
in its merely geographical dimension and in its economic function, but that in this way it can be 
legitimately counter-balanced by a series of regulatory limitations which are realised with the intent to 
promote a well-functioning internal market. Its inclusion at the super-primary level, covered by the 
freedom to pursue a business and on a same footing with market freedoms and fundamental rights, 
does not really amount to a consecration, but rather makes it a principle which necessarily has to be 
not only counter-balanced by fundamental freedoms and rights, but more importantly construed in 
light of those freedoms and rights. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
incoherent as it may be over a long period of time, offers nonetheless sufficient elements to read this 
development in the terms mentioned. As such, the concrete qualification of regulated autonomy seems 
to diverge from constitutionalised private autonomy both in, to mention but a few, its ordoliberal and 
welfarist reconstruction at the national level. 
This is not to say that the European legal concepts are radically new in respect to national law, quite to 
the contrary, while a few general principles of EU law are original and got then implemented in 
national law, when it comes to typically private law concepts, those which are employed at the 
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European level are mostly drawn from the experience of the Member States, as the case of the 
categories of the ‘general principles of civil law’ almost incidentally introduced by the CJEU18 and 
passionately debated by scholars19 exemplifies. When these are re-transferred to the Member States, 
however, those have already undergone a functionalization, as they have been interpreted with a view 
to make them comply with the regulatory framework and the policy objectives of the European 
Communities first and the Union later. Against this background, European private law appears to 
distance itself from its national counterparts in being function-oriented and therefore developing its 
own set of principles and methodologies.20 Instances for this process will be offered and highlighted. It 
must be recalled that autonomy is a dynamic concept whose concrete contents and contours might 
easily vary. If regulated autonomy is the functionalization of private autonomy in light of regulatory 
aims, it is self-evident that the concept changes as also those regulatory aims evolve. Again, European 
law offers the clearest instance for this, as in the history of European integration the number and 
nature of competences and policies of the supranational institutions have changed over the years. This 
is mostly the reason why, in a large period of time of sixty years, different forms or even generations 
of regulatory interventions on autonomy can be recognised. In all circumstances, for sure the same 
basic dynamic of extension-restriction can be identified, even if expressed in different ways. 
Marketization 
Regulated autonomy in Europe has mostly been an instrument for the construction of the common 
market first and the internal market later. In this sense, it makes sense to speak of a marketization of 
private autonomy, which also emerges if one considers the way in which this concept has been linked 
to the constitutional framework, i.e. associating it to market freedoms, which to a certain extent 
contrasts to those national contexts in which the principle rather assumed a stronger political and 
personalistic flavour. The establishment of the common market, which involved first a negative and 
then a positive phase, presupposes a coordination of the individual economic activities through a 
control on their private agreement in the same way in which it requires abolishment of barriers of trade 
and levies. In particular, the Court soon started addressing the issue from a constitutional perspective, 
already for the reason that the referring courts from Member States lamenting violations of the private 
autonomy of businesses referred to the constitutional nature of that concept in their national 
jurisdiction. More specifically, the typical manifestations of private autonomy got covered by the 
freedom to pursue a trade or profession, which, as the Court would articulate in a clearer way only 
later in the case Jean Neu ‘includes, as a specific expression of that freedom, the freedom to choose 
whom to do business with’21 and, more explicitly in the much later Sky Österreich case, ‘covers the 
freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free 
competition’.22 This development appears most clearly in the Nold case of 1974,23 originated when a 
                                                     
18 Société thermale d’Eugénie-les-Bains v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
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19 Among others, S. Weatherill, ‘The “principles of civil law” as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’ 6(1) European 
Review of Contract Law (2010) 74; A.S. Hartkamp, ‘The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law’, 75 RabelsZ 
241 (2011); M.W. Hesselink, ‘The General Principles of Civil Law: their Nature, Roles and Legitimacy’ in The 
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21 Jean Neu and others v. Secrétaire d’Etat à l’Agriculture et à la Viticulture, 1991 I-03617, joined 
cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 (10/7/1991) para. 13. 
22 Sky Österreich GmbH v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Case C-283/11 (22/1/2013) para. 42 
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German undertaking complained that European measures, in particular a decision of the Commission, 
authorizing the terms of business of a new coal dealing company was violating its economic freedom 
protected in Articles 2(1) (personal freedom, considered as protecting private autonomy) and 14 
(property) of the German Constitution. While the question was referred in terms which reveal a 
traditional liberal understanding of autonomy as a negative freedom from the State – or looking at it in 
a slightly different sense: an ordoliberal one, since it was lamented that the administration did 
authorize a restrictive terms therefore not hampering the restriction of competition by a ‘private 
power’ – the Court of Justice, following the eloquent opinion of its Advocate General Trabucchi, 
rejected the argument sustaining that, if that claim were accepted, then the Communities would have 
no power at all to regulate the market, which was on the contrary the objective of the decision.  
At the same time, while the European judges recognised the link between some manifestations of 
autonomy and freedom of trade, they singled out the reasons which can justify restrictions of that 
freedom. This argument became widespread and was almost literally followed in all successive 
judgments of the Court on freedom of trade: after recalling that fundamental rights are part of the 
general principles of law which are binding in European law, the European judges considered that 
even ‘if rights of ownership are protected by the constitutional laws of all the Member States and if 
similar guarantees are given in respect of their right freely to choose and practice their trade or 
profession, the rights thereby guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be 
viewed in the light of the social function of the property and activities protected thereunder. For this 
reason, rights of this nature are protected by law subject always to limitations laid down in accordance 
with the public interest. Within the community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights 
should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the 
Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched’.24 It can be noticed in the 
formula employed by the Court that this is expressed in terms which are corresponding to the 
constitutional tradition of the Member States: in particular the reference to the need to read freedom of 
trade ‘in the light of the social function of the property’ takes its roots in a well-established 
achievement of European post-War constitutionalism, already expressed several times by national 
constitutional courts. Again, however, the concrete meaning of that social function – which was 
already interpreted in very different ways in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Member States – 
assumes a particular flavour, as it coincides with the ‘overall objectives pursued by the Community’. 
In the following years, the Court of Justice relied strongly on this formula, more often than not 
accepting the legitimacy of any regulatory intervention of the European institutions as long as this was 
justified by the need to reach one of the policy objectives of the Union. The extension of private 
autonomy is carried out at the highest possible level: its constitutional dimension is recognised, but 
this does not involve its supremacy but rather implies the need for it to be read on an equal footing – 
guided just by a test of proportionality – to a series of regulatory goals which, on the other hand, may 
legitimize a restriction – or rather a functionalization – of individual freedom of contract. The 
developments of the freedom of trade as taken by the Court of Justice from the national level and 
functionalised in light of the common market are well-known, and led directly to the inclusion in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of a freedom to conduct a business,25 which became the protagonist of 
much of the most remarkable developments in the judicial treatment of private autonomy in the 
European Union. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
23 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, 1974 00491, Case 4/73 
(14/5/1974). 
24 Nold, para.14. 
25 On the right to conduct a business, D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights: In Search of Social Justice 
or Private Autonomy in EU Law?’171 and P. Oliver, ‘What Purpose Does Article 16 of the Charter Serve?’, 281, both in 
General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law, U. Bernitz, X. Groussot, F. Schulyok (ed.) (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer, 2013). 




The marketization of autonomy, that is to say the construction of private autonomy in light of the 
overall objective of building up a common or later an internal market, does not fully coincide with the 
liberal and ordoliberal understandings of the role of the state vis-à-vis the economy, since it admits a 
stronger regulatory function than in the traditional liberal or even ordoliberal understanding: it ensures 
competition is one of the objectives of the European regulator and therefore represents a legitimate 
means of steering of regulated autonomy, but at the same time implies more than that, and comprises, 
as later cases such as Hauer26 show, in general the ‘common organisation of the market’.27 Such a 
strong economic flavour and re-reading of the principle of autonomy and even of freedom of trade 
then have a direct impact in the evolution of analogous concepts employed at the national level: in this 
sense, even the principle that economic activities have to be read in light of the ‘social function’, 
started to be construed in national law taking into account the development of the concept at the 
European level. In this sense, the constitutionalisation of regulated autonomy at the European level 
differs from the economic liberal and ordoliberal approach, but even in a more dramatic way from the 
welfarist constitutionalisation of autonomy, as it has been performed in particular by the German 
constitutional court. It is self-evident that marketization would entail huge risks if it led to emphasize 
the economic character of autonomy over other aspects, and the interpreter would be left without 
appropriate doctrinal instruments to prevent a drift towards a full victory of economic rationality over 
other rationalities. To avoid this non-hypothetical risk, regulated autonomy must be read in light not 
only of market freedoms but also of fundamental non-economic rights. 
Social Fundamental Rights 
The impact of fundamental rights in the development of European private law has been extensively 
discussed in the literature, and cases such as Schmidberger28 and Omega29 account for well-known 
instances of the role that fundamental-rights-reasoning can have on national rules and, indirectly on 
contract law. In cases such these as the scholars have highlighted, the four freedoms must be 
counterbalanced by fundamental rights, which have been considered to lie on the same hierarchical 
level. The equal footing of the two possible opposed principles also means, nonetheless, that the 
fundamental rights do not always prevail, and indeed the case-law of the Court also lists examples of 
the other situation in which the four freedoms take the upper hand, with cases such as Viking30 and 
Laval31 being only the most famous and controversial, as they involve social fundamental rights. 
While the Court is famous for employing fundamental rights in its reasoning, and the most visible 
developments in that respect can be seen in the famous Kadi case,32 in the realm of private law this 
development has been more nuanced. First of all, it can be noted that, as famous cases like Omega and 
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28 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich, 2003 I-05659, Case C-112/00 
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30 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 
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less famous ones like Mesopotamia/Roj TV33 reveal, the Court might have now developed a less 
interventionist approach which tends to respect fundamental rights as they are qualified at national 
level and recognised at the European one as well, ‘translating’ nationally protected interests into 
European values34 and trying to avoid interference between European legislation and national 
constitutional interests. 
Included in the protection offered by the freedom to pursue a business, private autonomy needs to be 
calibrated against other occasionally conflicting fundamental rights. Spain and Finland v. the 
European Parliament and Council35 offers an example of this. The case had for its object the 
European regulations on the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities, 
which was considered by Spain and Finland as being in violation of the principle of freedom to pursue 
a business in as much as they disproportionally limited the autonomy of self-employed drivers. The 
directive in object had certainly the scope of building a common normative framework for the market 
of road transport in Europe, but in doing this it pursued also further objectives which are not inherently 
connected to the one of market building, in particular pursuing road safety and health. All these 
objectives are combined, as in the reasoning of the court the directive contributes ‘to realizing the 
objectives of road safety and alignment of conditions of competition’.36 In particular Spain sustained 
that the conditions of employed workers, for which stronger intrusions on autonomy might be 
justified, should be distinguished from the one of self-employed, for which on the contrary European 
rules appear as excessively intrusive. In judging the directive legitimate, the Court referred again to 
the traditional formula according to which ‘freedoms are not absolute rights, however, but must be 
considered in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on their 
exercise provided that the restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute 
in relation to the aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very 
substance of the rights guaranteed’.37 As the Treaties offer autonomous bases to qualify the protection 
of public health as a legitimate policy aim of the Union – primarily Art 168 and 9 TFEU – the 
balancing was not explicitly uttered in terms of a balancing between opposite fundamental rights. 
Considering cases dealing with more typical private law issues, references to fundamental rights are 
scarcer in the jurisprudence of the Court. This might certainly be due to the fact that only since the 
Treaty of Lisbon the European legal order has a clear list of explicitly formulated and legally binding 
fundamental rights at its disposition, but there appears to be more substantive explanations as well. In 
a first sense, this might be a question of competences. Looking at how the judiciary employs 
fundamental rights in private law cases, it appears that these are used to achieve ‘just’ results, in a way 
contributing to elaborating a social contract law; but the European architecture is to a large extent still 
dependent on the traditional distinction of competences which allocates social issues at the level of the 
member states. This could be confirmed by the fact that even after the entering into force of the 
Charter, the situation does not seem to have changed a lot, and the Court still seems to instil 
constitutional values in typically private law cases (differently than, for instance, in labour law or even 
non-discrimination law cases) in a disguised way. The clearest instance of this appears to be the recent 
and already famous Aziz case,38 in which the Court, interpreting the unfair terms directive, dealt with a 
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worryingly prominent social problem linked to the consequences of financial crisis in several 
European countries, i.e. the eviction of insolvent consumers from their homes. Even in the astonishing 
lack to any reference to the constitutional value of a right to housing, the Court stated that its 
interpretation ‘applies all the more strongly where, as in the main proceedings, the mortgaged property 
is the family home of the consumer whose rights have been infringed, since that means of consumer 
protection is limited to payment of damages and interest and does not make it possible to prevent the 
definitive and irreversible loss of that dwelling’.39 
If on the one hand these references show how humble the Court is in explicitly reading private 
autonomy in light of a welfarist principle through the employment of social fundamental rights in a 
manner similar to the German Constitutional Court, on the other hand it shows that ‘marketization’ 
may not be the only feature of regulated autonomy. Also non-market policy objectives may contribute 
to the functionalization of a private autonomy which, if on the one hand is expanded in the larger 
internal market, on the other hand necessitates stronger regulatory approach. Admittedly, this is in a 
far less developed phase than marketization is, probably due to the above-mentioned matter of division 
of competences as well as other institutional issues concerning the applicability of the Charter in its 
social part. In particular, under the pressure of solving the problems linked to the economic crisis, 
there might be however room for surprising developments in this area. A clear sign of this is the 
opinion of the Advocate General in a case originating from Slovakia involving, again, unfair terms in 
consumer credit agreements and public auctions. The Advocate General, in more explicit terms than 
the ones employed by the Court in the Aziz case, noticed that ‘where the property concerned by the 
procedure at issue is the consumer’s home, there must be specific guarantees. Failure to provide such 
guarantees may prove problematic from a fundamental rights perspective. Indeed, the loss of a family 
home is one of the most extreme forms of interference with the rights of the consumer. As respect for 
the home is a right guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, in the light of which Directive 93/13 must be interpreted, any person at risk of an interference 
of this magnitude should be able to have the proportionality of such a measure reviewed by an 
independent judicial body’.40 
Regulating the Information Society 
Even the provisions contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights can be therefore employed as 
regulatory tools. If their employment to instil in private law relationships considerations of social 
justice such as the protection of the dwelling is less developed than it is with regard to other policy 
objectives, fundamental rights might also be employed to structure the market in particular sectors. 
This would suggest that in their relation to private autonomy fundamental rights should not be 
understood as mere external limits but as more pervasive elements. As the focus of this paper is 
limited to the constitutional development of regulated autonomy in Europe, the clearest example of 
this tendency is offered in the area of the so called information society. This represents not only a 
technological development with huge social consequences, but certainly also a new and pivotal aspect 
of the internal market. The Commission itself recognised the information society as the new frontier of 
the internal market,41 identifying the policy instruments to build and regulate that sector of the market 
with the goal of promoting ‘a competitive environment’, characterised by the liberalization of the 
infrastructure of the telecommunications sector, standardization and interoperability, and also through 
the design of new intellectual property rights measures.42 The impact of such measures on private 
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autonomy is enormous and the recent case-law of the Court of Justice on the point highlights the role 
of regulated autonomy in this field. 
The series of cases on copyright law including cases such as Promusicae,43 Scarlet44 and Netlog45 is 
well-known as it has, rightly, attracted the attention of private law and fundamental rights scholars. 
The constitutionalization of the legal discourse on copyright law is certainly co-determined by the 
reference contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which explicitly mentions the need to 
protect intellectual property46 and therefore makes it on the one hand necessary to frame in 
constitutional terms any exception or limitation to that principle, but on the other hand permits a 
clearer judicial balancing of different rights and policy objectives in the information society. 
While the recognition of the freedom to pursue a business, inasmuch as it constitutionalizes at least 
partially the economic individual autonomy, could be read as the triumph of a liberal understanding of 
the economic freedoms, the cases in the area of the information society on the contrary reveal how that 
principle might be employed against other economic rights with the double function of both protecting 
individual rights and shaping the information market. Already the first instance is quite striking, since 
the traditional preconception, reinforced by the case-law described here, about the relation between 
private autonomy and freedom of trade would lead to think that these stand necessarily in contrast to 
other fundamental rights, especially social rights. That tension indeed characterised the series of cases 
dealt with by the Court of Justice of which some examples have been shown here, whose outcome has 
nonetheless been non-univocal, since the starting point employed by the court was not the preference 
for the economic or the social right, but rather the specific function of those rights in the particular 
context of the European internal market. The same functionalist approach – which takes its starting 
point in the hierarchical equivalence of market freedoms and fundamental rights and then solves that 
contrasts in light of their function in the market47 – has led to quite diverse results in the magmatic 
area of the information society, which is a market which to a large extent still needs to be structured 
and which also represent an area in which rapid technological evolution – by itself already one of the 
triggers of the transformation of private law in recent years – make it on the one side very easy for 
fundamental rights to be infringed and on the other hand exposes regulatory measures to a high risk of 
quick obsolescence. In as much as it increases the powers of the judiciary, constitutionalization might 
even be thought of as a possibly efficient regulatory technique itself. 
In this sense, the judicial treatment of the freedom to conduct a business, to which the category of 
private autonomy is usually associated, has led to distinct outcomes in a series of cases also in the area 
of intellectual property law. In Scarlet and soon later in Netlog the European Court employed freedom 
to conduct a business ‘in support’ of personal rights such as the date of the users, sustaining that 
obliging an internet services provider to install a particular, possibly expensive and ineffective, 
technology to prevent copyright violations limiting the rights of the users would amount to an 
infringement of the economic freedoms of the provider. Combining different policy goals – framed in 
terms of constitutional rights – such as protection of intellectual property, freedom of trade and 
protection of user data, the decision leads to affirm that the protection of copyright cannot go as far as 
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giving copyright holders the right to demand internet services providers to disclose users’ data, which 
therefore enjoy a particular protection.  
Further analysing the use of fundamental rights in judicial discourse, it can be noticed that the decision 
was certainly facilitated by the fact that the norms of the directive already sanction that the measures 
set up by Member States to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be ‘fair and 
equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly’,48 so that evaluating those requirement 
is already attributed to the competence of the judge even without the necessity of framing the problem 
in constitutional terms.49 For our purposes another aspect related to constitutionalisation is nonetheless 
worth noting: while the referring court qualified the problem as a conflict between intellectual 
property protection on the one side and personal data protection on the other side (covered by the 
articles of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to respect for personal life and 
freedom of expression), the Court autonomously went a step further, referring to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and introducing in its balancing a new element, indeed freedom to conduct a 
business, so that the balancing now requires to consider ‘on the one hand, the protection of the 
intellectual property right enjoyed by copyright holders, and, on the other hand, that of the freedom to 
conduct business enjoyed by operators such as ISPs’.50  
It was therefore the Court by its own motion that, acknowledging the impact of the issues at stake on 
freedom of trade, attributed to the case a more evident market-structuring function. This inclusion 
leads to consider the role of private autonomy as a regulatory medium to ensure the balancing of 
different policies and rights: the question does not just concern the degree to which personal users data 
should be protected, but also what is the role of private autonomy in this context, i.e. to what extent a 
private subject can be charged with and made responsible to achieve policy objectives. In the concrete 
situation, what is the room of autonomy of the internet service provider and how should it be expected 
to act to ensure that either intellectual property or user data are protected. In including the freedom to 
pursue a business which, as already said, is the constitutional coverage of private autonomy, the Court 
appears to have identified this pivotal aspect of the case. Protecting the autonomy of the internet 
service provider, the Court reaches the result of also protecting something else, which is users’ data. 
The most outspoken conceptualization of the role of private autonomy in this context will nonetheless 
come a few years later, in a case arising in another field of the information society, i.e. TV 
broadcasting. The EU had already been active in the area of TV broadcasting since several years, 
issuing firstly the well-known Television without frontiers Directive51 and later, repealing the former, 
the new Audiovisual Media Services Directive.52 These directives were already the focus of other 
judgments which are also relevant in the fundamental rights perspective such as, for instance, the 
Mesopotamia case which led the Court to consider, again, what is the place of human dignity in the 
common market, and more concretely if infringements of the understanding of human dignity in a 
Member State may legitimately limit the freedom of broadcasting information in the whole of Europe 
– a freedom which clearly extends broadcasters’ autonomy – which was a question eventually 
answered in the affirmative by the Court consistently with the approach taken in Omega. 
It is however only in 2013 that the Court of Justice expressly took into account the role of private 
autonomy in a judgment involving the broadcasting directive and conceptualized its relation with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the policy objectives of the Union in the clearest terms. The Sky 
case concerns the right of TV broadcasters to produce short news reports of events of public interest 
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using audio-visual material of other broadcasters. The directive reads that ‘for the purpose of short 
news reports, any broadcaster established in the Union has access on a fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory basis to events of high interest to the public which are transmitted on an exclusive basis 
by a broadcaster under their jurisdiction’,53 and such right is established out of a particular policy 
objective which is also strictly enshrined in fundamental rights: ‘to safeguard the fundamental freedom 
to receive information and to ensure that the interests of viewers in the Union are fully and properly 
protected’.54 This right created nonetheless controversy since the directive also provides that the right 
should be granted for free, something which was considered unacceptable by the TV broadcaster Sky, 
which lamented that such a rule was too intrusive of its economic freedom. The Court nonetheless 
rejected Sky’s claim, on the basis of the argument that European rules were meant to give application 
to fundamental rights which have to prevail over the contractual freedom which is covered, as the 
Court explicitly notes, by the freedom to conduct a business. The limitation on contract freedom is 
justified ‘In the light, first, of the importance of safeguarding the fundamental freedom to receive 
information and the freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter and, 
second, of the protection of the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the 
Charter, the European Union legislature was entitled to adopt rules such as those laid down in Article 
15 of Directive 2010/13, which limit the freedom to conduct a business, and to give priority, in the 
necessary balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to information over contractual 
freedom’.55 
The tendency of the Court to make balancing and evaluate autonomy in light of the particular 
economic sector and context in which this operates emerges also in its judgment from the Court’s 
attention to the economic reality of the audio-visual market, considering for instance that remuneration 
is excluded by the European rules only for the realization of reports for general news programmes, but 
not also for entertainment programmes, ‘which have a much greater economic impact than general 
news programmes’.56 
Here, the dynamics of regulated autonomy emerge very clearly. In the first place, private autonomy is 
directly linked to a constitutional provision expressed in market-oriented terms – the freedom to 
conduct a business – but as such it is made object of a series of limitations in light of other 
fundamental rights and, as a result of that construction, it becomes an instrument of regulation of the 
market. The rule of the directive which strongly impacts on private autonomy has indeed the clear 
function of creating an internal market of the information characterized by pluralism and competition 
so that, in order to do this, it grants that all operators in the Union have equal access on a fair and non-
discriminatory basis. At the same time, the rules on the right to produce short news reports represent 
the recognition in this area of a universal service obligation, which is a key element in the construction 
of liberalised market such as the one discussed here: operators have, at certain conditions, to ensure 
that some services which have a particular relevance or even a constitutional dimension, such as in this 
case the right to receive information, are granted to all users/citizens even when this appears to be 
economically non-profitable. In doing so, these rules impact on even the most typical area in which 
traditional private law grants (almost) full freedom to parties, that is the determination of the economic 
content of the agreement, which is now on the contrary affected by regulatory measures. Such is a 
counter-balance to the extension of autonomy granted by the establishment of a liberalised internal 
market which goes to the core of the balance extension/limitation of regulated autonomy.  
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The contextual extension and limitation of the room of contractual freedom of individuals, to which 
new economic possibilities are offered but who at the same time have to accept strong intrusions to 
their economic liberty in order to conform to the objectives – both economic and, yet to a quite 
different extent, non-economic – of the legal order, is denoted in this paper as a regulated autonomy. 
The term ‘regulated’ refers to the idea of autonomy not only as something which gets limited but that 
also serves as a regulatory tool. The analysis here has focused entirely on the law of the European 
Union and more specifically on its interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This 
is not to say that regulated autonomy is exclusively a European Union concept, and quite to the 
contrary, national scholarship during most of the past century has investigated the impact of the 
steering function of the state on personal autonomy and the concept of functionalization of private law. 
In some private law codifications, tool which were meant to open up the inner rationality of private 
law to the needs of market regulation were already explicitly included. As it was not suggested here 
that regulated autonomy is an EU invention, this was not the place for analysing the development of 
that idea at the national level. What characterizes European regulated autonomy is nonetheless the 
peculiarity of its regulatory framework and the policy objectives that this pursues. European rules have 
a strong impact on private law relations, even when these are not meant to primarily address them, but 
those measures are meant to achieve a distinctive set of policy objectives, which have certainly 
undergone transformation during the years, but that in general could be summarized as the creation of 
an internal market. To achieve this goal, private autonomy gets on the one hand extended, as 
regulation is meant to construct and enlarge a market in which all operators have an equal access on a 
non-discriminatory base, but on the other hand gets subjected to a series of measures which in a 
traditional private law perspective are qualified as limitations of it, and which notably include a 
growing necessity to respect fundamental rights which, in this context, appear as both objectives and 
means of regulation. While these can be identified as the general features of regulated autonomy, its 
more concrete characteristics need to be addressed and analysed in each and every sector of the market 
in which it operates.  
To introduce the concept and highlight its institutional significance, as a link between private law and 
the institutional system, this contribution has looked in particular at the constitutional dimension of 
regulated autonomy. To be sure, the idea that private autonomy should be constitutionalised, which 
has already led to noteworthy outcomes in a number of European and non-European countries, must 
be read in its specific economic and ideological dimension, or, more correctly, in its several possible 
ideological dimensions. This short overview of the case-law of the Court of Justice reveals that even if 
private autonomy is not constitutionalised in explicit terms, the Court has nonetheless already granted 
at least a certain degree of constitutional anchorage to the concept, which has mostly happened 
through the freedom to conduct a business. Such quasi-constitutional qualification reveals on the one 
hand the linkage of a concept – private autonomy – which has strong political and moral 
underpinnings to an explicitly market-oriented dimension – the right to conduct business – but at the 
same time justifies the possibility to functionalize that concept not only to achieve the traditional 
policy objectives of the Union, but also to infuse fundamental rights in private law reasoning. These 
developments can lead to diverse conceptualizations of the relation between private autonomy and 
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A Socio-Legal Study on the Operation of Hybrid Collective Remedies in the Area of 
European Social Regulation 
Betül Kas 
Introduction 
The aim of this research project is to investigate the interplay between the European and the national 
level in shaping collective remedies within the area of European social regulation. This progress report 
will set out the conceptual background of the research project, the methodological approach chosen 
and the current stage of research. However, the report will refrain from analyzing the detailed 
empirical findings collected until now.  
Traditionally, under the principles of procedural and remedial autonomy, the European legal order left 
it to the Member States to designate the appropriate institutions and to define the appropriate remedies 
for the enforcement of European law, provided that they comply with the principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence. The standard formula in secondary Union law required that Member States introduce 
effective, proportionate and deterrent national remedies for the enforcement of rights granted under the 
respective instrument. However, it was argued that the principle of procedural autonomy has lost its 
relevance as the European Union is exerting more and more influence on the national enforcement 
structures by borrowing its competence in enforcement matters from the respective subject related 
substantive area at stake. Also the Court of Justice of the European Union took a prominent role in 
intervening into the procedural autonomy of the Member States and in creating new remedies.1 
Consequently, the trend of restricting the freedom of the Member States to construct their judicial and 
administrative enforcement mechanisms takes a rather patchy and fragmented approach, with the 
degree of interference depending on the substantive are at stake.  
For many years, it seemed that the European Commission was not prepared to intervene in the 
regulation of collective judicial enforcement beyond injunctive relief. The process was slow and 
initially restricted to the areas of competition and consumer law. In 2005, the Commission adopted a 
Green Paper on antitrust damages actions2 and in 2008, a White Paper, which included policy 
suggestions on antitrust-specific collective redress.3 In the same year, the Commission also published 
a Green Paper on consumer collective redress4, followed by public consultation ‘Towards a more 
coherent European approach to collective redress’ in 2011.5 On 2 February 2012 the European 
Parliament adopted the resolution ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’, in 
                                                     
1 E. Storskrubb, "Civil Justice - A Newcomer and an Unstoppable Wave?," in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. 
de Burca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); J. Delicostopoulos, "Towards European Procedural Primacy in 
National Legal Systems," European Law Journal 9(2003); C.N. Kakouris, "Do the Member States possess Judicial 
Procedural Autonomy," Common Market Law Review 34(1997); M. Bobek, "Why there is no Principle of "Procedural 
Autonomy" of the Member States", in The ECJ and the Autonomy of the Member States, ed. B. de Witte and H.W. 
Micklitz (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2011), 305. 
2 COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005. 
3 COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008. 
4 COM(2008) 794, 27.11.2008. 
5 COM(2010) 135 final, 31.3.2010. 
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which it called for any proposal in the field of collective redress to take the form of a horizontal 
framework including a common set of principles providing uniform access to justice via collective 
redress within the Union and specifically but not exclusively dealing with the infringement of 
consumer rights. The resolution stressed the need to take due account of the legal traditions and legal 
orders of the individual Member States and enhance the coordination of good practices between 
Member States.6 On 11 June 2013 the Commission adopted Recommendation 2013/396/EU on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member 
States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law.7 The recommendation covers all the 
situations where the breach of rules established at Union level has caused or is likely to cause 
prejudice to natural and legal person. It aims to ensure a coherent horizontal approach to collective 
redress in the European Union without harmonizing Member States' systems. While the principles set 
out in the recommendation are non-binding, it should be remembered that in Alassini8, the CJEU 
rendered the seven principles of Recommendation 98/257 applicable to the bodies responsible for out-
of-court settlement of consumer disputes9 obligatory in case of compulsory ADR-procedures.10  
Consequently, the European influence on collective judicial enforcement mechanisms is constituted by 
a patchy mix of binding and non-binding, horizontal and vertical, rules and principles at different 
levels. The Member States are required to fill the gaps left by the European regulatory framework in 
such a way as to ensure the effective judicial protection of rights granted under Union law. The 
research project argues that the interplay between the European and the national level in the shaping of 
collective remedies leads to hybridization. Hybridity means that the legal character of the respective 
collective remedy is neither European nor national but merges elements of both legal orders.11 In order 
to examine the outlook and the implications of hybrid collective remedies, the research project will 
reconstruct three specific case-studies. They are constituted by three preliminary ruling procedures in 
the area of European social regulation, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union in co-
operation with the national actors and courts established a hybrid collective remedy.  
The conceptual background 
The traditional view: Procedural autonomy 
The traditional view on the enforcement of European law is the following: The European enforcement 
system is based on the concept of ‘executive federalism’, meaning that the substantive rules adopted 
by the European Union are applied and enforced by the national courts and the national public 
authorities.12 This decentralized enforcement structure is crucial for the European enforcement system 
as the protection offered by the centralised enforcement instruments, constituted by the infringement 
procedure under Articles 258 TFEU and the annulment procedure under Article 263 TFEU, is 
                                                     
6 2011/2089(INI). 
7 OJ 2013, L 201, p. 60. 
8 C-317-320/08, Rosalba Alassini et al. v. Telecom Italia[2010] ECR I-02213. 
9 OJ 1998, L 115, p. 31. 
10 H.W. Micklitz, Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des Verbraucherrechts? Gutachten A zum 
69. Juristentag, 2012, A 94. 
11 H.W. Micklitz, “A SELF-SUFFICIENT EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW – A VIABLE CONCEPT?” (EUI Working Paper 
2012), p. 22. 
12 H.W. Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law 
on Remedies," in The ECJ and the Autonomy of the Member States, ed. B. de Witte and H.W. Micklitz (Cambridge, 
Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2011), 367. 
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considered to be limited.13 The institutional decentralisation of the enforcement structure raises the 
question about which remedies and procedures are applicable before the national enforcers of 
European law. The principle of procedural autonomy provides that in the absence of European rules, 
the national legal systems lay down the detailed procedural rules for the enforcement of European law, 
subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.14 The principle of procedural autonomy also 
extends to remedies. According to the national remedial autonomy, in the absence of European rules 
on this subject, European law does not intend to create new remedies other than those already laid 
down by national law. The procedural autonomy of the Member States, to which the Court of Justice 
of the European Union still formally holds tight, can be seen as a source of policy diversity. Similarly 
to the principle of subsidiarity15, it allows the Member States to follow their own national conceptions 
about the organisation and functioning of the administration of justice, according to their local legal 
culture and varied societal goals.16 The classic statement of the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States can be found in the Rewe and Comet case:  
“[…] in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens 
have from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be 
less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature […] the position would 
be different only if the conditions and time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the 
rights which the national courts are obliged to protect.”17  
The tool of the Court of Justice of the European Union to restrict the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States is not so much the principle of equivalence or non-discrimination but the principle of 
effectiveness. According to the principle of equivalence, the same conditions need to apply to claims 
based on European law brought before the national courts than in respect of similar actions based on 
purely national law. The principle of effectiveness requires that national remedies and procedural rules 
must not render the exercise of European rights virtually impossible or excessively difficult in 
practice. Accordingly, Article 19 (1) TEU provides that “Member States shall provide remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” However, even 
though those principles are constantly reoccurring in the case-law of the Court of Justice, their definite 
meaning and relationship to each other remains unclear. As the Court of Justice is increasingly 
emphasizing the fundamental right to legal protection as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it might be argued that a new understanding of the 
principle of effective legal protection as requiring not only effective but adequate remedies is 
                                                     
13 M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice : Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Oxford; 
Portland, Or. : Hart Publishing, 2004), 1-2. 
14 Case C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 
1989, para. 5; Case C- 45/76, Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para. 13. 
15 The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into EU legislation by Article 5 (3) TEU, providing: “Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level.”  
16 M. Dougan, "The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing Union Law before the 
National Courts," in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. de Burca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
17 C-158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord and Rewe-Markt Steffen [1981] ECR 1805, para. 44; C-432/05, Unibet [2007] 
ECR 2271, para. 40. It hast to be pointed out that the term “remedial autonomy” is not used by the Court of Justice but it 
is also referring to “procedural autonomy” in the context of remedies. See: V. Trstenjak and E. Beysen, "European 
Consumer Protection Law: Curia semper dabit remedium?," Common Market Law Review 48(2011). 
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evolving. However, the definite meaning of what constitutes an adequate remedy and whether it has to 
be understood as a substantive or procedural concept remains open.18 
A new conceptualization: Hybridity 
The aim of the research project is to provide for a conceptualization of the interplay between the 
European and the national level in enforcement matters. It thereby departs from the procedural 
autonomy of the Member States and investigates how the national level interacts with the European 
level by filling out the gaps and spaces left by the European regulatory framework. The hypothesized 
conceptualization of the relationship between the European and the national level is that of 
“hybridity”.19 The overall research project suggest that hybridity constitutes a model of a composite 
legal order, within which the European and the national legal orders both play their role in some sort 
of merged European-national legal order. The process of hybridization is currently under-theorized in 
legal research. Kaarlo Tuori argues that “legal hybrids are legal phenomena which cannot be caught by 
the traditional systematization and conceptual ordering of nation-state law or the complementary 
black-box model of the relations among national legal orders and international law.”20 According to 
him, legal hybrids are merely temporary creatures, awaiting their extinction through novel ways of 
legal conceptualizing. 
The notion of cultural hybridity has emerged particularly in postcolonial theory as culture arising out 
of interactions between “colonizers” and “the colonized”. Homi Bhabha argued that colonizers and the 
colonized are mutually dependent in constructing a shared culture by cultural collisions and 
interchanges. In the attempt to assert colonial power in order to create anglicized subjects, the cultural 
traces that are disapproved by the colonizers are not repressed but repeated as something different, 
being a mutation, i.e. a hybrid. Hybridity contradicts the attempt to fix and control indigenous cultures 
and the illusion of cultural isolation or purity.21 Consequently, colonialism was not seen as a unilateral 
business with a West-to-the-rest attitude, but the relationship between colonizers and colonized is 
described as a co-operative interaction, highlighting intercultural exchanges and leading to the 
construction of a new culture and new identities. Those hybridization processes could not only be seen 
as a by-product of colonialism, but as a necessary element to ensure stability within the empire.22 Also 
from a legal history perspective, hybridity is described as a form of co-existence of old local law and 
colonial law, scaling from a mere side-by-side co-existence to mutual interpenetrations.23  
Applying theories on hybridity to the enforcement of European law, the research project argues that 
the interaction of the European and the national level leads to hybrid remedies, i.e. the legal character 
of the respective remedy constitutes a mix of European and national elements. The influence exercised 
by the European level leads to a destruction of the national patterns, which have to be reconstructed in 
the light of the effet utile of European law. Those hybridization processes hypothetically lead to a 
“unity in diversity” in the sense that the different national legal systems are not homogenized but each 
                                                     
18 N. Reich, Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht-Von der „Nationalisierung“ zur 
„Konstitutionalisierung“ von Rechtsbehelfen, Vortrag vor der Juristischen Gesellschaft Hannover, 2012. 
19N. Reich, ‘Horizontal Liability in EC Law: Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation in Case of Breaches 
of EC Rights’, Common Market Law Review 44 (2007), 705, at 708-713. 
20 K. Tuori, ‚On Legal Hybrids’, in A Self-Sufficient European Private Law – A Viable Concept? (EUI Working Paper 
2012), p. 67. 
21 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
22 Catherine Hall, "William Knibb and the constitution of the new Black subject," in Empire and Others. British Encounters 
with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1999). 303. See also for more elaborate use of identity creation: Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects. Metropole and 
Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).  
23 Th. Duve, An Early Globalization of Justice? Historical observations on mechanisms of creating normative coherence in 
the Age of Discovery, paper presented at the University of Helsinki, September 2011. 
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national legal order determines individually how it fills the gaps left by the European regulatory 
framework. In this regard, the research project will investigate the processes that give shape to hybrid 
remedies and verify whether the concept of hybridity has an explanatory ability to define current 
trends. 
The delimitation of the research field and the methodological approach  
European social regulation and collective problems  
The focus of the research project is to investigate the interplay between the European and the national 
level in shaping collective remedies within the area of “European social regulation”. Particularly, the 
three case-studies cover the areas of environmental law, anti-discrimination law and consumer law. In 
this sense, the term “European social regulation” will be used in a broad sense in order to distinguish it 
from the area of “European economic integration”. Social conflicts often bear a strong collective 
dimension: As the individual, who is the European right-holder, might often not be willing to take 
legal action for various reasons (not necessarily only related to costs), the enforcement of social 
regulation requires reliance on administrative mechanisms (i.e. enforcement via public authorities) or 
judicial collective mechanisms (i.e. enforcement via private parties organized in a collective form as in 
an association or represented by a third party). While the Member States are encouraged to establish 
public authorities at national level and the concept of collective judicial enforcement is supported, 
secondary legislation generally contains limited guidance on collective remedies and wide variations 
exist among the Member States and the different legal areas.24  
The identification of three preliminary ruling procedures 
The empirical part of the paper will consist of the reconstruction of three preliminary references by 
national courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 TFEU. Even though 
the three cases-studies chosen, namely Janecek25, Feryn26 and Invitel27, concern specific areas of 
European law, being environmental law, anti-discrimination law and consumer law respectively, it 
will be argued that one can discern common patterns and draw general conclusions for the interaction 
of the European and the national level in the shaping of collective remedies. In the three case-studies, 
we are faced with a phenomenon that private or public actors rely on European law before the national 
courts in order to strike down national barriers that obstruct the protection of the collective interest. 
This phenomenon takes often the form of a strategic litigation, where the applicants pursue their own 
national interests in co-operation with the personal ambitions of a lawyer. They rely on the obligations 
of national courts under European law and ultimately on the preliminary ruling procedure as provided 
for in Article 267 TFEU, which constitutes a unique method of co-operation between the national 
courts and the Court of Justice. However, the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national 
courts is not always a smooth process. Clashes might arise between the national conceptions about the 
organisation and functioning of the administration of justice and the European aim to ensure the effet 
utile of the respective substantive area at stake.  
C-237/07 Janecek 
                                                     
24 N. Reich, "Effective Private Law Remedies in Discrimination Cases," in Non-Discrimiantion in European Private Law, 
ed. Schulze (Mohr-Siebeck 2011); N. Reich, "Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht," 
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25 Case C-237/07, Janecek v Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221. 
26 Case C-54/07, CGKR v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR I-5187.  
27 C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt [2012] ECR I-0032.  
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The Janecek case dealt with the question whether on the basis of Article 7(3) of the Directive 
96/62/EC on ambient air quality assessment and management an individual can require the national 
competent authorities to draw up an action plan where there is a risk that the European air quality 
standard is exceeded. Mr Janecek, who is the applicant in the proceedings, has been straw man for an 
environmental organization, whose own possibilities to bring a legal action before the German courts 
were considered even more limited. The proceedings before the German courts revolved around the 
question whether Mr Janecek has a subjective right to require the national authorities to set up an 
action plan. According to the legal standing rules under the German Administrative Process, 
individuals are only entitled to bring an action before an administrative court if they can assert the 
impairment of an individual subjective right by an act of the state. According to the 
Schutznormtheorie, a subjective right is existent if the legal norm on which the claimant relies serves 
to protect his individual/personal interest. Consequently, all actions which are aimed at the objective 
legality control of administrative decisions are foreign to the German Administrative Process - not 
only popular actions but also representative actions and actions of interested parties are excluded. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union held that any natural or legal persons directly concerned by a 
risk that the limit value or alert threshold may be exceeded must be in a position to require that the 
competent authorities to draw up an action plan. 
C-54/07 Feryn 
The Feryn case arose under the Race Equality Directive 2000/43/EC and deals with the Belgian public 
equality body initiating judicial proceedings against a private company because of a public statement 
by that company that it will not recruit any Moroccans. The crux of the case is that there has been 
never an identifiable victim, whose application has been rejected by the company. Initially, the 
Belgian public equality body, whose history can be traced back to 1989, was empowered to file only 
criminal complaints in case of a violation of the Federal Racial Equality Act from the 30th of July 
1981. The implementation if the Race Equality Directive led to an immense advance of the powers of 
the equality body. Leaving it to the public prosecutor to struggle with the presumption of innocence in 
criminal proceedings, the equality body was enabled to act as an enforcement body by initiating civil 
proceedings and benefiting not only from the reversal of the burden of proof but also from rather 
strong civil remedies introduced into Belgian law. The broad enforcement powers of the equality body 
were strengthened by the Court of Justice. In line with the effet utile of the Directive, the Court of 
Justice established that the existence of direct discrimination is not dependent on the identification of a 
complainant who claims to have been the victim. Consequently, the Court of Justice overcame the 
individualistic nature of the European right to equal treatment enshrined in the European Race 
Directive and infused the Directive with a collective element. 
C-472/10 Invitel 
In the Invitel case, due to numerous consumer complaints, the Hungarian Consumer Protection Office 
initiated a public interest action against the fixed-line telephone network operator Invitel. Invitel had 
introduced into its general business conditions a price amendment clause providing for ‘money order 
fees’ to be applied in the event of payment by money order without any provision specifying the 
method of calculation of those fees. The Consumer Protection Office requested the Hungarian court 
for a finding that the term in question is void and for refund of these costs and expenses. It was 
questionable whether in accordance with Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms, the declaration of the 
invalidity of an unfair term, as a result of an action for injunction in the public interest, may produce 
effects with regard to all consumers (including those who were not party to the proceedings) and 
whether the national courts must also, in future and of its own motion, draw all the consequences 
which are provided in national law in case of the unfairness of a term. Generally, judgments are 
binding inter partes only. Accordingly, in most Member States, a ruling on a collective action for an 
injunction is mandatory only with respect to the case and the parties in question, i.e. the qualified 
entity which brought the action and the business which is the subject of the injunction. The Court of 
Justice held that the effective implementation of the Directive’s consumer protection objective 
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requires that terms of the general business conditions of consumer contracts which are declared to be 
unfair in an action for an injunction brought against a business, may not be binding on all consumers 
who have concluded with that business a contract to which the same general business conditions 
apply. 
The socio-legal method of reconstruction 
From a methodological viewpoint, the research will be conducted via the “reconstruction” of those 
case-studies within their socio-political, national and European context. This method has been 
employed by Micklitz in “The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU” regarding three case-
studies on Sunday trading, on equal treatment of men and women and on good faith in contract law in 
order to reveal the interests of national courts, national litigants and the Court of Justice in employing 
European law. This method requires to set out the history of the case from cradle to grave, “starting 
with the factual legal-political background to the litigation, the way in which the case first reached the 
national courts, the arguments brought forward and the efforts made to bring the case to the ECJ, the 
handling of the case before the ECJ, its reception in the national and/or European academic 
environment, and whether and to what extent the ECJ’s ruling was or was not implemented by the 
national courts.”28  
A qualitative approach was used by conducting interviews with the key actors involved in the legal 
proceedings on the national and European level, thereby avoiding the sole reliance on written 
documents. The interviews have been conducted in a flexible way via open and spontaneously formed 
questions, trying to stimulate a normal conversation. This entails the benefit of receiving 
comprehensive data on all important facets of the case. The interviews have been subsequently 
analysed with the support of the sociologist, Thomas Roethe, by using the method of objective 
hermeneutics. The method of objective hermeneutics is a sociological tool of text interpretation, i.e. 
sequences of the written text of the interview. Starting from the presumption that every human act is 
guided by an invisible social structure, it is supposed that this underlying social structure can be 
revealed through reconstructing the latent structural meaning sentence by sentence, being confirmed 
by repetition throughout the text. This is done by analysing the objective meaning structures of the 
text, focusing particular on linguistic and interactive aspects. The method of objective hermeneutics 
therefore allows reconstructing the reasons for decisions both by individuals and organizations.  
It is foreseen that the combined analysis of the primary legal material, European and national legal 
literature and the qualitative data in form of the interviews will reveal the processes and patterns of the 
interplay between the national and the European level in dealing with collective problems and 
therefore allow testing the hypothesis of hybrid collective remedies.  
Conclusion 
Safeguarding collective social rights is problematic if both the European system of legal protection 
and the national legal system build on individually enforceable rights. However, national private and 
public (activist) actors can rely on the preliminary ruling procedure and the co-operation of the Court 
of Justice to infuse the European and national legal order with collective elements. In the Janecek 
case, from a European perspective, by empowering “natural and legal persons” to enforce the quality 
standards before the national courts, the Court of Justice introduced a new enforcement mechanism 
into the European Air Quality Directive, which previously relied solely on the Commission taking 
enforcement action via the infringement procedure. From the perspective of the German legal system, 
the Court of Justice thereby struck down the traditional individualistic nature of the German system of 
judicial protection, which is assigning the protection of the collective good to the administration. In 
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the Feryn case, the Court of Justice overcame the individualistic nature of the European right to equal 
treatment enshrined in the European Race Directive by learning from the Belgian legal system. 
Interestingly, the European-wide applicable substantive concept of “direct discrimination” got infused 
with a collective element by the Belgian procedural rules. From the perspective of the Belgian legal 
system, the proceedings prompted the acceptance of the Belgian courts that the protection of the public 
interest in discrimination matters is not only effectuated through criminal proceedings anymore but 
also has a role to play in civil law proceedings. In the Invitel case, the Court of Justice clarified the 
relationship between individual and collective legal actions. Despite that it is common to the rules of 
procedure of most of the Member States that a judicial decision on the unfairness of a term in response 
to an actual contract dispute does not necessarily prevent the continued use of that term, because such 
a decision has legal effect only between the parties, the Court of Justice found that the erga omnes 
effect of a finding of unfairness on individual contracts corresponds to the effet utile of the Unfair 
Terms Directive. The implications of these case-studies for testing and developing the hypothesis of 
hybrid collective remedies has to be further developed.  
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FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES, EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION AND PRIVATE LAW 
Barend van Leeuwen* 
Introduction 
The potential of free movement of services in the European Union (“EU”) is significant. Services 
amount to approximately 70% of the GDP in the EU. Both service providers and service recipients 
increasingly move across borders. At the same time, the full potential of the internal market for 
services has not yet been achieved. Therefore, the EU adopted the Services Directive 20061 with a 
view to stimulate and facilitate free movement of services.  
Free movement of goods has always been the more successful brother of free movement of services. 
One of the regulatory strategies which have been used to increase free movement of goods within the 
EU is European standardisation. After the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)’s 
judgment in Cassis de Dijon2, standardisation of the sizes and materials of products greatly improved 
the effectiveness of the internal market for goods. The EU adopted this regulatory strategy with the 
New Approach3. Product safety directives would provide the essential requirements which goods had 
to comply with, whilst the technical details were left to European standardisation. These directives 
provided that goods which complied with the requirements of a particular European standard would be 
in conformity with the directives and could be lawfully brought on the market. The result is that 
standardisation proved a highly successful regulatory strategy. 
As a consequence, it is not surprising that the EU also turned to standardisation as a regulatory tool to 
increase free movement of services. Uniform services standards would potentially make free 
movement of services within the EU more attractive. The Services Directive 2006 contains an article 
which expressly obliges the European Commission (“the Commission”) and the Member States to 
stimulate European standardisation initiatives in the services sector.4 However, there are some 
important difference between goods and services. Services standards attempt to define a uniform 
definition of the required quality of a service, which is less technical than defining the sizes and 
materials of a product. Moreover, European standardisation of services involves the standardisation of 
the human interaction between service provider and service recipient. Such interaction does not take 
place in the technical production of goods. Regulating such interaction makes it more likely for 
standardisation to interact with existing legal regulation, such as regulation on training and 
qualifications of service providers. Furthermore, the making of a European quality standard for 
services implies that there can be a common European definition of the concept of quality.  
In addition to these cultural and practical difficulties with services standardisation, there is also a legal 
problem. Although the EU encourages European standardisation of services, it has not provided a legal 
framework which provides that services which comply with a European standard can be lawfully 
brought on the market. The New Approach for goods has not been followed for services – there are no 
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directives on services safety which refer to European standards for the specific requirements with 
which a service has to comply. Consequently, there is no automatic link between a European 
standardisation process and the legal effect of a European services standard. 
This is where private law enters into the arena. In the absence of a European framework to provide 
binding legal effect to European services standards, private law could play a role in making the 
standards binding in law. In effect, what happens is that private law is being employed to make a 
European services standard binding and to facilitate free movement of services. In combination with 
European standardisation of services, private law becomes a regulatory tool to improve the EU 
internal market for services. For example, this could mean that European standards are being 
incorporated or applied in services contracts. Alternatively, European standards could be used to 
determine the standard of care expected from a service provider in tort. Finally, European standards 
could be used for the certification of service providers. The result of this application of European 
services standards in private law could be that the same standards would be used in all Member States. 
As a consequence, the combination of European standardisation and private law provides a mechanism 
to create a degree of convergence of services standards throughout the EU. This process would in turn 
improve the internal market for services. 
The process described above assumes that European standardisation and private law both positively 
contribute to free movement of services. It is assumed that the triangular relationship between free 
movement of services, European standardisation and private law works well. However, this 
assumption has to be tested both at the theoretical level and at the empirical level. In this paper, I will 
discuss some of the more theoretical problems. I will start by providing a more detailed description of 
the theoretical framework behind the process. The theory of convergence will be introduced. My next 
step will then be to test each of the three bilateral relationships in the triangle. First, I will discuss the 
relationship between free movement of services and European standardisation. Second, the 
relationship between European standardisation and private law will be discussed. Third, I will 
complete the triangle by discussing the relation between free movement of services and private law. 
Some of the results of empirical research have been incorporated in the discussion. The paper will 
conclude with some preliminary conclusions on the validity of the theoretical framework. 
The theoretical framework: convergence in private law through European standardisation 
The process described in the introduction sets out a strategy for the improvement of the internal 
market for services. It is based on the following theoretical framework: 
1. European harmonisation of private law has been criticised on the basis that the introduction of 
European, or foreign, concepts in national private law will not lead to effective convergence in 
private law. Significant differences in legal culture and interpretation will remain and cannot be 
overcome by European harmonisation of legislation. Although the wording of a particular rule 
might in theory be similar in all Member States, in practice the application of the rule will be very 
different in the individual Member States. The result of European harmonisation of laws will be 
divergence rather than convergence. The most prominent supporters of the “no convergence” 
theory have been Pierre Legrand5 and Gunther Teubner.6 Teubner has described the introduction 
of European concepts in national private law as “legal irritants”.  
2. The aim of convergence in private law through European harmonisation has been to improve the 
functioning of the EU internal market. It is based on the assumption, which is held by the 
Commission, that differences in national private law can be obstacles to the effective exercise of 
the right to free movement. The introduction of common legal rules would then remove these 
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obstacles. The proposal for a Common European Sales Law (“CESL”)7 could be considered to 
introduce the ultimate form of convergence: although the application of CESL would be 
voluntary, parties are encouraged to choose common European rules which would effectively 
remove a transaction from the national private law framework.  
3. If European harmonisation of legislation does not result in effective convergence in private law in 
practice, other strategies for convergence should be considered. Top-down convergence through 
European harmonisation of legislation could be contrasted with bottom-up convergence through 
soft coordination. Walter van Gerven has been the main proponent of what he has called the “open 
method of convergence”.8 Rather than introducing similar legal rules through harmonisation, 
convergence in private law could be realised through coordination, for example through judicial 
dialogue and consistent interpretation. Co- and self-regulation would be other alternatives 
strategies to realise bottom-up convergence in private law. 
4. Standardisation could be one of the strategies to increase bottom-up convergence in private law. It 
is expressly referred to in Article 26 of the Services Directive 2006 as a tool to improve the quality 
and compatibility of services. European quality standards would create a minimum level-playing 
field for services throughout the EU. However, standardisation is a form of pure self-regulation. It 
cannot on itself create binding legal effect. Therefore, private law is instrumentalised as the 
regulatory tool to give binding legal effect to the European quality standards. This could be 
through contract law, tort law or certification. The end-result would be that the standards which 
would be legally enforced in private law relations in the Member States would derive from a 
common European source. This would lead to converged quality standards for services in private 
law. 
5. In essence, this bottom-up strategy for convergence in private law is a two-stage process. First of 
all, a European services standard has to be agreed through the European standardisation 
organisation Comité Européen de Normalisation (“CEN”). The national standardisation 
organisations send representatives to Brussels to agree on a European services standard. Once the 
European standard has been formally adopted, it still has to be applied in private law. Both of 
these two stages have to be successful before a process of convergence in private law through 
standardisation can be successful. If no European services standards were adopted, no 
convergence in private law would take place. And if European services standards were made, but 
they were not subsequently applied in private law, then no convergence in private law would 
occur either. Consequently, the test to decide whether or not a process of convergence in private 
law through European standardisation is taking place is: (i) firstly, to see whether European 
services standards are being made and (ii) secondly, whether these standards are being 
(effectively) applied in private law relations (contract/tort/certification). In the end, the process 
would result in a safer and more effective internal market for services. 
Before the possible obstacles to this process of convergence are discussed, it is necessary to briefly 
describe the European standardisation process. Standardisation is a purely self-regulatory process. 
CEN is the European standardisation organisation which facilitates and coordinates European 
standardisation initiatives. However, it never initiates European standardisation processes itself. The 
initiative for European standardisation processes has to come either from the services sector itself – a 
private initiative from the “stakeholders” in a particular sector – through one of the national 
standardisation organisations, or directly from the Commission. The Commission has been given the 
legal competence to issue a mandate to CEN and ask CEN to start working on a particular European 
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standard.9 This standard would then often be adopted in combination with a legislative process – 
without the services standard playing any concrete role in the legal framework. Even if the 
Commission takes the initiative for a European services standard, the process will remain completely 
self-regulatory. The standard will be developed by the stakeholders themselves. The Commission can 
take a supervisory role, but will take no part in the decision-making process on the substance of the 
standard.10 
When a proposal for a European standard has been submitted, each national standardisation 
organisation has to consult with stakeholders in the particular field of the standard to determine 
whether the stakeholders are interested in working on a European standard. A European 
standardisation process can only be started if a qualified majority of the national standardisation 
organisations have voted in favour of a European standardisation process, and if there are sufficient 
national standardisation organisations which are willing to actively participate in the making of the 
standard.11 If the proposal is accepted, one of the national standardisation organisations will be 
responsible for the secretariat of the standardisation process. A European committee will be formed, 
which consists of representatives of national “mirror committees” which closely follow and scrutinise 
the work of the European committee. Participation in the national mirror committees is open to all 
parties who are willing to participate and to pay the costs of participation. Standardisation 
organisations are non-profit organisations, but the stakeholders have to pay the costs of the 
organisation and administration of a standardisation process.  
Once the European committee has agreed on the final version of the European standard, the national 
standardisation organisations have to vote again on whether the standard should be formally adopted. 
If the proposal is accepted, by the same qualified majority, the standard becomes a formal European 
standard which has to be implemented as a national standard by the national standardisation 
organisations. It is clear that a European standardisation process involves an interesting interaction 
between the European level and the national level. Although the substance of a European standard is 
agreed by the European committee, the votes on the proposal and the final version are controlled by 
the national level. This enables stakeholders to enforce and protect national interests through the 
national mirror committees. It also reduces the supranational nature of the European standardisation 
process.12 
After the adoption of the European standard, the standard becomes a national standard in the Member 
States. The precise legal status of the standard is different across the Member States,13 but the common 
feature in all Member States is that a European services standard does not obtain any automatic 
binding effect in law. This is where private law can be employed to promote the European services 
standard from a self-regulatory soft law instrument to a legally binding standard. But before I discuss 
the interaction between European standardisation and private law, I have to discuss to what extent the 
relationship between European standardisation of services and free movement of services can be 
considered to be based on friendship or animosity. 
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Free movement of services and European standardisation 
European standardisation of services is included as a regulatory tool in the Services Directive 2006 
because it is assumed that standardisation of services will positively contribute to the functioning of 
the internal market. The adoption of minimum standards throughout the EU would make the quality of 
services more transparent. As such, it would be easier for consumers to decide whether or not receive 
services in another Member State. Similarly, it would be easier for regulators – whether public or 
private – to assess the quality of service providers who wish to provide services in another Member 
State. The standard would be a benchmark of a common European definition of the required quality of 
a particular service. 
It is important to emphasise that a European service standard would only set minimum standards. In 
no way would a European standard aim for some kind of maximum harmonisation. It would still be 
possible for individual Member States to go over and beyond the requirements of the European 
standard.14 In combination with the non-binding nature of the European standard, it would only 
provide soft coordination of the minimum level of care required of service providers. 
As has already been mentioned above, the interaction between free movement of goods and European 
standardisation had been very successful. The adoption of European standards for goods enabled 
producers across the EU to decide on common materials and sizes of products. This standardisation 
process was reinforced and constitutionalised by the EU with the adoption of the New Approach. As a 
result, the European standardisation process provided an answer to the CJEU’s deregulatory judgment 
in Cassis de Dijon. It limited the regulatory necessity of national product requirements. However, 
making European services standards does not only involve an attempt to regulate the sizes and 
materials of products, it also involves a definition of the concept of quality of a service. This implies 
that a common European definition of quality can be established, even though quality is a very 
culturally – and sometimes even personally – defined concept.15 
More importantly, defining the required quality of a service is not necessarily facilitating free 
movement. Quality regulation is a different species from technical product standards. Quality 
comprises many different elements, such as the training of the provider, the use of products, the 
facilities and materials used by the service provider, information requirements and after-care 
requirements. Even if a European services standard only included minimum standards, minimum 
requirements for training, for example, could constitute obstacles to free movement. This risk becomes 
even more realistic if the quality standards are defined by a particular services sector itself. Although 
the overall aim of the standard could be to create a level-playing field in the internal market, 
stakeholders might equally be driven by protectionist motives to participate in a European 
standardisation process.16  
The possible difficulties with European services standards and free movement of services can best be 
illustrated by two recent examples of standardisation processes in the services sector. Given that the 
focus of my research is on European standardisation in the healthcare and tourism sectors, I will take 
two examples from these sectors.  
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A European standard for tourist guide services 
In 2008, CEN published a European standard on tourism services and the requirements for the 
provision of professional tourist guide training and qualification programmes.17 Tourist guides are 
trained guides who guide groups of tourists through a specific city. They are not tour managers who 
travel with a group of tourists, but they are based in a particular city in which they offer their services. 
They are usually self-employed. In many of the Mediterranean Member States the profession of tourist 
guide is regulated by (public) law and tourist guides are required to obtain a specific qualification by 
law. In other Member States certification by a private body or organisation is required before certain 
tourist guide services can be provided. The differences in national regulation of tourist guides have led 
to case law before the CJEU. In the late 80s and early 90s, the Commission brought a series of 
infringement proceedings against France, Italy, Spain and Greece.18 In each of these cases the training 
requirements which were imposed on tourist guides were in breach of free movement of services, in 
that they imposed requirements which were more difficult to satisfy by foreign tourist guides. The 
judgments resulted in a restricted wave of liberalisation in these Member States. In addition, the 
adoption of the Services Directive 2006 prompted significant adjustments to national legislation on 
tourist guide qualifications.19 
The decision of national and European tourist guide federations to start working on a standard for 
tourist guides might actually have been a response to the liberalisation of their profession as a result of 
the CJEU’s judgments and the Services Directive 2006.20 The standard barely deals with the actual 
service requirements imposed on tourist guides. Instead, it is almost exclusively focussed on what 
training tourist guides should have had. This background to the standardisation initiative immediately 
emphasises the possible tension with free movement of services. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the final 
standard contains a provision which could potentially be a restriction to right to freely provide services 
in the EU.21 
In addition to various theoretical training requirements, the European standard provides that tourist 
guides must have followed practical training in the city in which they want to work as a tourist 
guide.22 This practical training comprises 40% of the total training requirements, which means that 
they must have spent at least 240 hours in the city in which they want to provide tourist guide services 
as part of their training. This requirement is obviously easier to satisfy for potential tourist guides who 
already live near the area in which they want to work. While it is perfectly logical that tourist guides 
must have spent some time in the area in which they provide their services – reading about a city is 
quite a different experience from seeing a city in real time – a requirement of 240 hours is substantial. 
The requirement could be considered to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of making sure that 
tourist guides have actually seen what they are talking about before they offer their services. This 
practical training requirement for tourist guides has come to the attention of the Commission. In fact, it 
has been one of the reasons why the Commission believes that it is necessary to conduct further 
research on the question to what extent European services standardisation actually contributes to free 
movement of services.23 The reasons for stakeholders to propose European services standardisation 
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processes might have very little to do with improving the internal market for services. As such, the 
Commission believes that it is necessary to decide on the usefulness of European standardisation as a 
regulatory tool to facilitate free movement of services. 
A European standard for aesthetic surgery services 
Cosmetic surgery services have become very fashionable in the EU. The market for cosmetic surgery 
services is truly European and many customers travel across borders to receive cosmetic surgery 
services in a different Member State from the one in which they are resident. Customers who receive 
cosmetic surgery services are not patients – there is nothing urgent about the treatment they receive, 
and the treatment is for exclusively cosmetic purposes. As a result, customers looking for cosmetic 
surgery services behave like “real” consumers. The prices of the treatment are a decisive factor in 
deciding where to go.24 At the same time, the market for cosmetic surgery market is not very well 
regulated and many different service providers are competing for customers. Plastic surgeons are well 
qualified to perform cosmetic surgery, but they are not the only ones who offer cosmetic surgery 
services. In addition, general doctors, dermatologists and ENT-surgeons all compete on the market. In 
the United Kingdom, nurses are allowed to perform certain cosmetic treatments.25 Furthermore, 
certain producers of cosmetic products have even started to provide cosmetic surgery services 
themselves. Most Member States have not strictly defined which treatments can be performed by 
which doctors. France is one of the few Member States with a very clear legal framework – in France 
cosmetic surgery services can only be performed under the supervision of a plastic surgeon.26 In some 
Member States, certain general doctors are calling themselves “cosmetic surgeons”, which is not a 
protected title.27 Consumers assume that doctors who call themselves surgeons have received 
specialist training in surgery, but this is often not the case. For all these reasons, the cosmetic surgery 
services market suffers from a lack of transparency and regulation.  
Plastic surgeons coming from a number of Member States have now taken the initiative to develop a 
European standard for cosmetic surgery services. The reputation of plastic surgeons suffers from what 
they consider as the intrusion of non-qualified doctors and nurses on the market. From that 
perspective, the reason to start the European standardisation process can be compared to the tourist 
guide initiative – it is a counter-reaction to liberalisation of the market.28 However, the plastic 
surgeons are not against cross-border healthcare services per se. Moreover, they also recognise that 
due to a lack of (State) regulation they are faced with a reality that the market is full of differently 
qualified service providers.29 Since they consider that consumers are too much led by prices, they 
consider that self-regulation is necessary to protect consumers and improve the safety of cosmetic 
surgery services. As with all CEN standardisation processes, the process is open to all stakeholders. As 
a consequence, plastic surgeons have to sit around the table with cosmetic surgeons, general doctors, 
nurses and producers of cosmetic products. Despite the sharply different interests at stake, an attempt 
is made to agree on some basic principles to improve consumer safety. 
The European standardisation process is currently in its final stages. The focus of the standard is on 
which treatments can be performed by which doctors, and where particular treatments have to take 
place. Again, the draft standard contains a provision which is potentially restrictive of free movement 
of services. It provides that certain invasive treatments have to be performed in an operation room, 
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while other non-invasive treatment can be performed in a general consultation room.30 The effect of 
these provisions is that doctors operating on the cosmetic market are at the very least required to have 
a fixed location when they provide their services. At the moment, there are doctors who move across 
the EU without having a fixed location. It is even possible that they offer their services at the 
customer’s home. The standard seeks to prevent this by providing the type of room in which a 
particular treatment should take place. This means that certain service providers would possibly have 
to hire a treatment or operation room. Although it is easy to see how this should contribute to 
consumer safety, and as such could possibly justify a restriction to free movement, there might be 
proportionality issues which would have to be seriously considered. 
In conclusion, the two examples given above illustrate the possible difficulties with the interaction 
between European standardisation of services and free movement of services. The regulation of 
quality of care often involves the imposition of requirements on service providers which are not 
necessarily facilitating free movement. On top of these considerations, it should be added that there 
have simply been very few initiatives for European services standards so far. The European 
standardisation process is not yet very well known for services.31 Despite various studies on the 
benefits of European services standards,32 very few European services standards have actually been 
adopted. Therefore, European standardisation and free movement of services are yet to become the 
true friends that many believe they could be. 
European standardisation and private law 
Convergence in private law through European standardisation assumes that it is possible to make a 
link from European standardisation to private law – that private law can be instrumental in turning the 
self-regulatory standard created through European standardisation into a legally binding standard. In 
the introduction, I have referred to three different private law tools: (i) contract, (ii) tort and (iii) 
certification. Although each of these options would provide a slightly different route to convergence, 
the end-result of each of them would be that a European services standard would be used to determine 
the standard and quality of care required of a service provider in private law relations. Therefore, I will 
not discuss each private law tool separately, but rather discuss two problems which are common to all 
three tools. I will illustrate the problems by reference to the healthcare sector. 
Legitimacy considerations and private law 
The link between contract law and healthcare services might not be immediately obvious. 
Traditionally, healthcare was a public service which was regulated by legislation imposed by the State. 
Nevertheless, in the last decades, many Member States have introduced elements of liberalisation and 
privatisation into their healthcare systems.33 As a result, contracts have become a common regulatory 
tool in the healthcare sector. Privatisation of healthcare services has resulted in the need for contracts 
between healthcare providers and patients. Moreover, in many of the healthcare systems of the 
Member States, public authorities and health insurers have to buy the provision of healthcare services 
for their citizens or customers. Again, they use contracts as their regulatory tool. Finally, the 
individual contract – the insurance policy – between insurers and insured persons is likely to include a 
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provision on the right to healthcare services, and the standard of care which can be expected from the 
healthcare provider. 
Essentially, a European services standard can be applied in three ways in such healthcare contracts: 
1. Compliance with a European services standard can be made an express term of the contract: “The 
service provider will comply with the requirements imposed by the European services standard”. 
2. The contract can provide that the service provider will comply with existing quality standards in 
the sector: “The service provider will provide his services in accordance with current quality 
standards in the sector”. The European services standard could then be one of the standards which 
could be referred to in determining the required standard of care. 
3. The contract itself could be silent about quality standards, but it could be implied that that 
European services standard has to be complied with – the European services would become an 
implied term of the contract. 
In the first scenario, few problems with the application of the European standard will occur. Although 
there might be problems with certain terms or parts of the European standard, and courts might be 
required to assess the fairness of individual terms, courts are at least required to look at the European 
standard. In the other examples, they have a discretion to decide whether or not the European standard 
should be applied in the contract. In the exercise of their discretion, courts will employ certain criteria 
to decide whether or not the European standard should be given binding force in law. 
From a procedural point of view, the criteria which will be used to decide whether or not to give 
binding force to a European standard will not be European criteria. The national private law orders of 
the Member States will have developed their own criteria to decide whether or not a private self-
regulatory instrument should be given binding force in law.34 The differences in national criteria could 
potentially act as an obstacle to convergence in the EU, since courts in some Member States could be 
more willing to apply European standards than courts in other Member States.  
From a substantive point of view, the criteria which are used often involve questions about the 
legitimacy of the standard-making process. Was the process to make the standard transparent? Was it 
possible for all parties concerned to have an input in the standard-making process? Was the standard 
really made in the public rather than the private interest? Have all key stakeholders in a particular 
sector participated in the standard-making process? Is the standard publicly available and accessible? 
These questions could potentially cause problems for the European standardisation process.  
Firstly, the European standardisation process is completely confidential. The meetings of the national 
mirror committees and the European committee are private. As van Gestel and Micklitz have put it, 
they meet in “closed club houses”.35 All the documentation related to the meetings is strictly 
confidential and cannot be disclosed to members of the public. The only moment when the European 
standardisation process opens its doors to the public is when the draft standard is published. For a 
short period of time, the draft European standard has to be published on the website of the national 
standardisation organisations. Interested individuals or organisations can provide comments on the 
draft standard, which the national mirror committees must take into account. However, this is the only 
public dialogue in the European standardisation process. This confidentiality remains after the 
publication of the standard. The European standard becomes a product which has to be bought through 
the national standardisation organisations. It is not freely available. Courts may have problems with 
giving binding legal force to a standard which is not publicly available. How could service providers 
be obliged to comply with a standard which they might never have seen before? Furthermore, from a 
                                                     
34 See, for an example in the healthcare sector, a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court: HR 2 maart 2001, NJ 2001, 649 
(Trombose-arrest) 
35 Rob van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz,” European Integration through Standardisation: How Judicial Review is Breaking 
Down the Club House of Private Standardisation Bodies”, (2013) 50 CMLRev 145-182. 
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practical point of view, parties which are involved in litigation might be less likely to refer to a 
European services standard. The result would be that the European standard would be less likely to be 
applied in private law disputes. Similarly, certain private regulators, such as health insurers, would be 
less likely to expressly apply European standards in a contract.36 
Secondly, the European standardisation process is open to all parties concerned. There are no objective 
criteria to decide which parties are concerned. It is the responsibility of the national standardisation 
organisations to contact all parties which could potentially be interested to participate in the 
standardisation process. Moreover, there are no formal obligations on which parties should definitely 
participate in the standardisation process. Although the new Standardisation Regulation 2012 provides 
that non-governmental organisations, consumer organisations, environmental organisations and public 
authorities should be encouraged to participate,37 this obligation does not seem to be legally 
enforceable. As a result, a European standardisation process can be started and completed without the 
participation of some of the key players in a particular sector. The non-participation of certain parties 
could again be a reason for courts to refuse to apply the European standard in private law, because a 
standard should carry weight across the whole sector. 
European minimum standards and the new Member States 
Another potential problem with the application of European standards in private law is the fact that 
European services standards provide minimum quality standards. As such, they do not exhaustively 
regulate the required quality of a particular service. The aim is to provide a level-playing field in the 
internal market, which would encourage both service providers and service recipients to make use of 
their right to free movement. From an internal market point of view, this is probably more flexible 
than maximum harmonisation. However, the problem with minimum quality standards is that certain 
Member States might not be willing to lower their standards in private law to a common European 
standard, if they consider that the current national standards are significantly higher than what the 
result would be of a European standardisation process. 
The initiative for a European standard for cleft lip surgery provides a good example of this. The 
European Cleft Organisation (“ECO”) submitted a proposal to CEN for a European standard on cleft 
lip surgery. ECO is an organisation for patients born with cleft lips in Europe. One of its primary aims 
is to improve the care for babies born with cleft lips in the new Member States. ECO regularly 
organise training programmes, in particular in Bulgaria and Romania. These Member States would 
also be greatly helped by the development of a European standard which would lay down the 
minimum level of care to which babies and their families should be entitled in the EU.  
Despite the widespread recognition that cleft care should be improved in some of the new Member 
States, ECO’s proposal was rejected by a number of old Member States. The required qualified 
majority support for the standard was not reached.38 As a result, the standardisation process was not 
even started. One of the reasons of some Member States for rejecting the proposal was that it would 
not be in their interest to work on a European minimum standard, because they would continue to 
provide medical care of a higher level.39 Moreover, they were frightened that the creation of a 
European standard would be an incentive for public authorities and health insurers to cut on funding 
                                                     
36 Interview with with CZ Health Insurer (Tilburg) on 23rd August 2012. 
37 Articles 5-7 of Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European standardisation. 
38 Voting Results: “Creation of a new CEN Project Committee on 'Healthcare services for cleft lip and/or palate'”, 
CENBT/8561, Brussels, April 2011. 
39 “Formal responses by the Proposer”, document published on by ECO after the presentations in Brussels on 8th November 
2011, p 5: http://www.ecoonline.org/media/documents/concerns_and_responses_-_FINAL[1].pdf (accessed on 15th 
November 2013). 
Free Movement of Services, European Standardisation and Private Law 
 
37 
for cleft care, with the possible outcome that a European standard would lead to lower quality of care 
at the national level. 
Like all participants in European standardisation processes, the stakeholders in the old Member States 
would have been required to contribute to the costs of the European standardisation process. But why 
would they contribute to the creation of a European standard which would be lower than their national 
standard? This illustrates a potential problem with self-regulation in the public interest – especially 
when in this example the public interest would extend far beyond the boundaries of the individual 
Member States, and would not even include the own Member State. The European standardisation 
process would effectively become some kind of development aid. Doctors in the old Member States 
are certainly willing to share national standards, but they are not going to pay for a European standard 
which would not be used in their own Member States anyway.40 Finally, it should also be noted that 
cross-border movement of patients was not an issue in this example. Because of the limited financial 
resources and the fact that babies with clefts need long-term treatment plans, cross-border movement 
for treatment becomes virtually impossible.41 Perhaps this was one of the reasons for the old Member 
States to refuse to engage with the problems in the new Member States through a European 
standardisation process. 
From the perspective of convergence, it could be argued that it does not matter that some old Member 
States will continue to subscribe to higher national quality standards. In any event, the adoption of a 
European services standard would mean that the standards in the private law systems of the new 
Member States would be raised. A process of convergence would take place in the direction of the old 
Member States. This might be true once a European services standard has been adopted. However, the 
problem with this strategy for convergence is that the old Member States are also necessary in the 
standard-making process. If they continue to refuse to get involved in European standardisation 
process because they do not see the need for European minimum standards, this will mean that no 
European standards can be adopted. A small minority of some of the bigger old Member States is able 
to reject proposals for European services standards. As a result, a process of convergence in private 
law through European standardisation cannot take place, since there would be no European services 
standards which could be applied in private law.  
To conclude, it is clear that legitimacy concerns about European standardisation could act as an 
obstacle to the application of European standards in private law. This is a less of a problem for 
European standardisation of goods, which has become a quasi-legislative process with the New 
Approach. The binding effect of the European product standards in law follows more or less 
automatically from the European standardisation process itself. However, European services standards 
rely on voluntary application in public or private law. As such, requirements imposed by private law 
will provide an indirect incentive to improve the legitimacy and transparency of the European 
standardisation process. At the same time, the minimum nature of European services standards can be 
problematic in areas in which certain Member States do not want to give up their national private law 
standards. 
Free movement of services and private law 
Finally, the relationship between free movement of services and private law should shortly be 
discussed. I will approach this relation from the perspective of horizontal direct effect of the free 
movement provisions and the impact of horizontal direct effect on private law. 
The traditional approach towards free movement law was that the free movement provisions were 
intended to regulate State conduct, and that they could be used to eliminate obstacles to free 
                                                     
40 Interview with NEN (Delft) on 12th April 2012. 
41 Interview with ECO (Skype) on 14th March 2012. 
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movement created by the State.42 Competition law would be the tool to regulate private conduct. 
However, under the pressure of globalisation, the role of the State as the exclusive regulator of the 
internal market has decreased. Private parties have come to assume a much more important role in the 
regulation of the internal market. Activities which were regulated by public authorities in one Member 
State could be regulated by private parties in another Member State. Moreover, some of the regulatory 
conduct of private parties could not be caught by competition law. As a consequence, the application 
of the free movement provisions had to be extended to private parties to ensure the effectiveness and 
uniformity of EU law.43 
The CJEU laid down the foundations for the application of the free movement provisions to private 
parties in Walrave and Koch.44 In this case, the CJEU held that private conduct which was intended to 
provide collective regulation on the basis of the legal autonomy of the private regulator in question 
would be caught by the free movement provisions. After the judgment in Angonese,45 it appears that 
collective regulation is no longer required. All what is required is that the private party is able to 
effectively restrict the free movement rights of other private parties. The free movement provisions 
will be applied to private parties on the basis of the effect of their actions. Making a formal distinction 
between public regulators and private parties has become irrelevant. 
The extension of the application of the free movement provisions has implications both for standard-
making bodies and for private parties who apply European standards in private law. Private regulation 
through contract or through certification could be challenged under the free movement provisions. In 
the recent case of Fra.bo,46 the CJEU held that the provision on free movement of goods was 
applicable to a German private certification institute. Although it could be argued that a decisive factor 
in this case was that German legislation had provided that goods certified by this institute could be 
lawfully brought on the German market, the judgment opens the door to the application of the free 
movement provisions to certification organisations in general.47  
Standard-making bodies 
Organisations such as CEN and national standardisation organisations are definitely engaged in 
collective regulation on the basis of their legal autonomy. As such, it is likely that the free movement 
provisions are applicable to them. However, in the context of European services standardisation, it is 
unlikely that cases will be brought directly against standard-making bodies. Although CEN facilitates 
and administers the European standardisation process, the simple adoption of a European services 
standard does not achieve an important regulatory effect in law. The regulatory effect in law, and the 
possible restriction to free movement, derives from the fact that another private party voluntarily 
decides to apply the European services standard, for example in contracts or in certification activities. 
This is an important difference from European standardisation of goods, since the legal effect of 
European product standards is directly linked to the European standardisation process. The 
intervention of private law is not necessary for the European product standard to have a regulatory 
                                                     
42 Joined Cases C-177/82 and C-178/82, Criminal Proceedings against Jan van de Haar en Kaveka de Meern BV, [1984] 
ECR 1797 
43 Stefaan van den Bogaert, “Horizontality: the Court Attacks?”, in Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott, (eds.), The Law of 
the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002), 123-152. 
44 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale and others, [1974] ECR 1405. 
45 Case C-281/98, Angonese v Casa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-04139. 
46 Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) – 
Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, judgment of 12 July 2012. 
47 For a more detailed discussion, see Barend van Leeuwen, “From Status to Impact, and the Role of National Legislation: 
the Application of Article 34 TFEU to a Private Certification Organisation in Fra.bo”, (2013) 3 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation, 405-408. 
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impact. For European services standards, it is more likely that cases will be brought directly against 
private parties which apply a European standard in their regulatory conduct.  
Private regulators applying a European services standard 
To illustrate how private law disputes can lead to a challenge based on free movement law, I will give 
two (fictional) examples: 
1. A Dutch health insurer offers its customers the possibility, for a monthly supplement, to be insured 
for a limited number of cosmetic interventions. For this purpose, the health insurer concludes 
contracts with a number of private cosmetic clinics in the Netherlands and Belgium. These 
contracts expressly provide that the clinics will comply with the requirements imposed by the 
European standard for Aesthetic Surgery Services. Mrs Houben lives in Rotterdam, but she would 
like to get some Botox treatment from COSMOBILE, a private clinic based in Belgium which 
occasionally sends its cosmetic surgeons to the homes of their customers to treat them at their 
homes. Under the contract with the health insurer, they are not allowed to do this as it would be in 
breach of the European standard. COSMOBILE claims that this contractual provision constitutes a 
breach of its right to freely provide services and refuses to comply with it. It sends a “mobile 
doctor” to Mrs Houben to treat her at her home and sends an invoice to the health insurer. The 
health insurer refuses to reimburse COSMOBILE for the treatment and COSMOBILE brings an 
action for payment against the insurer. 
2. An English private certification organisation certifies tourist guides who want to provide tourist 
guide services in the UK. The European standard for tourist guide training requirements is used as 
the basis of its certification activities. It refuses to certify Mr Von Amsberg, a German tourist 
guide who wishes to provide his services in Oxford, because he has not spent 240 hours in Oxford 
as part of his practical training. Mr Von Amsberg studied Classics in Oxford forty years ago and 
believes that this requirement is an obstruction to the exercise of his right to freely provide 
services in the UK. He brings an appeal against the refusal to provide him with a certificate 
claiming that the 240 hours requirement is incompatible with free movement law.  
In both examples, private parties are applying a European services standard which they have probably 
– the possibility that they have participated in the European standardisation process cannot be 
excluded – not made themselves. The legal action is based on the decision of the private parties to 
apply the standard in private law, and on the subsequent regulatory impact of the application of the 
standard. The parties will have to bear responsibility for their choice to provide binding effect to the 
standard in law. 
What implications does the extension of the application of the free movement provisions to private 
parties have for the theory of convergence in private law through European standardisation? In 
principle, the fact that the regulatory actions of private parties can be scrutinised under EU law should 
not have a detrimental impact. At the same time, it means that the regulatory actions can be more 
closely scrutinised under the free movement provisions. Furthermore, there is a close link to the 
relationship between European standardisation and free movement of services. The horizontal direct 
effect of the free movement provisions means that an indirect obligation is imposed on the 
stakeholders which are participating in the European standardisation process to comply with free 
movement law. If they do not do so, this might mean that private parties are less likely to apply the 
standard in private law relations, as they could be held responsible for possible breaches of free 
movement law in the provisions of the European standard. 
Conclusion 
The process of convergence in private law through European standardisation is a two-stage process 
which involves European standard-making and the application of European standards in private law. 
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In this paper, I have attempted to show that the triangular relationship between free movement of 
services, European standardisation and private law will not work unless there is a degree of 
compatibility between each of the three components. At the moment, each of the bilateral relationships 
in the triangle faces certain problems which affect the overall validity of the theoretical framework. 
This might mean that certain improvements will have to be made to the European standardisation 
process. I will conclude with a number of short proposals: 
1. The European Commission should closely monitor European services standardisation processes. 
This might mean that the Commission has to get more actively involved in European 
standardisation processes. The Commission should make stakeholders aware that the provisions of 
a European standard have to comply with the free movement provisions. The stakeholders 
participating in European standardisation processes should be made aware of the implications of a 
European services standard in free movement law. 
 
2. European services standards should be developed in such a way that they can most easily and 
effectively be applied in private law. This means that it is in the interests of the participants to 
make sure that all interested parties in a particular sector have an input in the process. Even more 
importantly, if the transparency of the European standardisation process is not improved, this will 
have a detrimental impact on the application of European standards in private law.  
 
3. The application of the standards in private law should act as a legitimacy test of European services 
standards. This test will be undertaken either by national courts in deciding whether or not to give 
binding effect to European standards, or by the services sector itself – the market – in deciding 
whether or not to incorporate European standards in contracts or in certification activities. A 
consistent refusal by national courts or by stakeholders to apply European services standards 
would provide a clear message to CEN and to national standardisation organisations that structural 
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Introduction 
As a result of liberalization and the Internal Market aspiration, the bulk of the rules concerning 
telecommunications derive from the European Union. Under EU Law, Member States were required 
to set up National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs), which perform a key role in the implementation and 
enforcement process of the European legal framework. In this process, the European Union has shown 
an enforcement deficit as a result of the National Procedural Autonomy. However, even though the 
implementation and enforcement of the EU rules depends on the Member States, there is a slowly and 
growing influence by the European Union in the national regulatory activities.1  
Thus, this paper will focus on how the executive powers of the EU deeply rooted on the integration 
process and the construction of the Internal Market are encroaching on national competences on the 
sly. To this end, this paper aims at displaying the institutional design of the telecommunications sector 
in decision-making and the implementation of the EU rules under a particular case of study. 
The Internal Market harmonization has been the driver for the rise of the “Euro executive power” in 
many fields covered by EU competences but it is also extending up to other spheres traditionally 
belonging to the Member States, for instance, private relationships.  
The first part of this contribution includes the evolution of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications. Here, the paper shows how the primary aims of the Regulatory Framework are 
shifting from liberalization and competition to harmonization of the Internal Market and Consumer 
protection. The liberalization of the telecommunications sector should have led to its “deregulation” 
and the system to be governed by general competition and general contract law only.2 However, 
further liberalization measures are not (for the time being) envisaged within the development of the 
legal regime and sector-specific legislation is still being adopted.  
Secondly, this paper shows a real case of analysis, what I have termed the “OPTA case”. This is an 
implementation case which concerns the application of an EU Commission’s Recommendation. The 
examination of this case discloses the intricacies of a highly bureaucratic procedure (the so-called 
Article 7a procedure) whose raison d’être is consolidating the Internal Market for electronic 
communications (finalité) through a consistent implementation of the European Regulatory 
Framework vis-à-vis national law and the judiciary.  
Methodologically, the paper has been created under a “bottom-up” approach via an observation 
process carried out during my second year of research. The empirical evidence is, thereby, derived 
from the performance of a set of interviews with key players of the telecommunications market. 
                                                     
1 Ottow, A. (2012) ‘Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets’, European Public Law, 18(1), pp. 191–221. 
See also Cseres, K. (2013): Integrate or Separate Institutional Design for the Enforcement of Competition Law and 
Consumer Law. In Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Working Paper Series (2013-01). 
2 Recital 5 of the Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive) as amended by 
Directive 2009/140/EC and Regulation 544/2009: “the aim is progressively to reduce ex-ante sector specific rules as 
competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition law 
only (…)”.  
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Therefore, I have interviewed to staff members from the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), 
Head of Units from the European Commission, people involved in the Body of European Regulators 
for Electronic Communications (BEREC), practitioners, the Government and the industry,3 mainly in 
relation to the procedure examined as a case-study.  
The interviews were formal and recorded. All the interviews have been entirely transcribed and 
thoroughly analyzed and interpreted. Along this hermeneutic journey, I have been guided by a 
sociologist in order to get a better understanding of the information provided for with the interviews. 
As they were open-ended interviews, they give me a very comprehensive understanding of the 
analyzed institutions, their nature, their functioning and their interaction with each other. The content 
of this paper has been, thereby, shaped by the outcome of the interviews taking account of sensitive or 
fraught issues that account for where the practical problems reside. On the other hand, the information 
gathered as a result of the empirical research has been displayed following an integrated approach; i.e. 
the text is a coupled combination of parts of the interviews and its interpretation with relation to the 
formal goals and aims of the EU Regulatory Framework. As a result, the body of my paper is based on 
both, the provisions contained in the EU rules concerning telecommunications and the trends 
suggested by the empirical observation and the socio-legal analysis. However, provided that it is an 
on-going research, most of the empirical material has not been used in this short contribution, since it 
will be subject of further analysis in my PhD dissertation. 
The evolution of the telecommunications sector in the areas analyzed in this paper provides a 
comprehensive picture of the transformations operated at the level of decision-making and its impact 
in the regulation of private law relations in the national context. 
Setting the Scene. Visible Side: EU Regulatory Framework and Private Law 
European Regulatory Framework 
The legislator has pursued a functional approach which has originated regulated sectors to become 
functionally independent and it has led to the sectoralization of network services. Thus, although the 
different sectors (gas, electricity, transport, telecommunications, etc.) have followed parallel paths, 
their regulation has been carried out through a sector-specific approach, resulting in different sectorial 
regulations.  
Liberalization, harmonization of the Internal Market and the application of competition rules have 
been the cornerstones underpinning the market-opening process and the reform of the sector in order 
to accomplish with the general EU policy goal for telecommunications: ‘to develop the conditions for 
the market to provide European users with a greater variety of telecommunications services, of better 
quality and at a lower cost, affording Europe the full internal and external benefits of a strong 
telecommunications sector’.4 The vast number of rules comprising each heavily regulated vertical 
regime comprises different issues, from the liberalization of the sector, to particular provisions 
concerning contractual matters. 
                                                     
3 In this regard, I would like to thank all the people who has been interviewed to make this paper possible. All the 
participants have been very open and frankly and they have provided me with a inestimable help and information. 
Nonetheless, the opinions expressed in this paper are the result of the personal opinion and interpretation of its author. I 
would also like to acknowledge the help of Dr. Thomas Roethe (German Sociologist) who has helped me conducting and 
empirical research and interpreting the material.  
4 Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290 
final, page 3 (Introduction). For a deeper analysis see Queck, R., de Streel, A., Hou, L., Jost, J., & Kosta, E. (2010), The 
EU Regulatory Framework Applicable to Electronic Communications, in L. Garzaniti & M. O’Regan (Eds.), 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Intenet. EU Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, pp. 3-262. 
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All the enacted rules contained in three different generations of rules (telecom packages) compose 
what has been termed the ‘EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications’, which 
provides the basis for the national legislation in the field. To date, three series (generations) of rules 
have come to light. 
The First package (1980s-2002) 
The process of liberalization in the telecommunications sector was initiated by the European 
Commission in 1987, with the adoption of the Green Paper on Telecommunications,5 which brought 
the full liberalization of the sector in 1998.6 The creation of a market was on top of the initiative of the 
liberalization aspiration. 7 The market was opened to competition under Article 86 EC Treaty (now 
Article 106 TFEU). At this point, the European legislator was mainly focused on liberalizing the 
sector and enhancing competition.  
According to the 1987 Green Paper, there were several reasons originating the review process: the 
speed of technological diversification, an expanding range of new forms of access to sources of 
information, an explosive growth in communications requirements, and the major importance of scale 
effects through multinational participants. Further, the EU Commission also declared that the 
measures taken by the US and Japan affected the authorities concerned and it forced the review 
process as well.8 The main purpose of the regulatory adjustment was to create competition and, thus, 
more cost-efficient services. Additionally, it would stimulate investment and innovation. A final 
reason was that the Commission regarded at telecommunications as a sector of vital importance in 
economic activity and as ‘the most critical area for influencing the “nervous system” of modern 
society’.9  
At that stage, some European companies understood the opportunities provided by the global market 
and they were eager to compete in international trade on an equal basis. The UK was the pioneer in the 
liberalization process and, in 1984, privatized British Telecommunications. Not all Member States, 
however, agreed with the liberalization policy, and the need to reach a consensus entailed a more than 
a decade of Directives and incentives to Member States to undertake the review process.10  
The separation of the regulatory and operational functions of the incumbent was a crucial aspect for 
the liberalization purpose. These functions were formerly performed by the same entity, the incumbent 
operator. Since this would hinder the introduction of competition, entailing a risk of distortion and 
discrimination for the new entrants, the EU rules envisaged the creation of bodies independent of the 
telecommunications organizations for regulatory functions.11 Thus, as a matter of institutional choice, 
the reforms included the establishment of what afterwards would be called “National Regulatory 
Authorities” (NRAs) in order to implement liberalization policies and to perform regulatory 
functions.12  
                                                     
5 Communication from the European Commission of July 30, 1987, “Towards a dynamic European Economy: Green Paper 
on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”, COM (87) 290.  
6 Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the 
implications for Regulation - Towards an information society approach, COM (97) 623 final. (Not published in the 
Official Journal). 
7 Mr. Reinald Krüger (Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination and Markets’ –DG CONNECT– European Commission), 
Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, 15.10.2012. 
8 1987 Green Paper, supra n. 5, p. 2. 
9 Ibid., p. 1. 
10 Melody, W.H. (2012), ‘Viewpoint: The Closing of the Liberalization Era in European Telecommunication’, Competition 
and Regulation in Network Industries, Volume 13, No. 3, pp. 218-235 (see, p. 221). 
11 Article 7, Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 
192 , 24.07.1990, pp. 10-16. 
12 National Regulatory Authorities and their role is deeply analyzed below.  
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Later on, in 1997, with the aim of co-operation between the different NRAs, an Independent 
Regulators Group (IRG) was created. The IRG was formed by NRAs with the purpose of serving as a 
meeting point or forum where to share experiences and points of views among its members on issues 
concerning the development of the telecommunications market in Europe as a result of liberalization. 
The Second package (2002-2009) 
The rapid development of the sector forced the European Commission to review the first package 
shortly after its implementation. This new package (2002) was primarily aimed at the convergence of 
the Regulatory Framework in order to foster the industry’s development via technologically neutral 
and (more) flexible rules.13 The idea was to put an end to the vertical approach in the regulation of the 
different services and networks provided within the telecommunications market (for instance, all 
networks used for the transmission of radio and television programmes). Thus, due to the emergence 
of a broad range of communications services, the convergence of the ICT (Information and 
Communications Technology) sector was sought under a renewed common approach.14  
Once the liberalization machinery had been rolled-out, the second goal was the development of a 
common market for telecommunications across the European Union. Accordingly, the legal basis for 
the adoption of this second set of rules was Article 95 EC (now 114 TFEU), aimed at the 
harmonization of the Internal Market, and consumer protection (Article 153 EC, now Article 169 
TFEU). Nonetheless, the second package did not led to the replacement of all the former rules from 
the first package. Consequently, this meant a basic dualism: harmonization, on the one hand, and 
liberalization, on the other.15  
The new package, consistent with the goal of harmonization –and following the mandate of the 
Framework Directive to contribute to the development of the Internal Market by cooperating with each 
other and, unlikely to the IRG, with the Commission–,16 also included the creation of a European 
body, the European Regulators Group (ERG).17 The idea of its creation was not only to advise the 
Commission, but also to create a sort of “European network of NRAs". Thus, the purpose was to bring 
together the regulators of electronic communications and to encourage them to take a European 
perspective when performing their regulatory activities. Shortly after, the ERG started to constitute 
into study groups and to issue binding guidelines which served as benchmark exercises on the 
different regulatory topics. Accordingly, the ERG was created to enhance co-operation and co-
ordination between the Commission and the different NRAs by ensuring the proper and uniform 
implementation of the EU rules in order to ensure a more consistent approach. Although it operated in 
parallel with the IRG, its main role was to advise and assist the Commission in consolidating the 
Internal Market for electronic communications networks and services.18  
The Third package (2009-to date) 
Around two decades after the first package was launched, some Member States had successfully 
developed competition in their telecommunications markets, whereas others were still more laggard. 
This situation, linked to the incorporation of the EU Member States, the Significant Market Power 
(SMP) of national incumbents and the restricted powers of NRAs, implied a deceleration in the 
                                                     
13 Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R. (2009) The emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a new Self-standing field within 
Community Law, in Koening, C.; Bartosh, A.; Braun, J.D and Romes, M., EC Competition and Telecommunications 
Law, 2nd edition, Wolters Kluwer, pp. 41-52 (see p. 48). 
14 For a further analysis see Melody (2012) supra n. 12, pp. 223-226. 
15 Braun & Capito, op. cit. supra n. 14.  
16 Article 7(2) and Recital 36 of the Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive) as 
amended by Directive 2009/140/EC and Regulation 544/2009. 
17 Decision of the European Commission of July 29, 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services (OJ L 200, 30.7.2002, pp. 38-40).  
18 Ibid. Article 3.  
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implementation of the second package. The process flowed slower than expected and it required the 
rules to be amended and adapted to the new circumstances.  
The different directives from the 2002 package (Framework, Authorisation, Access, Universal Service 
and E-Privacy) contained review clauses providing a procedure whereby the Commission would 
review their functioning no later than three years after its transposition. Thus, the 2006 Review gave 
rise to the 2009 package or “third generation”. According to the Commission, the 2009 package was 
enacted to ‘substantially strengthen competition and consumer rights on Europe's telecoms markets, 
facilitate high-speed internet broadband connections to all Europeans’.19 Although competition had 
generally developed, this trend was fragmented and there were some countries and markets where 
competition was still lacking. Therefore, the revised rules were still (very much) based on ex-ante 
regulation.  
The ERG was replaced by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC).20 This would provide a forum of discussion between the Commission and the NRAs in 
order to foster the Internal Market for telecommunications services. Roughly speaking, BEREC is the 
body in charge of ensuring a consistent application of the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications.21 BEREC is, therefore, established as a meeting point for the co-operation of 
regulators and, in general, Member States must ensure that the goals of BEREC of promoting greater 
regulatory coordination and coherence are actively supported by the NRAs.22 
Current scenario  
The 2009 Amendment to the Framework Directive (Recital 5) states that ‘the aim is progressively to 
reduce ex-ante sector specific rules as competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, for 
electronic communications to be governed by competition law only’. Yet this does not seem to be the 
practical path that evidence suggests that it actually follows. Actually, the “de-regulation” of the sector 
has not yielded a decline in the legislation concerned; rather, the creation of the Internal Market for 
telecommunications has entailed its “re-regulation” and it has actually led to “overregulation”.23 In this 
regard, it has been pointed out that the new agenda did not include any new liberalization measure, 
any reference to the expansion of competition among providers or to any orientation concerning the 
benefits of liberalization within its policy objectives.24 This means that competition is no longer on top 
of the agenda and that further steps in this regard are not (at this moment) foreseen.25 Today there have 
been some developments but there still are: persisting bottlenecks, competition law cannot redress 
resulting market failures, and artificial barriers to market integration. These factors are the reason why 
market regulation is still needed.  
This may entail that although competition is effectively achieved in some telecommunications 
markets, regulation will continue to be adopted even once markets are competitive because there are 
greater policy aspirations. The policy aims in the telecommunications sector are found in the 101 
actions grouped in the 7 pillars of the Digital Agenda. The Pillar I is the Digital Single Market. Single 
Market presides, thereby, the actions taken under the Digital Agenda’s initiatives. It might be one of 
the reasons why, despite having achieved full competition in the telecommunications markets, the 
telecommunications legal regime will remain as such; i.e. being a sector-related regime. Furthermore, 
                                                     
19 Press Release, MEMO/09/491, Brussels, 5 November 2009. 
20 This Body was set up by the Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 1-10. The BEREC is deeply analyzed below.  
21 Article 1 BEREC Regulation. 
22 Article 3(3b) Framework Directive. 
23 Thus, for example, there are more than a hundred of different directives, decisions, regulations, recommendations and 
resolutions concerning telecommunications. 
24 Melody (2012), supra n. 10, pp. 226-227. 
25 Ibid. 
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due to the existence of deregulatory failures26 and despite its envisaged potential integration within 
competition law, the sectorial approach towards the regulation of telecommunications seems to 
survive not being by now –in practice– part of a broader horizontal approach. 
Actually, the current state of affairs is that there is a forth package being discussed in the European 
Parliament. On this occasion, the legal package is not made out of Directives, but of a Regulation27 
and a Commission’s Recommendation.28 By so doing, the EU is moving from the regulation via 
Directives to adopt legislation in the form of a Regulation (and, therefore, directly applicable) whose 
main aim is the removal of the barriers and the process of building a genuine Single Market for 
telecoms. Hence, the proposal takes Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for enacting this “one-size-
fits-all” solution, which is currently being debated in the European Parliament.  
Telecommunications and Private Law 
The liberalization of the telecommunications market has implied its displacement towards the private 
law domain. The relationship between providers and end-users is now governed by private law. 
However, since these services constitute economic activities of particular importance to citizens, they 
are subject to public intervention. Its nature as regulated markets services entails, therefore, a 
particular configuration of the contracts for the provision of these services. Here, contract law has 
been used as a regulatory tool aimed at achieving the liberalization of the market and a genuinely 
competitive European market for telecoms29. Hence, the implemented regime pursues the model of the 
regulatory State. In this model, the provision of the immediate service is entrusted to a private 
company, whereas the State guarantees that private providers comply with their supply obligations.30 
That is the reason why the EU Regulatory Framework encompasses many provisions which have an 
impact in the contractual relationship provider-recipient. In this regard, as Taggart pointed out: ‘[t]he 
State is not really doing less; it is doing it differently and often less visibly’.31  
The purpose of the liberalization was to create competition and, thus, more cost-efficient services. To 
this end, the EU Regulatory Framework also introduces a set of mechanisms aimed at the facilitation 
of the access to the incumbent’s network by new entrants; i.e. not only social, but also economic 
regulation. Consequently, there is also an impact for private law in the relationship between 
undertakings (B2B dimension). For instance, when it comes to relationships between operators (B2B 
dimension), the rules establish certain rights and obligations to meet in their contracts. This is the 
result of the market-based approach pursued by the European Union. Within this approach, the main 
idea is access, given that access regime allow alternative operators to access to the Significant Market 
Power (SMP) operators’ networks enabling competition. The goals in the wholesale and in the retail 
                                                     
26 Currently, a process of deregulation in Poland has failed (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-100_en.htm). The 
European Commission has called the Polish telecoms regulator (UKE) to withdraw its proposal to deregulate conditions 
under which other operators can access Polish telecom company Telekomunikacja Polska's (TP) broadband network in 11 
communes of Poland since –in the Commission’s view‒, it could have a negative effect on competition in Poland.  
27 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single market 
for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent - COM(2013) 627.  
28 Commission recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote 
competition and enhance the broadband investment environment - C(2013) 5761.  
29 On the idea of contract as a regulatory tool see Micklitz, H.-W. (2005) ‘The concept of competitive contract law’, Penn 
State International Law Review, The Dickinson School of Law of the University of Pennsylvania (2) 393, 549–586; and 
Micklitz, H.‐W.(2008), Regulatory Strategies on Services Contracts in EC Law. EUI LAW Working Paper No. 2008/06. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093643.  
30 Rott, P. (2005), ‘A New Social Contract Law for Public services?–Consequences from Regulation of Services of General 
Economic Interest in the EC’, European Review of Contract Law, 3, pp. 323–345.  
31 Taggart, M. (2005), ‘From ‘Parliamentary Powers’ to Privatization: The Chequered History of Delegated Legislation in the 
Twentieth Century’, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 55, pp. 575-627 (see in particular p. 615). 
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markets are closely connected. They follow common approaches, since the achievement of full 
competition in telecommunications is a mediate goal to enhance consumer’s welfare.  
At European level, the Regulatory Framework harmonises the way in which Member States regulate 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities.32 By 
way of example, the Access Directive sets up the ‘rights and obligations for operators and for 
undertakings seeking interconnection and/or access to their networks or associated facilities’.33  
The imposition of such access obligations corresponds to National Regulatory Authorities.34 Thus, 
between the different functions of these regulatory agencies, they shall conduct market analyses in 
order to detect whether specific markets are not competitive and, where appropriate, impose regulatory 
remedies on the operators which have Significant Market Power (SMP). The remedies at the 
wholesale level are: transparency obligation,35 non-discrimination obligation,36 accounting separation 
obligation,37 obligation of access to essential facilities,38 price control and cost accounting 
obligations.39 In addition, the 2009 Amendment to the Access Directive includes two new remedies: 
imposition of functional separation of vertically integrated undertakings under specific circumstances 
(ultima ratio),40 and the procedure to follow when a vertically integrated undertaking decides to carry 
out a voluntary separation.41 In case any of the wholesale remedies proves to be effective, NRAs are 
also allowed to impose regulatory obligations at the retail level.42 With the aim of protecting end-users 
interests whilst promoting effective competition, these obligations on the retail market may consist on 
the applications of appropriate retail price caps, measures to control individual tariffs, or measures to 
orient tariffs towards costs or prices on comparable markets.43 These remedies necessarily involve an 
impact in the contractual relationships among undertakings.  
Implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework. A Case of Study 
As aforementioned, the EU Regulatory Framework for Telecommunication includes provisions which 
have an impact in private law matters. When it comes to contracts between telecoms operators, NRAs 
exert price control over the prices that the incumbent charges to alternative operators for the use of the 
network, for instance. A problematic matter of competence is represented by the delegation of 
substantive competence to “specialized institutions”.44 The establishment of NRAs in the telecoms 
sector is a clear example of the partial integration or integration by sectors that Pescatore speaks 
about.45 But in order to get a clear understanding on this it is required to look at the functional 
                                                     
32 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection 
of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities; Article 1(1).  
33 Ibid. Article 1(2).  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. Article 9. 
36 Ibid. Article 10.  
37 Ibid. Article 11.  
38 Ibid. Article 12.  
39 Ibid. Article 13.  
40 Article 13a as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, 
and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (“Better Regulation 
Directive”).  
41 Article 13b as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive).  
42 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 108 , 24.04.2002, pp. 55-77) and now amended 
by the Directive 2009/136/EC (OJ L 337 18.12.2009 , pp. 11-36), Article 17(1) 
43 Ibid. Article 17(2) USD.  
44 Pescatore, p. 27.  
45 Ibid.  
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competence of such institutions as well as the interplay between the EU, the Member States and the 
established administrative structures. This might be the result of the nature of the prerogatives 
reserved to the European Commission with regard to the control mechanisms which grant it with 
certain powers aimed at the “adjustment” of the national measures; e.g. via Consultation procedures.46 
The rationale of such procedures responds to the political and legal imperatives set out at EU level.47 
A closer look to the implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
reveals a subtle increasing power of the EU Commission’s role at the functional level when it comes 
to the achievement of the regulatory goals; i.e. consistent application of the legal framework and 
harmonization of the Internal Market. The following case-study illustrates this phenomenon. 
The case analyzed (what I have termed “OPTA case”) concerns to the implementation of a 
Commission’s Recommendation on the methodology employed for the calculation of termination rates 
costs.48 This case is a good example to illustrate the implementation process of EU’s decisions on the 
Member States with implications for private law (price control in B2B contracts).  
A B2B case: Article 7 procedure and OPTA Case. Operators in play 
Article 7 procedure 
Before going into details, it would be appropriate to briefly explain the consultation mechanism which 
is analyzed in practice taking the example of a real implementation case between OPTA (former 
Dutch NRA)49 and the European Commission. In order to ensure a proper application of the EU rules, 
a control mechanism was put in place; the so-called Article 7 of the Framework Directive procedure. 
This procedure establishes a consultation and notification mechanism through which NRAs are 
required to adopt a collaborative approach informing the European Commission and the other NRAs 
when it comes to measures which may have an impact to the Internal Market. In practice, there are two 
different Article 7 procedures: Article 7 (‘Consolidating the internal market for electronic 
communications’) when performing Market Definition50 and Market Analysis procedures;51 and 
Article 7a (‘Procedure for the consistent application of remedies’) which takes place when obligations 
are imposed to operators with Significant Market Power.  
Particularly, as it stands today, the procedure of Article 7 (‘Consolidating the internal market for 
electronic communications’) establishes that the NRA concerned shall notify the European 
Commission when adopting a proposed measure for a particular market.52 The case is, then, assessed 
                                                     
46 Article 7 and 7a of the Framework Directive. In this regard, see also Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, 
Practices and the Living Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2009 
47 Pescatore, p. 45.  
48 Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU (OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74). 
49 OPTA (Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit, "Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority", in 
English) has been replaced by a single “super watchdog” body: the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets 
(“ACM”) after the merger of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), the Netherlands Consumer Authority, and 
the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA). ACM became operational as of 1st 
April 2013. 
50 Article 15 of the Framework Directive. 
51 Article 16 of the Framework Directive.  
52 The markets where competition is considered not to be effective and where national regulators are expected to carry out 
market analysis are enlisted in the Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services. These markets are: Access to the fixed telephone network; Call origination on the fixed telephone 
network; Call termination on individual fixed telephone networks; Wholesale access to the local loop; Wholesale 
broadband access; Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines; Voice call termination on individual mobile networks. 
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by the Commission, which may require the regulator for clarification or to provide more details within 
a period of three days. The European Commission will have to conclude the assessment in a period of 
one month. In case the Commission does not express “serious doubts” on the compatibility of the draft 
measure with the EU Regulatory Framework, it may provide comments and the NRA involved will 
have to take into consideration those comments when adopting the measure concerned. In case that the 
European Commission raises “serious doubts” concerning proposed measure, there will be an 
extension of two additional months of the investigation procedure, leading to the opening of what is 
called “Phase II”. During this stage, the NRA can provide further evidence and BEREC gives an 
Opinion on the Regulator’s proposal, which cannot be adopted during the proceedings. The final stage 
involves three possible scenarios: 1) the European Commission may withdraw its serious doubts, in 
which case the regulator may adopt the measure; 2) the Commission can make comments and the 
regulator must take utmost account of them when implementing the draft measure; 3) the Commission 
may require the regulator to withdraw its proposed measure.53 In any event, the regulator may also 
withdraw its draft measure at any time during either phase. 
With the 2009 review of the Regulatory Framework, the European Commission extended its 
investigation powers also on remedies, not only in market definition and market analysis. Accordingly, 
the Better Regulation Directive introduced Article 7a into the Framework Directive. Compared to 
Article 7, this new provision establishes a more complex procedure where the BEREC is required to 
intervene and cooperate with the regulator national to modify the proposal by making concrete 
recommendations. The process can be summarized as follows: 
Phase I: ‘Communication of draft regulatory measures’. This Phase may take up to 1 month period 
during which other NRAs and the BEREC may provide comments on the proposed measure, as well 
as the European Commission which may agree (providing comments or not) or raise “serious doubts”. 
Phase IIa: ‘Regulatory Dialogue’. This Phase may take up to 3 months preventing the adoption of the 
draft measure (standstill period).54 Within the first six weeks, the BEREC may issue and Opinion 
expressing an evaluation of the Commission’s serious doubts. In that case, there is a process of 
cooperation between the actors involved (the BEREC, the Commission and the NRA). This stage may 
finalize in 3 different ways: a) the NRA withdraws its proposal; b) the NRA amends its proposal 
taking utmost account of the Commission’s serious doubts and BEREC’s Opinion; or c) the NRA 
maintain its proposal.  
Phase IIb: ‘Commission say on remedies’. If the NRA decides not to withdraw from its proposal, as 
well as in case that the BEREC does not share the Commission’s serious doubts or it has no Opinion, 
it goes to the European Commission. In this case, the Commission has 1 month to, first, issue a 
Recommendation requiring the withdrawal or the amendment of the Regulator’s proposal or, second, 
withdraw its serious doubts. In any case, the Commission is not entitled to veto the imposition of 
remedies. Therefore, the ultimate decision about modifying the proposal or maintain it unchanged 
remains with the national regulator.  
Finally, within 1 month after the Commission’s position, the national regulator has to inform the 
Commission and the BEREC about the final measures taken, and where the Commission’s 
Recommendation has not been followed, the NRA shall provide a reasoned justification.  
The following chart illustrates the whole process of Article 7a: 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Nonetheless, However, if a NRA detects consistent market failure on another market/s, it is allowed to regulate it, but it 
will have to justify its decision. 
53 Under the Article 7 procedure, the Commission is empowered to “veto” draft measures, where such measures seek: to 
define markets other than those defined in the Commission Recommendation; or to designate or not operators with 
significant market power and such draft measures would affect trade between Member States, and the Commission 
considers that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single European market or has serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with Community law. 
54 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive). 
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What is the Article 7a procedure in practice? The consultation procedure of Article 7a is about the 
subsidiarity principle in so far as market analysis ‒the cornerstone of the regulatory model for 
telecommunications‒ is carried out at the national level by the National Regulatory Authorities. It 
results in a supervisory mechanism which is ‘controlled to a large extent by the Commission and now, 
with the recent addition, the BEREC’.55 Through this mechanism, the European Commission attempts 
to achieve consistency in the application of the EU Regulatory Framework in concert with the BEREC 
and the different NRAs.  
Article 7a in practice: OPTA and the European Commission 
This case illustrates the functioning of Article 7a procedure in a real situation which involves the 
participation of a NRA (OPTA), the European Commission, the BEREC, groups of interest (in this 
case the telecommunications operators) and the judiciary in the regulatory process. It has resulted in a 
highly controversial case by a NRA (OPTA) vis-à-vis the European Commission on the 
implementation of a Commission’s Recommendation.  
NRAs are required to take the utmost account of the policy objectives contained in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive, namely: promotion of competition, contribution to the development of the 
Internal Market, and promotion of the interests of the citizens of the European Union. The European 
Framework requires NRAs (whence OPTA), among other tasks, to investigate market termination.56 In 
2009, the European Commission issued a Recommendation on termination rates.57 Without 
elaborating the technical details, termination rates are the rates which telecoms networks charge each 
other to deliver calls between their respective networks; i.e. how much mobile phone operators can 
charge to connect calls on each other’s networks. These costs are ultimately included in call prices 
paid by consumers and businesses. The 2009 Commission’s Recommendation establishes that 
termination rates (fixed and mobile) should be calculated on the basis of the effectively costs incurred 
by an efficient operator using the pure Bottom-up Long Run Incremental Cost (BULRIC) 
methodology for its calculation. This method imposed a stricter costs measurement method. Thus, 
unlikely to the previous method used (BULRIC+), under the pure BULRIC methodology there are 
some of the costs which result not included in the tariff. 
On 2010 (July, the 7th), OPTA published its market analysis including its decision in relation to: (a) 
the review of the wholesale market for voice call termination on individual public telephone networks 
provided at a fixed location; and (b) the review of the wholesale market for voice call termination on 
individual mobile networks in the Netherlands. This decision included conditions establishing price 
control for mobile and fixed termination rates in line with Article 13 of the Access Directive. The 
methodology used by OPTA in that decision, consistent with the Commission’s Recommendation, was 
based on the pure BULRIC cost standard, because it was considered to be the best way to regulate for 
the highest consumer welfare.58  
This decision gave rise to a judicial procedure before the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 
(College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, the “CBb”) following the appeal of a number of 
telecommunications operators in the Netherlands59 against OPTA’s decision. Several issues were 
raised within the appeal. One of them is that the OPTA’s decision to set the price controls on the basis 
                                                     
55 Mr. Reinald Krüger (Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination and Markets’ –DG CONNECT– European Commission), 
Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, 15.10.2012. 
56 Article 15 of the Framework Directive and the the Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC on Relevant Markets.  
57 Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU (OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74).  
58 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
59 T-Mobile Netherland B.V., Vodafone Libertel B.V., Koninklijke KPN N.B., KPN B.V., Telfort B.V., and Lycamobile 
Netherlands B.V. 
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of the pure BULRIC cost standard. It implied that operators were no longer allowed to include certain 
costs in their tariffs.60  
The CBb’s Judgment was released on 31st August 2011. In very broad terms, the Court, upholding the 
appeal, argued that despite the Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates, conditions 
remained unchanged and, therefore, there was no reason to change the methodology for cost 
calculation from plus to pure BULRIC. As a result, the Court required OPTA to take a new decision 
setting the relevant rates on the basis of BULRIC+ methodology.61 As summarized by the BEREC, 
“according to the CBb, Dutch national law does not oblige OPTA to adopt precisely the measure 
which maximizes consumer benefits regardless of the consequences for the regulated operators. In this 
regard, the CBb stated that it is necessary to assess the proportionality of the measure”.62 In addition, 
according to the Court, in the interpretation of Article 6a.7(2) of the Dutch Telecommunications Act 
(Telecommunicatiewet), OPTA “does provide no support for an interpretation to the effect that a form 
of price regulation might be imposed which goes beyond a price measure that can already be 
considered cost-oriented.”.63  
Pursuant to Article 7a consultation procedure, in January 2012, OPTA notifies the European 
Commission the new decision complying with the Court’s Judgment and setting the rate following the 
BULRIC+ methodology. Since this measure departs from the 2009 Commission’s Recommendation 
on termination rates, OPTA justifies this deviation on the basis of the legally binding nature of the 
CBb Judgment as the highest appeal body in the Netherlands. During Phase I, the European 
Commission raised serious doubts and sent a serious doubts letter to OPTA on the 13th February 2012 
opening Phase II investigation.64 In that letter, the Commission expressed doubts concerning the 
compatibility of the measure with the European Regulatory Framework and provided reasons why it 
believed that the draft measure not only would create a barrier to the internal market, but it also stated 
that it would involve an increase in the retail prices originating a decline in the consumer welfare.65 In 
particular, the Commission considered that the measure did not comply with the requirements of 
Article 16(4) of the Framework Directive, and Article 8(4) of the Access Directive in conjunction with 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive. In this regard, the European Commission acknowledges that 
NRAs are allowed to deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation but, in that event, the deviation 
should be duly justified in light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles of the Regulatory 
Framework. In the eyes of the European Commission, OPTA did not provide any economic 
                                                     
60 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012.: “When we take a decision, we have to formally 
consult the draft decision and, then, they (the operators) react to it and said: ‘we don’t agree with it’. That’s what always 
saying and then there should be lower prices, because there are lower costs. Then, you as a company you’re a not happy, 
it is logical and… So, there is a consultation phase and after that we have a final decision and, then, they have, of course, 
the right of defense… and they have a right to go to the Court and fight the decision and they did that successfully”.  
61 Actually, the CBb itself set the price cap for Mobile Termination Rates at 0.056 €/min as of 7 July 2010, 0.042 €/min as of 
1 January 2011, 0.027 €/min as of 1 September 2011, and 0.024 €/min as of 1 September 2012 on the basis of the plus 
BULRIC methodology and OPTA's own calculations. 
62 BEREC Opinion in Phase II investigation pursuant to Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC Case NL/2012/1284 – Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 
in the Netherlands Case NL/2012/1285 – Voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands, 
BoR(12)23.  
63 CBb Judgment, 4.8.3.4.  
64 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012: “The process of notification requires that you have to 
notify again to the Commission. So, we came with the Commission and said: “ok, we are going to do this, we have a 
Court decision, we cannot do anything else than this, so this is what we are going to do”. And, then, the Commission got 
very annoyed, because they got serious doubts about what we were doing there with regard to the economic analysis 
underlying your decision”.  
65 Commission Recommendation of 13 June 2012, in accordance with Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services ("Framework Directive") in Case NL/2012/1284: call termination on individual public telephone 
networks provided at a fixed location in the Netherlands and in Case NL/2012/1285: voice call termination on individual 
mobile networks in the Netherlands; C(2012) 3770.  
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justification of the departure from the pure BULRIC methodology that guarantees that the BULRIC+ 
methodology would equally promote efficiency and sustainable competition, as well as maximize 
consumer benefit in the Dutch market.66 In addition, the European Commission considered that it 
would create barriers to the Internal Market because mobile termination rates set via the pure BULRIC 
level would contribute to a level playing field at EU level, by eliminating competition distortions 
between fixed and mobile networks.67  
This serious doubts letter initiated the Phase II investigation during which (3 months period) the draft 
measure cannot be adopted (standstill period).68 However, in the case concerned, the revised mobile 
termination rates based on the BULRIC+ methodology were already in effect in the Netherlands, as a 
direct effect of the CBb’s Judgment. During this Phase, the BEREC is required to issue an Opinion on 
the serious doubts letter indicating its position. To this end, and following the mandate enshrined in 
Article 7a(3) of the Framework Directive, an specific Expert Working Group within the BEREC was 
established.69 
This EWG held its first meeting in London the 20th February 2012. OPTA was invited to provide 
further clarifications and explanations. It followed several questions which were sent to OPTA who 
replied by the 28th February. A second video-conference meeting took place one week later, the 7th 
March, for supplementary clarifications. By the 15th March, on the basis of a comprehensive economic 
analysis, the EWG had drafted an Opinion which was referred to the BEREC’s Board of Regulators 
for comments. On the 23th March a final Opinion was adopted by the majority of the Board of 
Regulators. In that decision, the BEREC finds that the serious doubts raised by the European 
Commission were justified and it agrees that: 1) OPTA has not provided an economic justification for 
the use of the BULRIC+ methodology as the appropriate measure “to promote efficiency and 
sustainable competition and maximize consumer benefits set out in Recital 20 to the Access Directive” 
and; 2) the proposed measure may create a barrier to the Internal Market. Nonetheless, as for the 
BEREC’s position on whether the measures should be amended or withdrawn, it did not consider 
appropriate to impose on OPTA a particular way to proceed due to the legally binding nature of the 
Judgment by the CBb. 70 
Although OPTA may share the view of BEREC and the European Commission as regard the 
application of the pure BULRIC methodology, it is impossible to do otherwise because ‘there was 
only one outcome possible and it was to follow the Court’.71 Formally, it results in a complex situation 
because OPTA has to apply the Court’s decision. On the other hand, it is not a problem of 
compatibility of Dutch Law with EU Law, because the concerned provision existed as from 2004 and 
the European Commission never raised questions concerning the law, only about the specific 
reasoning of the Court.72 That means that the Commission is not claiming the lack of compliance of 
Dutch law with EU law, but the Court’s ruling, as long as it ordered OPTA to set the price on the basis 
of the BULRIC+ methodology contrary to the Commission’s Recommendation.  
                                                     
66 European Commission serious doubts letter.  
67 European Commission serious doubts letter.  
68 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC. 
69 The EWG was charged with the task of drafting an opinion containing a summary of the notification and the serious 
doubts, the experts’ analysis, and clear conclusions concerning the compatibility of the proposed regulatory measure with 
the EU Regulatory Framework, as well as the provision of possible alternative proposals (if any). 
70 BEREC Opinion in Phase II investigation pursuant to Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC Case NL/2012/1284 – Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 
in the Netherlands Case NL/2012/1285 – Voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands, 
BoR(12)23: “BEREC therefore considers that the Commission’s serious doubts, as narrowly expressed in its letter to 
OPTA of 13 February 2012 (i.e. without explicitly addressing the legally binding nature of the CBb’s judgment for 
OPTA), are justified”.  
71 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
72 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
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This situation perfectly reflects a clear decoupling between the CBb’s Judgment and the EU 
understanding, which puts on the table the debate on the nature of the EU soft-law; i.e. the binding 
effect of the 2009 Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates in this case. In this regard, 
NRAs (OPTA in the case concerned) are requested to take “utmost account” of the Commission 
comments. Utmost account comes into play in order to modulate the relationship among the different 
participating institutions. As a matter of fact, the CBb decided that its conclusions are not affected by 
the Commission’s Recommendation and that NRAs have to take utmost account does not involve that 
OPTA cannot deviate from the (non-binding) Recommendation, especially if it implies the breaching 
of the national law.73 In the words of the Dutch Court, ‘that Article 19(1) of the Framework Directive 
requires Member States to ensure that national regulatory authorities, when carrying out their duties, 
try their utmost to use the recommendations of the Commission, it does not affect the obligation of 
OPTA to deviate from the ‒non-binding‒ call termination recommendation because they would 
otherwise act in violation of provisions of national law’.74 That is the only reference made to “utmost 
account” throughout the Judgment. Utmost account, then, would imply that ‘you do not have to follow 
it exactly, but you have to take account of it’.75 However, the Court did not go deeper into the nature of 
the Recommendation and did not clarify what “utmost account” actually involves either. Actually, it 
could have been the perfect breeding ground for referring the case to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) asking for the clarification on the scope of “utmost account” and its 
definition, as well as to the binding force of soft-law measures; i.e. EU Commission’s 
Recommendations.  
This has resulted to a complex situation because the European Commission is not allowed to compel 
the national Court to do it otherwise. Besides, although NRAs are supposed to be independent, OPTA 
would not have been allowed to adopt the decision establishing the pure BULRIC methodology in so 
far as the Court would annul it again. Neither could OPTA appeal the Court’s decision due to the fact 
that, in the Netherlands, there is no higher appeal body as a result of the choice for efficient 
procedures. Otherwise, OPTA would have appealed the CBb’s ruling.76The result was, then, a 
“deadlock situation” which could have been overcome if the Court would have asked to the CJEU for 
its opinion on the interpretation of the status of the Commission’s Recommendation.77 In the same 
vein, the European Commission also considers that the Dutch Court should have referred the case to 
the CJEU.78 In addition, if the case would not have been decided by the highest Court, the European 
Commission would have used the Amicus Curiae formula in order ‘to help the Dutch regulator in 
front of the national court’.79 
                                                     
73Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012.: 'And the Commission formally –and that’s also what 
the Court acknowledges– is that, formally, its Recommendation is not a binding measure, is not binding to OPTA, that 
measure. That’s also why the Court says: ‘ok, if it is not binding, it is just a Recommendation, is not binding’. So, OPTA 
is not bind to follow that Recommendation, but the law –in the way as the Court explains it- is binding. So…”. 
74 CBb’s Judgement 4.8.3.6.  
75 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
76 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
77 Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012.: “Another solution for this situation is to appeal this 
Court asks the European Court for their opinion. That would be, in these types of cases, would be very appropriate, the 
thing to do for the Dutch Court, but they did not do that. So, yeah, that is their decision and we cannot influence that, but, 
of course, if you have these difficult interpretations of the status of a Recommendation I would say “I would ask the 
European Court for that”, but that’s my personal opinion”.  
78 Mr. Reinald Krüger (Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination and Markets’ –DG CONNECT– European Commission), 
Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, 15.10.2012: “That would normally the case when you speak to others 
judges in other Member States, they would tell you: Mmm, that should have normally been referred to Luxembourg. And 
that was not the case”. 
79 Mr. Reinald Krüger (Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination and Markets’ –DG CONNECT– European Commission), 
Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, 15.10.2012. 
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Network Approach. Law-Making vis-à-vis Implementation: A Thin Line 
By and large, like communications technologies, the Regulatory Framework for telecommunications 
services has evolved over the time giving rise to different generations of EU rules in line with the (also 
changing) policy goals. Thus, while the primary goal was to opening-up markets, the harmonization 
aim is becoming prominent and it is overshadowing the transition to competition. Hence, although 
regulatory convergence (ex-ante/ex-post) was expected, reality shows how the sector-related regime is 
increasingly deviating from pure market regulation (encompassing also social regulation; e.g. 
universal service) and –when it comes to private law provisions– from general contract law, leading to 
the creation of specific rules aimed at promoting competition (e.g. access and interconnection) giving 
rise to the governing of private relationships in line with the EU’s mandates.  
The liberalization of the telecommunications sector has favored the emergence of a particular 
ecosystem. Within its multiple “species”, the telecommunications ecosystem presents outstanding 
elements, namely the European Commission, the BEREC and the different National Regulatory 
Authorities. This system, and the interactions among its elements, is built under a network of 
cooperation. In the sense that Ladeur describes,80 within this network, there are no hierarchical 
relationships; rather the network tries to give shape to the multiple relationships (heterarchical) which 
take place among its different members. The observation process shows how the Internal Market 
approach, which ‒in turn‒ is the ultimate goal of the EU Regulatory Framework, is the main reason 
that has paved the way for the evolutionary development of the network. As we have seen, the 
telecommunications sector is now more committed with the harmonization of the Internal Market 
rather than liberalization.  
At the national level, the interplay between the EU provisions and national law is articulated by the 
decisive role performed by NRAs. Thus, the particular institutional design of the telecommunications 
legal regime has inevitably implied the transformation of the traditional private law approach when it 
comes to decision-making. Traditionally, the regulation of private law was carried out by the 
legislative power in a narrow sense (i.e. the parliament) in combination with some minor interventions 
by the executive. Nonetheless, the regulation of telecommunications services involves new 
instruments and actors as opposed to the traditional ones. As a result of the “inevitable delegation”,81 
the legislative power does not correspond only to a concrete actor (individually considered, the 
legislature), but it now lies also on the hands of different players. Altogether, the BEREC, the different 
NRAs and the European Commission are linked by an interdependence relationship which is 
modulated by the two-ways formula of “utmost account”, which in the absence of any legal definition, 
each side ‒inevitably‒ reads it differently.  
The examination of a real case (OPTA case) has disclosed the intricacies of the highly bureaucratic 
Article 7a procedure. The case reveals the lack of capacity of the EU to implement EU rules according 
to the EU’s aspirations. For that reason, it has set up of a proper institutional framework made out of 
national players (NRAs), European fora (BEREC) and implementing procedures (Article 7 
Framework Directive) which ensure the application of the Regulatory Framework according to the EU 
understanding and in line with its policy goals.  
As a result, the UE’s lack of specific competence in the field of private law seems to be filled via the 
establishment of a “multilayered institutional structure” (network approach). 82 There is no hierarchy 
                                                     
80 Ladeur, K.-H. (2010), “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General Administrative Law”. 
See also Ladeur, K.-H. (2010), “The State in International Law” in C. Joerges & J. Falke (eds.), The Social 
Embeddedness of Transnational Markets, Oxford, Hart Publishing.  
81 Here we have to recall Taggart, M. (2005), ‘From ‘Parliamentary Powers’ to Privatization: The Chequered History of 
Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century’, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 55, pp. 575-627 (see in 
particular p. 615). 
82 Svetiev, Y. (2012), W(h)ither Private Law in the face of the Regulatory Deluge, in: Hans-W. Micklitz & Yane Svetiev 
(eds.), A Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2012/31, pp. 26-44. 
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between the EU and the national level or any transfer of powers; rather, the “network” is underpinned 
by a system of supervision aimed at the achievement a consistent application of the EU provisions, 
giving the Commission police powers to achieve the policy goals. This transnationally “networked” 
institutional setting83 is aimed at the creation of a governance network which becomes into the new 
private law-maker. This perfectly marries with the legal basis employed to regulate 
telecommunications services (Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU aimed at the harmonization of the 
Internal Market). Provided that the European Regulatory Framework encompasses contract law 
provisions, the use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis has given rise to a process “private law 
creation via harmonization of the Internal Market”. In so doing, the EU is following a functionalist 
approach (Internal Market as a finalité and as an objective) which also touches upon 
contract/consumer law (integration through private law).84 All of this is shaped within the own 
Regulatory Framework for electronic communications displaying specific features of a self-contained 
system.85  
To conclude, decision-making at EU level takes place in a wide range of forms. In the telecoms sector, 
it occurs via an institutional design based on a system of executive federalism where the Commission 
holds strong supervisory powers which prevent the distorted application of the EU rules relying on a 
collaborative approach which aims at the removal of divergences among the performance of the 
different national regulatory authorities. Interestingly, what it is also at stake in the case analyzed is 
the role of EU soft-law. In any case, this paper has illustrated how the division of roles policy/law-
making vis-à-vis execution/implementation gets blurred when it comes to the supervisory powers of 
the Commission who tries to give shape not only to the implementation of the measures adopted at EU 
level, but also to its (consistent) application.   
(Contd.)                                                                  
See also Hancher, L. & Larouche, P., (2011) The Coming of Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries and Services 
of General Economic Interest. In G. de B. P. Craig, ed. The Evolution of EU Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 743-779.  
83 Here we have to recall Ladeur K-H, (2010), The State in International Law, in Joerges/Falke (eds.), Karl Polanyi, 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, Hart Publishing Oxford, pp. 397-418. See also Svetiev, 
Y. (2012), supra n.82.  
84 Schmid, C. (2005), The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications 
on a European Contract Law Code, European Review of Contract Law, vol. 1(2) pp. 211-227. 
85 See Micklitz, H.-W. & Svetiev, Y. (eds.), A Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?, EUI Working 
Papers Law No. 2012/31, pp. 26-44. 
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SECTION III: TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
FRANCOVICH: LIABILITY FOR SYSTEMIC REGULATORY FAILURE 
Rónán Condon 
On one view Francovich state liability arose in an ad hoc fashion from the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
to solve a particular problem: the asymmetry caused by the unwillingness of the CJEU to allow 
horizontal direct effect in Dori.1 It was meant to be an exceptional remedy in cases where the State 
failed to implement directives which granted rights to individuals under European law. It is hybrid 
because the EU has no competence in private law, and in consequence there is no harmonised law of 
remedies.2 Nevertheless, relying on a balancing exercise between the effectiveness of European law 
and the procedural autonomy of national law, Francovich and subsequent jurisprudence is fashioning a 
jurisprudence which has implications for national private law.3 At first blush, its ‘logic’ is that of ubi 
ius, ibi remedium but how this plays out in practice is far more subtle than the simple formula would 
lead us to believe. The precise balancing obtained at CJEU level has been categorised by Tridimas as a 
mixture of ‘outcome cases’, ‘guidance cases’, and ‘deference cases’.4 The doctrine has been met with 
strong criticism because it fragments national law and the political choices that undergird doctrine, not 
to mention the division of competences between the EU and member states.5 
In this short paper these issues will not be examined. Instead, it is argued that as the jurisprudence set 
in motion by Francovich works itself out, there are profound implications for national private law. 
This is particularly the case in common law jurisdictions which do not embrace a concept of systemic 
fault. By virtue of its ad hoc emergence its means of conceptualizing the relationship between the 
State and private tortfeasors has largely been ignored.6 The disputes it treats which tend to be on the 
border between public law rights (or constitutional rights if one prefers) and private remedies tend to 
cut across national limitations on doctrines such as vicarious liability, non-delegable duties and tricky 
                                                     
1 Dori v. Recreb srl, Case C-91/92, [1994] ECR I-3325. 
2 The traditional position per Rewe (1976)/Rewe (1981) is set out concisely by Kilpatrick in C Kilpatrick ‘The Future of 
Remedies in Europe’ in C Kilpatrick & others (eds.) The Future of Remedies in Europe (2000 Hart Publishing). ‘Rights 
or substantive issues concerning EC law were for the Court of Justice while remedies and procedural issues concerning 
the enforcement of EC law rights were for the national legal orders and the national courts.’ (3) 
3 T Tridimas refers to Francovich as ‘the apex of the principle of effectiveness and a culmination of a gradual trend towards 
the transformation of primacy from an abstract principle of constitutional law to a specific obligation on national courts 
to provide full and effective protection of Community rights.’ in T Tridmas ‘State Liability in Damages: Vingt Ans 
Apres’ (1).  
4 T Tridimas ‘State Liability in Damages: Vingt ans Apres’. ‘The Court may give an answer so specific that it leaves the 
referring court no margin for manoeuvre and provides it with a ready-made solution to the dispute (outcome cases); it 
may, alternatively, provide the referring court with guidelines as to how to resolve the dispute (guidance cases); or it may 
answer the question in such general terms that, in effect, it defers to the national judiciary on the point in issue (deference 
cases).’ (4) 
5 C Harlow ‘Francovich and the Disobedient State’ (1996) E.L.J 199. C Harlow ‘A Common European Law of Remedies?’ in 
C Kilpatrick (n 2). 
6 C Harlow goes far, however, in conceptualizing how Francovich fits into this relationship. See C Harlow State Liability 
(OUP Oxford 2004) Ch. 4. 
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questions about the liability of peripheral parties.7 These limitations often shield the State from 
liability. The personal liability of office holders tends to be diminished with liability increasingly 
being based on systemic regulatory failure.8 It is not torts by individuals that are important but the 
failure of the State per se in its positive obligations. If this failure can be described as sufficiently 
serious, liability should follow. As Francovich moves outward from non-implementation cases to 
those of misapplication of European law these tensions are increased. Francovich becomes, therefore, 
an engine for creative jurisprudence which reconfigures the relationship between the State and private 
parties by extending conceptually and practically the scope of state responsibility. 
By these lights, the Paul decision and the more recent COS.MET (hereafter Cosmet) will be examined. 
To set the scene for this examination, first the ‘logic’ of Francovich will be explained. This will focus 
on its cross-cutting nature. The argument will proceed to briefly the link between the activist 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the situation of the EU as a regulatory State, before suggesting that 
Francovich will continue to be a fertile ground for innovative remedies. 
The Emergence of a ‘Eurotort’: Expansive Potential, Inherent Limitations9 
The principle of Community law laid down in Francovich ‘that the Member States are obliged to 
make good loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can 
be held responsible’ was distilled into a three stage test in Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame.10 
Tridimas refers to Francovich as the ‘apex’ of European law because it is a logical out-working of the 
principle of primacy11:  
The judgment in Francovich marked the apex of the principle of effectiveness and the culmination of a 
gradual trend towards the transformation of primacy from an abstract principle of constitutional law to 
a specific obligation on national courts to provide full and effective protection of Community rights. 
[citations omitted]12 
The remedy developed, therefore, as an adjunct to the directly effective individual rights resulting 
from the Treaty declared as far back as Van Gend en Loos. In this sense, it is part of the 
‘constitutionalization’ of the Treaty.13 The relevant concept that underpins the relationships between 
rights and remedies is ubi ius, ibi remedium. This is buttressed by a rule of law argument most 
explicitly stated by Advocate General Tesauro. AG Tesauro argued that over time limitations of the 
neminem laedere principle in respect of legislative and other activities of the State have diminished as 
the balance of interest between those of the State and the individual has changed.14 He reasoned that:  
                                                     
7 C Harlow borrowing from Allison’s analysis of Fuller’s conception of ‘polycentric disputes’ argues that the question of 
state liability poses particularly difficult policy questions. See C Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (OUP 
2004) ch. 2; JWF Allision’Fuller’s Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication’ (1994) 53 
Cambridge LJ 367; and J Stapleton ‘Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for Deterrence’ 
(1995) 111 LQR 301. 
8 This seems at first glance similar to the approach of French Administrative Courts with regard to faute de service.  
9 I borrow the term Eurotort from P Giliker ‘English Tort Law and the Challenge of Francovich Liability: 20 Years on (2012) 
L.Q.R. 541. 
10 Francovich v Italy Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357 para 37; Brasserie du Pecheur v Germany and R v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex pa Factortame Ltd Joined Cases C-46 & C-48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029. 
11 Unlike the other general principles, the Francovich state liability doctrine does not derive from the law of the Member 
States but is an outworking of the principle of effectiveness see T Tridimas ‘The Principle of Effectiveness’ in T 
Tridimas ‘The General Principles of European Law’ (Oxford OUP 1999). 
12 T Tridimas State Liability in Damages: Vingt Ans Apres’. 
13 T Tridimas The General Principles of European Law (Oxford OUP 2006), 5. 
14 AG Tesauro para. 12. 
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In particular, the emergence of the State governed by the rule of law has resulted in an increasing shift 
of emphasis at least in the more advanced legal systems, from the conduct of the perpetrator of the 
damage to the rights of the injured party, as in the case of liability generally.15 
This does not mean, of course, that the interests of the State are ignored but merely that the balance 
has tilted in favour of the protection of individual rights. A fortiori, a stronger protection of individual 
rights is favoured also at the European level.16 This development has, of course, a harmonizing 
tendency because the change of emphasis between immunity and liability although largely favouring a 
greater scope for recovery has been struck differently in the main jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions 
such as the UK have proceeded cautiously and incrementally, whereas others such as France have 
been more generous in formulating rules of recovery.17 In any event, the Francovich and post-
Francovich jurisprudence has sought to establish a baseline of recovery throughout the Community on 
the basis of the rule of law. If we go deeper into this rule of law ‘logic’, however, we find the germ of 
an idea that the State is the guarantor of individual rights and has a positive role to ensure that these 
rights are vindicated. When rights and remedies are combined according to the principle ubi ius, ibi 
remedium, therefore, the potential for liability in frontier areas of liability is greatly enlarged, as will 
be demonstrated below. This ‘logic’ tends to cut across policy arguments against recovery in tort law 
and enlarges the scope of vicarious liability, and what has been described as the liability of peripheral 
parties. This ‘logic’ comes with a proviso however. These are not a carte blanche for unbridled 
judicial activism because through the definition of the criteria in the Francovich test, balancing of 
rights against other policy concerns can re-emerge. It simply inverts the exercise, placing rights before 
policy – a change of emphasis that AG Tesauro’s opinion indicates. 
That the protection of individual rights is at the forefront of analysis is clear, but this is a particularly 
nuanced form of rights protection. Engstrom refers to this rights-based rhetoric as ‘functional 
subjectivation’.18 That is, rights exist to give effect to European law rather than being based on 
protective interests as per tort law notably in the UK and Germany.19 There remains a tension between 
private law as a law of protected interests and effet utile as is evident in Paul and is discussed below. 
The functionalization of the remedy towards the ends of European law makes it difficult to classify 
Francovich as a constitutional tort in a traditional understanding of the term.20 The fact that it follows 
this functional logic, however, means such a remedy is consonant with the wider regulatory 
functionalization of European private law.21 However, Tridimas cautions against a focus on this 
                                                     
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid para. 13: ‘The fact that the Member States, even though subject to conditions limiting the scope of liability in different 
ways, may be called upon to answer for loss or damage caused by legislative activity of the public authorities suggests in 
itself that it is unreasonable that they should invariably and in any event not be liable for infringements of Community 
law which have an effect on the financial situation of individuals affected by those infringements.’ 
17 I think it is accurate to state that the approach favoured in the UK rests on Lord Diplock’s more cautious formulation of 
how the common law of torts should develop in Dorset v Home Office [1970] AC 1004. This cautious approach has been 
supplemented, however, by the Human Rights Act which is a new basis of formulating tort claims. However, there is a 
tendency in the UK to conceptually differentiate the Human Rights Act from tort law. This is only partially correct, 
however, as some development of tort law has occurred which has been inspired by the Human Rights Act. This has 
resulted in a patchwork law of torts and has been deplored by a number of scholars see D Nolan ‘The Liability of Public 
Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefits’ (2011) L.Q.R 260.  
18 M Ruffert also uses this phrase in his ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 
34 CML Rev. 307. 
19 The protected interests analysis of tort law is an interpretation of English tort law which unlike German tort law does not 
list protected interests. See C Von Dam European Tort Law (OUP Oxford 2005). 
20 See Lee for a discussion of this point: IB Lee ‘In Search of a Theory of State Liability in the European Union’ Harvard 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/99. 
21 H-W. Micklitz ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law 
from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’ EUI Working Paper EUI Working Papers LAW 
2008/14. 
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expediency in Francovich as representing but a partial picture.22 The protection of rights is to be taken 
seriously in a dynamic constitution. 
Thus, an autonomous ‘Eurotort’ which is meant, according to its described end, to ensure the 
effectiveness of European law by providing a compensatory remedy in the case of a breach of Treaty 
rights, which include rights derived from secondary legislation, has emerged. It is a ‘Eurotort’ in the 
sense that it is an extra-contractual remedy for breach of Community law distinct from national bases 
of recovery. In this sense, it is a new cause of action which individuals can invoke before their national 
courts. However, because the criteria are not self-explanatory and are under-determined, they require 
to be applied to concrete cases by national courts. In consequence, its development will be influenced 
by existing national tort law as courts grapple to find analogies to embed this form of recovery.23  
The criteria enumerated include that the ‘rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on 
individuals’, that ‘the breach must be sufficiently serious’, and finally that there ‘must be a direct 
causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and damage sustained by the 
injured party’.24 In those cases outwith simple non-implementation of European law, the notion of 
‘sufficiently serious breach’ translates into a ‘test’ to determine whether the Member State concerned 
‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion.’25 This test depended on criteria stated 
at paragraph 56 of the Brasserie judgment: 
The factors which the competence court may take into consideration include the clarity and precision 
of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or Community 
authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether 
any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact the position taken by a Community institution 
may have contributed by the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices 
contrary to Community law.26 
The relevant criteria were established in Brasserie du Pecheur and are, it is submitted, flexible rules of 
thumb which require application to diverse factual nexuses.27 In short, although it is clear that 
‘sufficiently serious breach’ does not amount to a concept of negligence or fault recognised the 
national laws of member states, it is unclear what exactly the concept imports.28 Indeed, although not 
fault according to a recognisable national standard, the emphasis on conduct as a relevant factor tends 
to blur the lines somewhat. This has been the case from the very first important cases. This fact that 
the conduct of the member state is a necessary but not sufficient condition to determining whether a 
breach is ‘sufficiently serious’ means that the distinction between Francovich liability and national 
conceptions of negligence or fault remains to be seen.29 This is not particularly troublesome in simple 
cases of non-implementation of European law where Francovich liability seems to be applied as if it 
were a strict liability standard but poses problems in mis-application cases.  
                                                     
22 T Tridimas (n ) 500-501. 
23 For a good illustration of the difficulties this may cause see P Giliker (n 9). 
24 Cases C-46/93 & c-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur & Factortame. para 51. 
25 Ibid para 55. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Like the negligence concept itself it is argued that the concept of ‘sufficiently serious breach’ simply guides judges in their 
decision-making. It does not present a ready answer i.e. cannot be applied deductively save for the simple case of non-
implementation. In misapplication cases the answer is rarely as apparent. 
28 Brasserie du Pecheur paras. 77-78. The Court made clear that the remedy does not depend on the concept of fault although 
‘certain objective and subjective factors connected with the concept of fault under a national legal system may well be 
relevant for the purposes of determining whether or not a given breach of Community law is serious (...).’  
29 It is argued that some element of fault is required but I would not go as far as Lee who argues that ‘sufficiently serious 
breach’ is fault by another name. See Lee (n 20). 
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It is argued that the more the case-law develops the more the application of the concept will gain 
consistency and refinement. This approach, it is submitted, indicates that these criteria which rest on 
notions such as manifest and grave disregard of discretion and on the notion of conferral of a right are 
sufficiently open textured to allow for a great deal of casuistry, and the case-law at least at the 
European level indicates that this is the correct interpretation.30 The formulation of such an open-
ended rule, it is submitted, can create the potential for feedback and gradual mutual learning and 
adaptation between courts. It allows for remodelling of national law and in addition provides for its 
supervision by the CJEU. In some jurisdictions such as the UK, or Ireland Francovich has deep 
implications because it introduces recovery for economic loss against the State in principle. In other 
words, the recovery is not strictly delimited by existing judgments or policy arguments. It is an 
alternative way to frame cases that would otherwise fall under the head of negligence. The latter is 
unsuited to the types of problems that are faced by citizens in the regulatory state because of its 
dependence on the guiding distinction between acts and omissions, and more deeply between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance. In practice when combined with the post-1990s jurisprudence on breach 
of statutory duty this all but debars actions against regulatory authorities except for on the basis of 
misfeasance in public office or where incremental development of the law has fashioned out discrete 
bases for recovery especially in cases that combine a Human Rights Act dimension.31 The common 
law jurisdictions are not alone in this reticence when it comes to recovery especially against financial 
authorities with higher standards of fault required in a variety of European jurisdictions.32 Francovich 
is shorn of these complications and may fill a gap in protection against omissions in the regulatory 
state.  
The foregoing demonstrated in brief that the conditions of liability are highly malleable and may come 
to be determined in greater specificity in the case-law. This makes the judgments pliable to a sort of 
incremental refinement notwithstanding the high-sounding rhetoric of individual rights protection 
which suggests a type of self-evident deductive enterprise. Whether the balance struck is faithful to the 
logic that the Francovich unfurled, namely the rule of law championed by AG Tesauro, and decried by 
Harlow, will be explored further below. 
Regulatory State 
The CJEU through the Francovich case-law is confronted with problems which can be best 
characterised as those of a regulatory state. The regulatory state is explained by Majone as a shift from 
the positive state of direct governmental control of services and goods provision to privatisation, 
liberalisation and de- and re-regulation.33 This is combined with the Europeanisation of regulation of 
what often were former state monopolies but as we will see, extends beyond these areas into such 
                                                     
30 The CJEU at paragraph 56 leaves the national courts a wide scope to mould the facts to the rule: ‘The factors which the 
competent court may take into consideration include the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of 
discretion left by that rule to the national or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was 
intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a 
Community institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or 
practices contrary to Community law.’  
31 See D Fairgrieve State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study (Oxford OUP 2003). 
32 For a detailed summary see D Nolan (n 17). 
33 G Majone ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance.’ 
(1997) Journal of Public Policy Vol. 17 No. 2 139. ‘The failure of regulation by public ownership explains the shift to an 
alternative mode of control whereby public utilities and other industries deemed to affect the public interest are left in 
private hands, but are subject to rules developed and enforced by specialised agencies. Such bodies are usually 
established by statute as independent administrative authorities – independent in the sense that they are allowed to 
operate outside the line of hierarchical control by the departments of central government. Thus, the causal link between 
privatisation and statutory regulation provides an important, if partial, explanation of the growth of the regulatory state.’ 
(144) The other driver is the Europeanisation of regulation, as Majone goes on the explain at p. 145-146. 
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sectors as financial services which are increasingly submitted to harmonised basic rules. The State 
often ‘delegates’ rule-making to private bodies, but retains a tightly controlled market supervision 
regime. The general content of these regulatory regimes are harmonised and often include supervisory 
obligations. This is linked to a greater thesis about the transformation of the role of the State which is 
beyond the scope of this short paper.34 
To effect these minimum rules regulatory agencies concerned with market building and consumer 
protection are established. In most cases, these Regulatory Agencies are given the task of market 
authorisation and surveillance in broadly formulated rules. To the extent that these consumer 
protection inspired rules can be conceived as individual rights, Francovich liability is relevant because 
it is based on the ubi ius ibi remedium concept.35 Yet it is not only in this frontier context, shall we 
say, that Francovich liability plays a role. It may be also used in the more traditional context of an 
infringement of market freedoms. In both cases, new remedial solutions are emerging which answer to 
the logic of effectiveness but which have profound implications for the balance between individual 
rights and state civil responsibility. The Francovich doctrine leads to what Harlow describes as 
‘leapfrogging claims’ because with their increased regulatory roles, the State is at the end of a long 
chain of liability.36 
The argument is this: to the extent that the new regulatory functions of the State can be converted into 
individual rights, they provide the warrant for extending civil liability into areas of previously 
restricted or no recovery. The responsibility of the State is reconceived according to European law as 
being prima facie responsibility for the application of European law. The relevant question is: as the 
State transforms its role into that of market surveillance to what extent can it be held responsible for 
the tortious consequences of its acts or omissions? Second, to what extent can it be held liable for the 
acts and omissions of others? 
We can contrast in this respect the case of COS.MET with that of Paul. In Cos.met one witnesses the 
attribution of liability to the State for the acts of an employee. However, as it will become apparent the 
acts were contrary to the instructions of the relevant Ministry of State. In Paul, the Court is reluctant to 
attribute to the State liability for the acts of a third party. This is not how Paul is framed. It is about the 
primary liability of the financial supervisory authority for failure in its duties. However, both cases 
deal with the attribution of liability to the State for the torts which can be describes at the edge of the 
normal scope of tort responsibility. In this respect, Paul is a classic case of the liability of a peripheral 
party to a tort. In COS.MET, the case resembles a form of vicarious liability. However, to call 
COS.MET a case of vicarious liability is somewhat misleading, again it is about the scope of the 
primary liability of the State where another party is at fault/breaches European law. In both cases, 
liability is attributed to the State in circumstances where the acts of another party are the proximate 
cause of loss. 
COS.MET 
The Cos.met case turned on Directive 98/37/EC which sets out health and safety requirements 
regarding, inter alia, machinery and safety components within the European Union.37 This directive 
was transposed into Finnish law by Government Decision 1314/1994. The claimant in this case was an 
                                                     
34 H Micklitz & D Patterson ‘From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law’ EUI Working Paper 
LAW 2012/15. 
35 They have a dual function usually, market access (as a feature of market building) and market supervision with economic 
and social regulatory dimensions.  
36 As Harlow (n 6) argues ‘The steady expansion of state power has come together with the trend in modern tort law that I 
have been describing to replace personal liability by an impersonal set of non-delegable obligations vested in systems, 
corporations, and institutions.’ (23) 
37 C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v Finland. 
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Italian importer of machinery to Finland. In particular, the case centred on the defectiveness or 
otherwise of a vehicle lift. In essence, the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), a private 
body, define the applicable standard for vehicle lifts in Europe. The role of CEN is to define minimum 
standards that apply across the European Union and relate to, inter alia, product safety.38 The rationale 
behind uniformity in standards is to reduce technical barriers to trade which come from divergent 
standards across member states, and relates therefore to the achievement of the Internal market.39 
These standards are supported by a strong market access case-law.40 CEN was entrusted these tasks 
under the New Approach to harmonisation which can be described as a delegation of authority in rule-
making from member states to the European level.41 These standards enjoy a presumption of 
conformity with national health and safety requirements. The State has a market surveillance task. In 
this sense, it chimes with the regulatory state. 
Directives such as Directive 98/37/EC establish the relevant standards as minima, and Francovich to 
the extent that it is applicable is the private enforcement side of ensuring Member States adhere to 
these standards. The ability of Member States to question the relevant standard is circumscribed. In 
particular, there is a procedure whereby member state authorities may withdraw machinery from the 
market pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Directive in circumstances where the relevant authority 
determines that the machinery when used ‘in accordance with their intended purpose are liable to 
endanger the safety of persons, and, where appropriate, domestic animals or property...’42 In an 
unusual twist to the case, the Finish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (the Ministry) did not 
invoke this market surveillance provision and eventually allowed the vehicle lift in question into the 
Finish market. The legal controversy concerned what happened in Finland before the vehicle was 
approved. 
To wit, the approval of the vehicle lift was not without controversy. A Mr Lehtinen, an official of the 
Ministry, drafted a report in November 2000 indicating that the relevant vehicle lift failed to meet the 
CEN standard. He advised the Ministry to take as decision to restrict or prohibit the sale and use of the 
vehicle lifts in question.43 In December 2000, Mr Lehtinen reiterated his position in a memorandum to 
the Ministry but added that a new locking system proposed by AGM.COSMET complied with the 
relevant standard. A meeting followed at which the Ministry agreed that the new standard was 
sufficient but a decision to grant entry to the market now depended on a certificate examination by an 
authorised body. It was also decided that the decision to be taken by the Ministry would not be made 
public.44 By the end of December it was proposed that the machinery be placed on the market. The 
Head of the Ministry decided that he had insufficient evidence to place the machinery on the market at 
this point.  
                                                     
38 These are voluntary standards, and viewed as minimum specifications which products must comply. C Joerges, H Schepel, 
E Vos ‘The Law’s Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in Europe’s Legislative Processes: The 
Case of Standardisation under the ‘New Approach’ EUI Working Paper LAW No. 99/9 defines the ‘New Approach’ as 
covering ‘...entire sectors rather than single products, and limits themselves to laying down rather general ‘essential 
requirements’ of health and safety. The task of harmonising technical specifications is now left to private European 
standards associations. Products manufactured according to these harmonised standards enjoy a ‘presumption of 
conformity’ with the essential requirements.’ (8)  
39 As J Pelkmans put it as far back as 1987: ‘The elimination of technical barriers to trade in the EC is one of the most 
important routes to achieve a unifed, genuinely free Internal Market in the Community.’ (249) J Pelkmans ‘The New 
Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization’ (1987) Journal of Common Market Studies 15(3) 249. 
40 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837. 
41 Joerges (n 38). Although the author takes issue with the ‘delegation’ categorization as potentially misleading. 
42 Directive 38/97/EC. Cited at para. 8 Cos.met. 
43 Para 23. 
44 Para 25. 
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On the 17 January 2001 Mr Lehtinen with the permission of his immediate supervisor appeared on 
national television and represented, inter alia, that the vehicle lift could present an immediate danger 
to workers who would be working beneath the load.45 On the 29 January 2001, a trade association sent 
a letter to the Ministry reporting serious defects allegedly found in machinery of the AGM range.46 Mr 
Lehtinen had been present at a meeting of the trade association.47 However, despite these allegations 
in February another more senior official in the Ministry took the view that the evidence did not justify 
a prohibition on the machinery.48 Within a week Mr Lehtinen had been removed from the case on the 
basis that because he had spoken publically expressing a point of view contrary to the official position 
of the Ministry he had acted contrary to the Ministry’s instructions and its communication policy.49 
This did not stop Mr Lehtinen, it appears. On the day after his removal from the case, 17 February 
2001, an article appeared in a region newspaper based allegedly on an interview with Mr Lehtinen 
entitled ‘Expert warns against treacherous vehicle lifts’.50 It stated also that the Head of the Ministry 
regarded these as Mr Lehtinen’s personal views.  
In June 2001 the Ministry took the decision not to apply market supervision measures against the 
manufacturer or importer of the vehicle lifts and clarified that the previous issues were resolved or 
were in the course of resolution.51 Subsequent to this decision the Ministry brought disciplinary 
proceedings against Mr Lehtinen on the basis of his press releases and media interviews which were 
considered a breach of the Ministry’s communications policy. Mr Lehtinen, a whistleblower, was 
reined in. This did not satisfy AGM.COSMET, however, which brought a claim before the Finnish 
courts ‘seeking an order that the Finnish State and Mr Lehtinen jointly compensate it for the damage 
allegedly suffered, in particular a loss of turnover in Finland and elsewhere in Europe.’52 In essence, 
this was a case of pure economic loss where the claimant was seeking recompense for a reduction in 
turnover caused by the statements of Mr Lehtinen. The Finish Court referred the matter to the CJEU. 
Mr Lehtinen and the Ministry were joint defendants. The question referred by the Finnish court was 
whether the Dassonville criteria applied, the case-law on measures having an equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions, owing to the fact that the impugned actions were not those of the Finnish state 
but of an official who was acting without authorisation. 
In those Member States that have a personal view of the law of torts, this would amount to a claim 
against Mr Lehtinen for his breach of European law, and against the Ministry in vicarious liability. 
Thus, the question would revolve around the primary liability of subordinate and secondary liability of 
the Ministry (vicarious liability).53 For a common lawyer, in particular, the interesting point from a 
vicarious liability perspective here is that the primary-secondary link seems less important than it 
would at national level. Although the breach of European law of the subordinate, Mr Lehtinen, 
triggered the liability of the State, this occurred outside of his employment duties. He was acting in a 
manner that did not have the support of the Ministry, and furthermore the Ministry made an effort to 
distance itself from his representations. The relevant question is whether his acts can be attributed to 
the Ministry, and whether these amount to a breach of the relevant Directive or Article 28. 
                                                     
45 Para 27. 
46 Para 28. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Para 29. 
49 Para 30. 
50 Para 31. 
51 ‘the manufacturer [had] corrected, as regards new equipment, and the importer [was] endeavouring to correct, as regards 
equipment in service, the technical faults identified.’ (para. 34 Cos.met) 
52 Para 37. 
53 In France this could be brought as a claim on the basis of a faute de service. 
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Normally in such circumstances it would be necessary to establish the personal liability of a 
subordinate before attribution can occur. This was not considered central by the Court, which 
indicated that the personal liability of Mr Lehtinen is a matter for national law to determine.54 The 
focus is, rather, on the State and the delimitation of its responsibility as opposed to the link between 
the wrongful act of an individual and the attribution of that act to the state. Thus, even if Mr Lehtinen 
cannot be held personally liable this is not important. The important question of attribution is whether 
his words and actions can be attributed to the State assuming, as the court did in the case, that this 
amounts to a breach of A28 and the Directive. This is unsurprising because the Court, given the lack 
of horizontal direct effect in this area, must approach the question of vicarious liability from a 
different angle: the scope of state liability rather than the scope of employment. 
In this vein, the Court first examined the issue of attribution favouring an objective test of attribution 
which depends ‘on how those statements may have been perceived by the persons to whom they were 
addressed.’55 The question then becomes one of whether ‘the persons to whom the statements are 
addressed can reasonably suppose, in the given context, that they are positions taken by the official 
with the authority of his office.’56 At para. 58 the Court listed a number of factors that the national 
court should take into account when making this assessment. If this can be shown, then they are 
potentially an infringement of Article 28 amounting to restriction on trade.  
If an analogy can be made with national vicarious liability, it is certainly a ‘master’s tort’ conception 
of liability.57 The focus is not, however, on the justification for attribution but is rather a strict liability 
rule which ignores the practical limitations on the State’s ability to censor whistleblowers. In effect, 
the State has an obligation not to infringe European law, and this obligation extends to civil 
responsibility where it fails to fulfil this obligation. This obligation is interpreted as a strict liability 
standard because the acts of the subordinate ran counter to the official position of the Ministry in 
circumstances where the Ministry made a sterling effort to distance themselves from his 
representations. In COS.MET, therefore, fault is unimportant. The State did not have discretion in any 
event such that the matter of sufficiently serious breach was dealt with expeditiously by the Court.58 
This substitutes national law concepts of personal responsibility and in its place creates a type of 
liability for systemic failure in discharging the State’s obligations. If this is so, it is entirely under-
theorized by the Court. This may be the case because to adequately theorize the matter, one would 
have to explain how infringement by private parties can come within the scope of the free movement 
of goods provisions. The Court was not prepared to go this far. Instead, the focus was squarely on the 
State and the identification of the acts of an agent of the state with the responsibility of the State in 
terms of Article 28. Hence, the case is really one of liability for omissions. The State failed in its duty 
to ensure that there was no obstacle to trade. It is systemic liability because it elides personal liability 
of the agent with that of the organization i.e. the State. 
The imperative behind the judgment was ensuring market access but in a type of liability that would 
not be accepted in a number of jurisdictions.59 This is because it relies on a circumvention of vicarious 
liability (common law), and recovery in economic loss without any policy discussion as to its 
                                                     
54 The Court formulated the possibility of personal liability negatively, but it was clearly not required by Community law: 
‘Community law does not preclude an individual other than a Member State from being held liable, in addition to the 
Member State itself, for damage caused to individuals by measures which that individual has taken in breach of 
Community law (...).’ (para. 98) 
55 Para. 56. 
56 Para. 57. 
57 See R Stevens ‘Vicarious Liability or Vicarious Action?’ (2007) 130 Law Quarterly Review 30-34; G Williams ‘Vicarious 
Liability: Tort of the Master or the Servant?’ (1956) Law Quarterly Review (1956) 522.  
58 Para. 60. 
59 Whether the balance struck between market access and market surveillance was the correct one is a separate question see 
N Reich ‘AGM-COS.MET or: Who is Protected by EC Safety Regulation? (2008) E.L. Rev. 33(1), 85-100.  
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appropriateness. This was achieved by conferring subjective rights on individuals on the basis of the 
Directive in combination with a reading of Article 28 of the Treaty. These rights were combined with 
a remedy against the State premised on the idea that the State has primary obligations that extend to 
the acts of its agents, with a test which is rigorously applied. It might be too far to suggest that this is a 
type of non-delegable duty imposed on the state; but if facts such as those in the instant case can be 
accommodated by the test of attribution, the suggestion is not too far off the mark. 
PAUL 
In Paul depositors sued the Bundesaufsichtsamt [the Federal Banking Supervisory Office] on the basis 
that the Authority failed in its supervisory duties.60 There was a further claim in state liability based on 
the non-transposition of main directive relevant to proceedings. At national law, the depositors were 
precluded by a statutory immunity from bringing an action against the Authority. The relevant national 
law, paragraph 6(4) of the Kreditwesengesetz [Law on Credit Institutions] provided that the the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office ‘shall exercise the functions assigned to it under this Law and 
other Laws only in the public interest.’ This precluded liability in respect of individuals. The question 
placed before the Court was whether this law had to be disapplied in light of European law, namely, 
whether the directives in issue conferred a right on individuals to compensation where the regulator 
failed in its supervisory duties. 
The Court accepted the submissions of a number of member states which argued that the most relevant 
directive, Directive 94/19, amounted to a measure of minimum harmonisation and that the 20,000 
EUR laid down in the Directive constituted the extent of reparation required under European law.61 It 
was open to Member States to provide reparation that exceeded that sum but this was not required by 
European law. The second question sought to find from a number of directives a conferred right that 
the supervisory authority take prudential supervisory measures which can result in liability for 
misconduct.62 In respect of the second question, the main argument against recovery devolved on the 
following points: 
1. That the directives in question were aimed at minimum or ‘essential’ harmonisation only63; 
2. It does not follow from the fact that directives in question impose on member states a number of 
supervisory obligations that this gives rise to individual rights: 
• There is no express grant of rights on the face of the directives 
• That supervisory liability does not appear necessary to achieve the objectives of the directives, 
namely, minimum harmonisation 
• The complexity of banking supervision i.e. the protection of a plurality of interests and the 
stability of the financial system 
• The fact that Directive 94/19 introduced a deposit guarantee scheme means that additional 
compensation is not required by EU law. 64  
It is submitted that Paul is a mis-step or missed opportunity in terms of the development of Francovich 
liability. It seems that the logic of European subjective rights is conflated with the German schutznorm 
theorie. In German administrative law the concept of locus standi requires the existence/conferral of a 
subjective right. This is conferred by statute and the matter for interpretation is whether the statute 
grants a protective right i.e. the schutznorm. The manner in which conferral of a right was interpreted 
                                                     
60 Peter Paul Case C-222/06 [2004] ECR I-9425. 
61 This was partly supplemented by reference to the 24th Recital of the relevant directive. 
62 Namely Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646. 
63 Para. 37 Paul. 
64 Paras. 40, 41, 43, 44, and 45 respectively. 
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up to that point was, however, wider. Its basis in effet utile guaranteed this. It is argued the Court at the 
very least comes close to eliding these two approaches. In this respect what is pertinent in Paul is that 
the Court seemed to accede to the argument that because no remedy was expressly provided for in the 
Directive, this was an argument against the conferral of a right.65 Second, the minimum harmonisation 
aim of the Directive took precedence over the protection of depositor and in this respect the case has 
echoes of the reasoning in the Three Rivers decision.66 This is despite that the Court accepted that that 
the directives were intended to protect depositors.67 Tison makes the point clearly:  
This seems to depart from previous case law of the ECJ, which suggested that the first condition for 
Francovich liability should be read more flexibly: until now, the Court seemed to be satisfied with the 
demonstration that the EU rules are intended to protect the interests of private individuals, without it 
being required that the said rules confer by themselves enforceable rights.68  
Reich argues that in Paul ‘To some extent, EC law takes over a modified German Schutznorm- or 
Normzwecktheorie which, however, is interpreted in a strictly objective sense depending on the need 
for protection and not the subjective intention of the tortfeasor.’69 However the extent to which this 
modified schutznorm theorie is consistent with the more flexible approach adopted in other cases is 
highly debatable. 
The main problem with this approach is that it takes Francovich away from its rule of law logic by 
restrictively interpreting the first criterion. It is not the last word, however. As AG Stix-Hackl stated 
‘It must be noted here that the fact that the alleged breach relates to the failure to take supervisory 
measures does not of itself militate against a finding of State liability.’70 Therefore, inasmuch as Paul 
forestalls recovery against financial regulators it cannot be considered the last word on the matter in a 
rapidly developing environment. The rule of law logic remains intact, if a little bruised from the 
narrow approach taken to conferral of a right. If in future more extensive harmonisation were to occur, 
the arguments in Paul could be revisited. 
There is, in fact, a more adequate way of dealing with the matter. If the matter were to be dealt with on 
the criterion of sufficiently serious breach, this would be more consistent with the general approach 
taken in the case-law. The degree of discretion afforded to national authorities is large in respect of 
Banking Supervision. There is, therefore, no guarantee that recovery would occur. What would 
change, in the spirit of AG Tesauro’s opinion in Brasserie, is the balance between rights and policy 
reasons for limiting recovery. Tison suggests that this is, in fact, consistent with the aims of prudential 
supervision: 
Submitting prudential supervisors to liability rules therefore is not in itself incompatible with the 
interests pursued by prudential regulation, as it does not automatically shift the cost of banking failures 
to the state, but only sanctions negligent or unreasonable behaviour from the part of the supervisory 
authority.71  
                                                     
65 See para. 41 ‘In that regard, it should first be observed that Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646 do not contain any 
express rule granting such rights to depositors. 
66 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England [2001] UKHL 16; 2001 WL 239757. 
67 Paul (n 60) Para. 38-39. 
68 M Tison ‘Do not attack the Watchdog: Banking Supervisor’s Liability after Peter Paul’, Financial Law Insitutte Working 
Paper Series WP 2005-02, 26, citing T Tridimas ‘Liability for Breach of Community law: Growing up or Mellowing 
Down?’ (2001) Common Market Law Review, 328. 
69 N Reich ‘Rights without Duties? Reflections on the State of Liability Law in the Multilevel Governance System of the 
Community: Is there a Need for a More Coherent Approach in European Private Law? 13. 
70 See AG Stix-Hackl, para 93. 
71 Tison (n 68) 29. 
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If one can go beyond the hurdle of conferral of right by an interpretation of the criterion more in line 
with general European law’s emphasis on rights protection, the question would be then 
notwithstanding the large discretion allowed to national regulators, can carelessness be excused? This 
desire to vindicate the prima facie rights of individuals would have to be measured against the 
negative consequences that flow from holding the State liable given the complexity of its regulatory 
tasks. These include the argument that this provides a perverse incentive on banks, and secondly that it 
in the end will shift losses to the State undermining the aim of prudential supervision itself.72 But these 
arguments can then be ventilated in national courts, and much like in the tradition of a common law 
court the facts of the case will be the levers on which the case will turn. In the background will be the 
supervision of the CJEU. The ability of the member states to strike a balance which is deaf to the 
rights claims of individuals will be curtailed. This does, of course, mean that the individual will 
succeed but a rebalancing of priorities will have occurred. 
Conclusion 
What is apparent is a type of public law liability which gradually reshapes the relationship between 
rights and policy. In this respect Paul is an obstacle which retards its emergence. Cos.met on the other 
hand shows that notwithstanding Paul, the area is ripe for future development. From a tort law 
perspective, because the emphasis is on the failure of the State to do a certain act, the positive 
obligations side threatens to destabilize the tort law of those jurisdictions which place an emphasis on 
limiting tort law to acts rather than omissions.  
At a deeper level what is apparent is realignment of the responsibility of the State which has an 
expansionist tendency. This arises out of the context of an increasing regulatory role for the State. This 
reformulation of tort law towards rights tends to turn the tort law into a question of balancing policy 
discretion with individual rights and can be seen as adding a layer of complexity to the law. There are 
strong opponents to the mixing of public and private in this manner. Its focus on systemic failure can 
act as an agent moteur for expansion. The question which this raises is whether Francovich is the 
future direction of tort law in Europe: a public law tort law premised on failure to fulfil constitutional 
obligations? Can regulatory systemic failures be recoded into the language of rights protection? 
 
                                                     
72 Tison (n 68). In his article he enumerates the numerous arguments against recovery. See for an economic analysis RJ 
Dijkstra & MG Faure ‘Compensating Victims of Bankrupted Financial Institutions: a Law and Economics Analysis 
(2011) J.F.R & C. 156. 
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THE TRANSFORMATION(S) OF PRIVATE LAW 
Hans-W. Micklitz and Yane Svetiev 
Introduction 
 
The overall title of the European Regulatory Private Law project posits a “transformation of European 
private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation”. If indeed this process 
transforms the underlying basis of private law rules (autonomy vs. functionalism), it should also 
change the role that private law plays in social and economic ordering and both the form and 
substance of private law rules and even institutions. One key objective of the ERPL project is to trace 
this process in the individual empirical fields. This inquiry involves both identifying the underlying 
drivers of this transformation and the resulting forms of normativity and enforcement institutions that 
may displace the traditional national sources of private law. 
To explore the above themes within the scope of the ERPL project two seminars were organised at the 
EUI Law Department, one focusing on the theme of “Autonomy and Regulation” and another one on 
the “Transformation of Private Law”, both of which sought to draw on literature exposing the 
conceptual foundations of the processes that are said to change our understanding of private law.  
For the purposes of the second workshop and for this working paper, we decided to write two papers 
that largely draw on the literature examined during these seminars. The aim is to tease out some 
conceptual tools that would ultimately be useful in providing a frame for analyzing the hypothesized 
process of transformation through the various empirical sub-projects. 
The two papers presented under the common title of “The transformation(s) of private law” have a 
slightly different focus. The first paper is written largely from an internal EU perspective, in that it 
departs from “within” ongoing debates about European private law and focuses in particular on the 
continued relevance of the public/private distinction and the factors that have transformed the way that 
the division between public and private has been perceived over time within legal discourse.1 The 
transformation drivers that identified during the course of the seminar were changes in economic 
relationships (due to economic integration or changes in the pattern of production), technological 
change, as well as changes in the forms of organization of civil society beyond organized politics. 
These drivers, we posit, operate simultaneously to both transform the state and its capacity to supply 
private law rules and institutions and, in turn, they lead to the emergence of alternative spaces for 
norm creation and enforcement.  
The second contribution takes, by contrast, more of an outside perspective. Rather than focusing on 
the literature from within EU debates, it explores how the question of the transformation of private law 
has been explored in other relevant literatures, including the extensive US contract law literature 
(where similar arguments about the growing irrelevance of existing codifications of private law have 
been made and supported by empirical evidence, such as in the work of Lisa Bernstein, Robert Scott, 
as well as the joint work of Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel and Robert Scott). This contribution also 
draws on literatures from other disciplinary traditions that focus on the maintenance of cooperation 
                                                     
1 The shifts in the public/private distinction and its continued relevance for the making of private law were explored in HW 
Micklitz, ‘Rethinking the public/private divide’, in M Maduro, K Tuori, S Sankari (eds) Transnational Law: Rethinking 
European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2014) and this contribution 
goes further in exploring that theme. See also earlier “The public/private divide in European law”, in H-W. Micklitz and 
F. Cafaggi (eds) European Private Law Afrer the Common Frame of Reference (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010). 
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through making and enforcing norms in communities without the aid of state legal institutions (such as 
the work of Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators on small group self—management of resources or of 
Eric Brousseau and his collaborators on internet group governance). This contribution seeks to identify 
common themes and conceptual tools or categories that would be useful in analyzing the 
transformation process through the empirical material gathered in the project in the EU context. 
Moreover, this contribution also aims to offer further food for thought on the question whether or not 
the processes that give shape to European Regulatory Private Law are driven from within the EU or 
whether they reflect broader trends and external drivers.2 
As already indicated, these preliminary contributions provide conceptual tools and first analytical 
steps. We aim to use them in order to develop a fuller account of the hypothesized transformation of 
European private law from autonomy to functionalism in regulation and competition.  
Part I - The parameters of formation/transformation/re-formation 
Introduction 
This paper provides an analysis of the key driving forces behind the transformation of the state, which 
in turn affect the state’s capabilities of acting as a law-maker and law-enforcer, particularly in the 
private domain. The drivers identified include changes in economy (in this essay principally 
considered as the effects of the increasing complexity of production and of international economic 
integration), changes in technology, as well as changes in civil society (the capacity and modalities of 
public participation in rule-making beyond organized politics).  
The starting point of the analysis provided in this part of the contribution is the 
formation/transformation/re-formation of the state, from state-nation, to nation-state and to the market 
state.3 Of particular importance for the analysis of these processes are the works of H. Arendt, G.-P. 
Calliess/P. Zumbansen, Ch. Joerges/J. Falke, D. Kennedy, K.-H. Ladeur, R. Münch, H. Muir Watt, S. 
Sassen, D. Patterson, M. Taggart.4 The key perspective is the changing patterns of the state and for 
the sake of the argument we have distinguished between the nation state, the welfare state, the market 
and the post market state. This rough distinction does not meet hard historical standards but it might 
suffice to make the argument. We will not go deeper into the state-nation as additional research is 
needed to get a clearer picture and to avoid romanticism.5  
We begin with a set of different transformation drivers, including the variation of the state, in turn 
affected by changes in the economy, the technology and the public beyond politics. We will associate 
to each of the four levels one leading hypothesis which shall highlight the respective stage of the then 
dominating public/private law divide. When put together the picture of the public/private becomes 
ever clearer – the rising power of the administrative state and the growing leeway allowed to private 
parties, forcefully reflected by the key role of standardisation for the building of a market economy.   
                                                     
2 See Y Svetiev, ‘W(h)ither private law in face of the regulatory deluge’, in HW Micklitz and Y Svetiev (eds) Self-Sufficient 
European regulatory private law: A viable concept?, EUI Law Working Paper 2012-31, 
(http://hdl.handle.net/1814/24534). 
3 Micklitz/Patterson, “From the Nation State to the Market State: The Evolution of EU Private Law”, EUI-Law Working 
Paper 2012/12 (ERPL-02), in B. van Vooren/St. Blockmans/J. Wouters (eds.) The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The 
Legal Dimension, OUP 2013, 59-78 
4  Cahier à Thème, Les Grandes Théories du Droit Transnational, avec contibutions du K. Tuori, B. Kingsbury/N. 
Krisch/R.B. Stewart, H. Muir Watt, Ch. Joerges/F. Roedel, F. Cafaggi, R. Zimmermann, G.-P. Calliess/M. Renner, A. 
Fischer-Lescano/G. Teubner, P. Schiff Berman, RIDE 2013, Numéro 1-2, 1-256 
5 E.g. M. Koskenniemi, (2011) “Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution”, University of Toronto Law 
Journal, 61: 1. 
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The building of the nation state and the public/private divide 
On the European continent and in America the late 18th early 19th century were marked as the era of 
nation and state building.6 The United Kingdom preceded the development by at least 100 years as 
state building there goes back to the 17th century. France stood at the forefront of the development in 
Europe, the elaboration of the French and the American constitutions was carried out 
contemporaneously. However, unlike in the US, in France the adoption of a constitution went hand in 
hand with the adoption of a national private legal order, the Code Civil. It is here that a decisive 
                                                     
6 Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism, http://spire.sciences-
po.fr/hdl:/2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k70p9ikj1/resources/hmw-pilagg-paper-final.pdf 
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bifurcation took place, on the one hand the public legal order, the establishment of constitutional 
institutions and constitutional rights, on the other a private legal order, based on three essential pillars; 
equal rights for every natural subject – the abolishment of a feudal legal order, on freedom of contract 
and l’autonomie de la volonté – based on the free will of each natural subject, on the protection of 
property rights – thereafter each subject was allowed to become a private owner of private property. 
This was the starting point for the establishment of a market, in which the parties in a ‘society of 
individuals’7 should and could engage in economic transactions. The feudal household as the producer 
of basic needs gradually lost importance. The basic needs in particular for the citizens living in the 
cities was increasingly to be met via the market.  
The establishment of nation states governed by constitutions and of national markets governed by 
national private legal orders yielded the necessity to establish a new system of interaction between 
nation states and market participants across borders. Nation state building and national private law 
building leads also to the birth of international public law and international private law. It has to be 
recalled, however, that Savigny did not conceptualise international private law as a law between nation 
states, but as between princedoms.8 Savigny argued forcefully against the elaboration of a national 
civil legal order in Germany. He established the so-called historical school (Historische Schule), 
seeking the basis of the law in the Volksgeist and the ius commune. It needed a decisive twist from 
princedoms to nations to apply Savigny’s concept of international private law to the emerging order of 
nation states in the end of the 19th century. Thus far, private international law building preceded public 
international law. 
The next major stage in the elaboration of the public/private divide resulted from the industrial age and 
in particular the beginnings of the regulatory state, first in the UK later on the continent. Whilst we 
will not insinuate that the nation states of the early 19th century did not intervene into the market, it 
was the industrial age that yielded greater regulatory activities, meant to shape the developing 
industrial production or to address what might today be called market failures. The regulatory state 
should not be confounded with the welfare state, although the regulatory state of the end of the 19th 
century started to adopt rules to protect the workers against health and safety at work and to guarantee 
basic protection in case of an accident and later a pension system. 
The most visible institutional change occurred in the relationship between the executive and business. 
Before the industrial age, the executive disposed of the necessary knowledge to take market related 
decisions. Industrialisation shifted the balance towards business. The executive had to realize that the 
new technologies (examples might include the telephone, industrial production via machines, the 
invention of chemical substances etc.) required expertise that was not available and that could not be 
generated within state bodies. The executive had to co-operate with business. The first laws were 
adopted in which national legislators refrained from legislating on technical details but involved 
business into the elaboration of technical rules that became the benchmark for assessing the legality of 
business behaviour.9 Pressure vessels and their standardisation in the beginning 20th century stood at 
the forefront of the development of technical standards and legal rules referring to technical standards.  
The increasing role of technical standards in the running of the marketplace changed the relationship 
between the state and market participants fundamentally. Standardisation increased the importance of 
the executive to the detriment of the legislative branch, through the mechanism of delegated powers. 
Parliaments had to recognise already in the early 20th century their inability to define technical details 
                                                     
7 Ladeur, K.-H. (2010), “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General Administrative Law”, 
unpublished manuscript, mimeo. 
8 This is an often neglected aspect that Muir Watt draws to our attention, see ibid 
9 Peter Marburger, Die Regeln der Technik im Recht, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1979. 
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via legislative means.10 The shift of power from the legislative to the executive also entailed the 
integration of private competence made available by business and industry into public-law making. 
The foundation of the major standard bodies, in the UK the BSI (1901),11 in Germany (1917) the 
DIN,12 ANSI (1919)13 and in France AFNOR (1926),14 as private associations, bears witness to the 
importance business and industry attributed to generating private knowledge, including for regulatory 
purposes.  
The rise of new technologies deprived the state from the possibility to define legal standards out of its 
own competence. Using H. Arendt’s distinction, the state first absorbed the public in that the 
legislative power and the discourse around the concrete shaping of a law shifted from the public to the 
political/constitutional sphere. However, as the state=the political is not competent (knowledgeable) to 
realise this task, it has to rely on the market. The public is doubly barred, first via the equation of 
state=political, second via the re-delegation of competence to the market which excludes the public. 
This deficit is somewhat remedied via the gradually increasing participation of trade unions and later 
consumer organisations in the standard making process during the latter parts of the 20th century. 
Participation, however, requires technical expertise. So participation of the public is bound to technical 
knowledge. The equation knowledge=expertise=participation facilitates a gradual de-politicisation of 
delegated law making, a process whose origins go back to the industrial age.15 It apparently ignores 
that technical standards are usually a composite of technical knowledge and political assessment.16 But 
the political dimension of technical standards becomes apparent in transborder business transactions, 
when different technical concepts clash and hinder transborder trade. Barriers to trade are no invention 
of the EU or the GATT legal regimes, they existed already in the growing exchange of the newly 
industrialised products at the turn of the 19th/20th century.17  
The intermingling of the public/private in the national welfare state 
The building of the welfare state is inherently bound to the rise of ‘The Social’.18 Its origin goes back 
to the period after the First World War. France took the lead; Germany remained stuck in conceptual 
considerations rather than concrete action. In Europe, the rise of the Welfare State, as well as the idea 
and the ideology of understanding the nation state as the responsible actor in providing for social 
distributive justice in the society is bound to the period of the 1960s/1970s, after Europe had recovered 
politically and economically from the Second World War.19 These were the high-days of political 
planning, of political programming and of using law as a means to an end, no longer of guaranteeing 
individual and political freedoms against the Leviathan, but to claim social rights, social protection, 
redistribution of chances and gains from the nation state. The national constitutions were submitted to 
                                                     
10 Reconstruction of M. Taggart, (2005), ‘From ‘Parliamentary Powers’ to Privatization: The Chequered History of 





15 M. Bach, Europa ohne Gesellschaft, Wiesbaden 2008. 
16 Ch. Joerges/J. Falke/H.-W. Micklitz/G. Brüggemeier, Sicherheit von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, (Englische Fassung: European Product Safety, Internal Market Policy and the New 
Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standards), European University Institute Working Papers in Law, now in 
Hanse Law Review 2010 http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf10/HanseLRVol6No02.pdf 
17 See on the way in which the German government was concerned to pave the way for German exports in this particular 
period, C. Torp, Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung. Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland 1860-1914 [Challenges 
of Globalization. Economy and Politics in Germany 1860-1914]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005. 
18 D. Kennedy, (2002) "Two Globalization of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968", Suffolk UL Review 36: 631. 
19 Thosten Kingreeen, Das Sozialstaatsprinzip im europäischen Verfassungsverbund, Mohr Siebeck, 2003.  
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a constant change of rules that all flew in the same direction, legitimising regulatory intervention for 
the establishment of a just society. A huge amount of new laws and regulations ensued during this 
period. These laws were no longer limited to establish markets, to free the market actors from 
medieval restrictions, they were meant to shape markets in view of a particular political perspective. 
The unleashed liberal markets were politically and socially re-embedded. This was possible because 
the markets still remained national markets, where the nation states had power and jurisdiction. 
Politics was meant to govern the market, the public and the private got ever more deeply intermingled. 
The transformation from the liberal nation state to the national welfare state required an institutional 
change within the state, but also in the relation between the state, the market participants and the 
public beyond politics. Ladeur suggests that the society of individuals turned into the ‘society of 
organisations’.20 The rise of the welfare state led to a further considerable extension of executive 
power. Planning and programming in new public policy fields, such as construction, environmental 
protection, health and safety regulation adapted to the consumer society, required new expertise within 
the administration, but also new institutional settings in which the administration could get together 
with the market participants and the public. The rise of the welfare state and the rise of the 
administration are inherently linked together. The welfare state could not have been built without the 
administration, which grew both quantitatively and qualitatively.21 
The international legal order remained unaffected at least on the surface. GATT, IMF, WIPO, just as 
much as the UN and its sub-institutions, did not change the key institutional outlook. This means that 
the international legal order was based on territorial nation states, enshrined in international public law 
and national private legal orders.22 The rise of ‘The Social’ did not affect the order of territorial nation 
states in its public dimension. Just as in the EU, the UN or even the GATT departed from a clear 
division between responsibilities, so that international legal orders only affected markets but not the 
welfare state’ social dimension.23 Of course the distinction was never so clear-cut, but changes brought 
about by international legal regimes took place largely outside the hard-core areas of ‘The Social’, 
such as labour law and social security. A visible sign of the institutional change at the international 
level were the establishment of new international bodies, dealing with the new policy fields, such as 
the United Nationals Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1972 and the proposed but later failed 
UN-CTC, which was meant to establish a similar entity for consumer protection.24 Less visible was 
the impact of these developments on the international private law regime. Savigny’s concept, as 
transferred to the nation state level, was built on the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable 
jurisdiction and the applicable law. The growing number of mandatory rules in contractual relations, 
via labour and consumer law, led to the need to find ways and mechanisms for the interaction of 
national private legal orders, particularly in cases where the standards of social protection differ 
between jurisdictions. International private law was reconceptualised as a regime of private legal 
orders where autonomy and freedom of contract had to be counterbalanced by restrictions and 
constraints.25 The rising new fields of policies in which the administrations were the key actors were 
much more difficult to master in the arena of private international law. It has to be recalled that a 
couple of decades ago, national administrations were not allowed to communicate across borders, the 
                                                     
20 Eileen Milner, Managing Information and Knowledge in the Public Sector, 65, 164 et seq. (Routelidge 2002), further 
references in Ladeur, ibid. 
21 See generally, Taggart, ibid. 
22 A. Afilalo/D. Patterson, The New Global Trading Order: The Evolving State and the Future of Trade (Cambridge, CUP, 
2008). 
23 For the EU, see the Spaak-report, for the internatinal economic order, see Afilalo/Patterson, above. 
24 The UN-CTC existed provisinally for some time and played a key role in the development of the UN Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection. 
25 Sonderanknüpfungslehre, Ch. Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Internationalen Kollisionsrechts, Mohr Siebeck, 1971.  
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interaction and exchange typically took place via diplomatic channels.26 If any, more informal 
mechanisms of exchange had to be established outside the established institutional settings. This is 
was the beginning of the ‘Weltinnenpolitik’.27 
The intermingling between public and private, within the nation state and beyond the nation state in 
the international arena becomes even clearer in the changing role of technical standardisation during 
the high days of the social welfare state. Standardisation might serve as blueprint for other areas of 
society in which the institutional change, ‘the society of organisations’, a composite of public and 
private bodies and actors could be studied. During the first half of the 20th century, standardisation was 
focusing on technical harmonisation of measurements, units and procedures. But the limits to more 
policy-loaded standardisation faded away with the development of the consumer society, which was 
largely a society of increased choice in consumer products (if not services). Two categories of 
products document how technical standards entered policy fields, namely the regulation of foodstuff – 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission was established as early as 1962 – as well as electrical 
appliances, which became subject to the 1973 low voltage directive and which influenced the 
elaboration of the GATT/TBT 1974 Agreement. It is no coincidence that health and safety regulation 
stood at the forefront of giving the internal market a social outlook after the adoption of the Single 
European Act in 1986 as well as the world trade order after the establishment of the WTO/SPS in the 
1994 Uruguay Round. The regulatory technique of delegated powers, from legislators (nation states) 
to administrative bodies, who then develop - in cooperation with business and industry - appropriate 
rules gained substantial ground. New patterns of co-operation had to be found. The result in the 
society of organisations, is that the public (but in fact the executive) was relying on business and 
industry, no longer merely on technical expertise - as in the industrial age - but also on scientific 
expertise in the regulation of pharmaceuticals, pesticides, chemicals, electrical appliances and so on.  
This neatly brings us to the question: What about the public beyond politics? If we understand courts 
as public fora in which citizens can express critique and discontent for political decisions, such as is 
the case in Germany with the German Constitutional Court28 and to some extent in the EU with the 
CJEU, often regarded by social groups and private individuals as a means of last resort to defend their 
constitutionalised economic, social and consumer rights,29 we have to recognise that courts were 
unable to take over such a public role beyond established politics, at least in the field of 
standardisation which became ever more prominent in the social welfare state era. This does not mean 
that courts at different levels and in different countries could switch into that role and counterbalance 
the power shift away from the public to politics, however, in the field of standardisation where the 
vanishing of the public/private divide is most apparent, appropriate mechanisms of judicial review 
were and are lacking.30  
The rise of the welfare state and the power shift from the legislature to the executive and to market 
participants is accompanied by the growing importance of non-governmental organisations in 
particular in the new policy fields, such as consumer protection and environmental protection. These 
organisations raised their voice outside the constitutionally and internationally foreseen fora, 
                                                     
26 A-M. Slaughter, The New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2005). 
27 U. Beck, Die Risikogesellchaft, edition Suhrkamp,1986 
28 J. Habermas, Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität. In: (ders.): Faktizität und Geltung. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 
1992, M. Jaestedt/O.Lepsius/Ch. Möllers/Ch. Schönberger, Das entgrenzte Gericht – Eine kritische Bilanz nach sechzig 
Jahren Bundesverfassungsgericht, Suhrkamp 2011.  
29 S. Sciarra, Labour law and the Court: national judges and the European Court of Justice, Hart Publishing 2001, D. 
Keleman, Eurolegalism The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union, Harvard University Press, 
2011. 
30 M. Taggart, above with regard to the Commonwealth, A Simple Common Lawyer Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart 
Edited by David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Grant Huscroft, Hart Publishing, 2009, H. Schepel, The Constitution of 
Private Governance - Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets. Hart Publishing 2005,. 
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criticising the input as well as the output legitimacy31 of standardisation beyond technicalities. They 
were requesting access to the standard-making process and participation in standard-making, thereby 
claiming precedence of politics over market requirements. Over time, however, non-governmental 
organisations were integrated (even coopted?) into the standard-making process, nationally in the 
standards bodies, in Europe via ANEC in CEN/CENELEC and internationally into ISO/IEC via 
COPOLCO and in the Codex Alimentarius Commission, just to name few key institutions. In Ladeur’s 
society of organisations, administrations, business and industry, NGOs were united in one and the 
same body. This process has triggered far-reaching theories on new international forms of 
constitutionalisation in Europe and beyond.32 The dividing line between the public (the 
administrations as representatives of states and high politics), the private (business and industry 
representing the market) and the public beyond politics (NGOs) fades away in this picture. Seen 
through the lenses of H. Arendt, we might say that the market has absorbed politics (administrations) 
and the public beyond politics (the NGOs). 
Precedence of the private over the public in the market state 
The emergence of the market-state is placed toward the end of the 20th century, when global 
economies started to integrate and give way to a more diffuse, interlinked market-states whose ethos 
focused on neoliberal preservation of the market and the maximization of opportunity, rather than top-
down welfare entitlements. Europe’s expansion into market-state regulatory territory is 
cotemporaneous with these developments.33 Economic globalisation affects the degree to which nation 
states are politically and economically able to shape ‘their’ markets and to maintain ‘their’ welfare 
state paradigm. To take a recent example, the constant struggle of EU Member States in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis to save Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Italy from default 
provide ample evidence that it is the market that requires action from EU Member States from one 
crisis summit to the next. This is not to say that globalisation automatically deconstructs the welfare 
state. The degree to which citizens might benefit from social welfare depends on the standards set in 
the Member States.34 The cleavage between the rich and the poor, in Europe largely between the North 
and the South, becomes ever clearer. However, what is equally true for all nation states is that 
globalisation of the economy disembeds the social welfare state. It shifts the focus from the state to the 
market and triggers a deepening of the intermingling between public and private, but this time in the 
opposite direction.  
In essence, it may be argued that the gradual loss of expertise and knowledge which accompanies the 
nation state building since the industrial age and which gained pace in the welfare state through the 
increased powers of the market participants in shaping health and safety, has now turned into a general 
pattern that affects the state’s autonomy vis-à-vis the market. Contrary to the political decision in the 
liberal state to separate markets and politics, to grant autonomy to the market and the market 
participants, in the era of the market state the market has freed itself from the political concession and 
is claiming autonomy from politics which is (or may?) be counterbalanced by the public reaching 
beyond politics. The consequence is a legitimacy crisis.35 
                                                     
31 With regard to this distinction see F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?, (Oxford, OUP, 1999).  
32 Ch. Joerges/J. Neyer (1997), “Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology 
in the foodstuffs sector”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 4: 609-625; C. Joerges, (2002), “’Deliberative 
Supranationalism’—Two Defences”, European Law Journal 8: 133-151, but also Cohen/Sabel, (1997) “Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy”, European Law Journal 3:313 
33 Micklitz/Patterson, ibid. 
34 S. Steinmö, The Evoluation of the Modern States: Sweden, Japan and the United States, (Cambridge, CUP, 2010). 
35 F. Scharpf ibid. 
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The decisive step in the market state transformation results from the ‘Autonomisierung’ – literally 
autonomisation or ‘gaining autonomy’ - and from the ‘Verselbständigung’ – literally 
indepedentalisation or ‘gaining independence’ – of financial markets, a process commonly referred to 
as ‘financialisation’.36 The first step in this process was the decision of the Western nation states in 
1973 to modify the Bretton Woods agreement and to reallocate exchange rate policy to the market.37 
The former concept of politically determined stable currency exchange rates as agreed upon in 
Bretton Woods was replaced through the expectation of a stable system of currency exchange rates. 
The second step constituted the ‘invention’ of financial derivatives, an independent form of money 
(capital), separate from the market of commodities (Gütermarkt) and from currency in circulation. If I 
understand it correctly the so-called Black-Scholes differential equation developed already in 1973 
was the break-even-point and the formula, which underscored Milton Friedman’s credo on ‘The Need 
for Futures Markets in Currencies’.38 While in the early 1970s financial derivatives hardly existed, 
today they are by far the largest market world-wide. Capital can be ‘produced’ via financial 
derivatives, independent from the currency in circulation and borrowing has become a riskless 
enterprise through securitisation and debt-making spreading an additional source of money making.39 
Despite Lehman Brothers the process has not come to a halt and it drives states’ currency policy and 
financial markets policies.  
In the welfare state era, the internationalization of standard setting in health and safety took place 
within the established body of international organizations. In the market state era, ‘financialisation’ is 
entrusted into the hands of a body which is little known to the public at large and which has no clear 
legal status. The International Organization of Securities Commissions IOSCO became the key player 
behind the curtain.40 A. Marcacci gives the following account: “Currently, IOSCO has 115 ordinary 
members (most of them are public financial market regulators), eleven associate members (such as 
regulators non dealing with regulated capital markets), and seventy-five affiliate members (usually 
stock and futures exchanges or dealers associations) from all around the world.41 It covers more than 
ninety-five percent of the world’s securities and futures markets,42 and it is not only the key global 
institution producing international standards for financial regulation,43 but it also has wider global 
responsibilities by being one of the three members of the Joint Forum of International Financial 
Regulators, alongside the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors, established in 1996.” IOSCO allowed for the transformation of the financial 
markets through securitization of debts via financial derivatives. It was apparently here that it was 
                                                     
36 While there is no commonly agreed definition of “financialisation”, the term is used according to the meaning in G. 
Epstein’s book, Financialization and the World Economy (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006). Epstein has stated “By 
financialization, we mean the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives and financial actors in the 
operations of the economy. This is but one of many different meanings that scholars ascribe to this relatively new term. 
The origins of the term are obscure, though it is being used with increasing frequency because of its obvious heightened 
relevance in modern capitalist economies. Indeed, in the last few months, a new international network has sprung up to 
study financialization.” (G. Epstein, “Financialization, Rentier Interests, and Central Bank Policy”, Paper prepared for 
PERI Conference on "Financialization of the World Economy", December 7-8, 2001, available at 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/341/) In German it can not be equated with Finanzkapital (Hilferding), Finanzialisierung is a 
genuine word that bears either positive or negative connotations depending on who uses it, how and in which context. 
37 B. Eichengreen, Global Imbalances and the Lessons from Bretton Woods, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2007). 
38 M. Freedman, “The Futures Market In Foreign Currency”, prepared for the International Monetary Market of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, 1973, 6-12. 
39 It is said that financial derivatives multiply, thus create, money by securitizing (i.e., insuring) debts. Thus derivatives, on 
the one hand, create money, while on the other hand, dim the risks enshrined in the creation of money. 
40 Antonio Marcacci, The EU and IOSCO: an ever closer cooperation? EUI-Law Working Paper 2013/02 (ERPL-04), 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/26458, provides an analysis of the role of the EU in paving the way for securitisation. 
41 See: https://www.iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?section=general  
42 See: https://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background  
43 See C. Brummer, (2009) "Post-American Securities Regulation",  California Law Review , 98: 327. 
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decided to transform mortgages into tradable financial products.44 Public-private rules merged in an 
indistinguishable amalgam of public and private responsibilities, elaborated in a relatively 
intransparent procedure at the heart of the international legal framework for the financial markets. 
IOSCO is the perfect example of the states’ transformation to become responsive to the needs of the 
market. It is a “non-body” with no clear institutional and legal status. The decisive criterion for 
membership appears to be expertise generated in national agencies. Consultation takes place in a 
closed shop system, to which financial sector actors have access, but not consumers or other 
stakeholders or their representatives. Even researching IOSCO is a challenging task. The rules agreed 
upon in this forum are not legally binding, but they have made their way into the legal financial 
systems of the Member States. The EU is an affiliate member only, which means it is not even on an 
equal footing with the Member States. However, Marcacci has amply demonstrated the growing 
political influence of the EU in this body, which allowed the EU to shape European capital markets 
according to the requirements agreed upon in IOSCO.  
Economic integration and globalisation is not limited to the financial markets, but also affects the 
market of commodities, products and services. Beginning with the liberalisation and privatisation of 
former public services starting from the late 1970s and 1980s, first in the US and UK, then also in the 
EU, the key markets for services beyond the financial market, such as telecommunication, energy, 
transport, health and safety (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, pesticides) but also sports, may be viewed 
sectorally, whereby the making of the rules, the substantive standards and the enforcement 
mechanisms all follow a particular rationality45 enshrined in that market sector, which cuts across the 
boundaries of public and private responsibilities as well as boundaries between the national, European 
and international level. These sectoral regimes could be compared with ‘silos’, in which networks are 
established, networks between agencies, networks between agencies and industry/business, to some 
extent public interest groups, networks in which the distinction between public and private, between 
national and international is withering away.46  
The rule makers in the silos are not parliaments nor do international organisations provide the rule-
making setting, even if such institutions operate with a political mandate and a traditional basis of 
legitimation. As with IOSCO, in each of the other ‘silos’ it is possible to identify ‘institutions’ with an 
unclear legal status, with a shaky traditional basis of legitimation, institutions in which national 
administrations in co-operation with the respective business and industry representatives, with 
sometimes greater, sometimes lesser participation of public interest groups, develop market access and 
market management rules, often in the form of ‘technical standards’.47 A well-established means in 
democratic constitutions to legitimate such rule-making is the legislative tool of delegated powers. The 
enforcers of the rules are typically (independent) agencies, which have mushroomed in the networked 
sector markets. In each sector we find agencies with specialised competences, being responsible not 
only for the workability of the market (in a technical sense), but also increasingly for considering and 
even balancing the collective interests of market participants, such as business and customers. In these 
market surveillance activities, the well-established distinction between public responsibilities and 
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private responsibilities vanishes away.48 In the liberal state logic, private individuals would have to 
look after their own interests and defend them in court if necessary. In the silos, particular litigation or 
dispute resolution mechanisms are established, usually in form of ADR mechanism for b2b and b2c 
disputes, often in separate, though silo-related bodies.49 Sector related agencies look after the 
collective interests of the customers and sometimes even go as far as combining sanctions against 
business infringing the market conduct rules with collective compensation schemes for customers.50 
One question is where is the public beyond politics in these new rule-making and rule-enforcement 
settings? The role of non-governmental organisations as the holder of the public beyond politics, as the 
countervailing power against the predominance of economic considerations, to which so much 
scrutiny was attributed in the last decades of the 20th century, has ironically suffered from its grand 
success. Today each silo is maintaining its own ‘NGO-zoo’, in the words of one experienced activist 
from a consumer-environmental organisation.51 Those who advocate for the integration of NGOs into 
the rule making via standardisation at the international, EU and national level underline the 
opportunities to increase the legitimacy of the respective bodies. Those who take a critical stand refer 
to the dark side for NGOs becoming an integral part of the de-politicisation process.52 NGOs often 
lack the technical/scientific/financial expertise to be taken seriously in some of these settings. 
Therefore their input is often limited to the political side of the rule making, where the NGOs often 
conflict with administrations and eventually with states.  
The overall development might help to understand why courts can play such a crucial role in the 
current environment, far beyond guarantors of an institutional balance between different statutory 
powers. The rise of the individual forcefully announced by Durkheim already in the early 20th century 
led to the emergence of the concept of individual rights, which should and could be enforced via the 
courts. One characteristic of current court litigation is that individual litigation often bears a collective 
dimension. This is particularly clear in the preliminary reference procedures that reach the CJEU in 
Luxemburg. However, neither in the newly established independent financial market nor in the other 
sectoral market-silos does judicial litigation play a prominent role. Most of the conflicts are solved 
through extra-judicial conflict resolution mechanism, such as the agencies, ADR mechanisms or even 
arbitration. Only in rare cases, the parties to a conflict engage courts and it is here where the courts 
seem ready to embark on new ground, by imposing public responsibilities on private parties. 
A number of important developments occurred before the CJEU. Loic Azoulai53 has convincingly 
shown that in the aftermath of the (now infamous) cases of Viking and Laval private parties as far as 
they are addressees of market freedoms may also become addressees of social rights. Thereby the 
exercise of economic freedoms would be bound(ed) by the limits of social rights. The key question is: 
who are the private parties who could become addressees of economic freedoms. So far the CJEU has 
only extended the horizontal direct effect of fundamental rights to collective entities. One might 
wonder, however, whether and to what extent the case-law could be extended to the area of universal 
services, where secondary Community law requires the Member States to nominate a supplier of last 
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resort who provides access to public services. In short, the CJEU may be ready to take full account of 
the changing responsibilities resulting from the market state paradigm. 
From a more theoretical perspective, clarification is needed of when and under what conditions a 
conflict can be confined to the sectoral silo, as opposed to when the pressure in the silo becomes so 
high that only external conflict resolution (in court) can bring the sectorial order back into balance.54 
One possibility is to use the distinction between standard and emergency or serious situations.55 Only 
when the conflict passes a certain threshold beyond mere ‘business as usual’, courts become involved 
in dispute resolution.  
Post market state – the revival of the public/private distinction?  
It is already difficult to circumscribe and analyse the ongoing transformation in the market state area. 
Unsurprisingly then, it is even more difficult to ‘predict the future’, or to trace the elements that point 
towards the future. That is why the following is more tentative and speculative than analytical. 
What would the post market state look like? There is already emergent a strong normative claim 
toward the re-establishment of the authority of the nation state against the dominance of supranational 
decision-making at the EU and/or the international level. This strain of arguments aims at the 
restoration of the national democracies and rule making and rule adoption in national parliaments, the 
revival of politics and the claim of political supremacy over market autonomy.56 It is directed against 
the EU with its weak input and supposedly strong output legitimacy. But given the transformation of 
the global economy which has happened and which cannot be turned back so easily – it is difficult to 
see how the nation states can get easily get out of the overindebtedness or even state default trap to 
reassert themselves - I would see more potential in the European Union turning into a lead player in 
the reshaping of the financial market or to use Polanyian language, the re-embedding of the financial 
market into a legal-political frame.57 
The EU could play a similar role in the area of financial markets to the one it plays in the promotion of 
human rights58 and environmental protection in its external relations. In recent years, the CJEU has 
strengthened the hand of the European Commission and the EU in defending higher human rights and 
higher environmental standards against international pressure, in particular from the US. For this 
argument, it suffices to recall the Kadi-Judgment59 and the judgment in Air Transport Association of 
America on emission trading.60 With some imagination one might read the Kadi logic into the TNT 
judgment of the CJEU61, where the Court strongly argued that international commercial law rules must 
be ‘equivalent’ to the EU rules, thereby ‘defending’ higher liability standards within Europe. Along 
this line of argument it is imaginable to propose measures aimed at strengthening a more investor-
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creditor orientated financial architecture for Europe, which could set a benchmark beyond the Internal 
Market.62 
The EU playing the ‘good guy’ and even succeeding in advocating for a major change in the global 
financial market does not, of course, solve the legitimacy issue. In the best of worlds, it would increase 
the output legitimacy of the EU. However, the reembedded financial market would then be the result 
of another authoritarian-bureaucratic-transnational decision-making process. In a society and an 
economy beyond the nation state there are not only growing spaces giving autonomy to companies, 
but also enhanced economic and social responsibilities. The responsibility logic, justified by the 
Fundamental Freedoms and expanded by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, represents an essential 
part of the EU law, which is formally secured by references to it in the recitals of the directives. 
Habermas created the philosophical and legal-theoretical bases for a horizontal mutual linking of 
moral and positive law beyond the state.63 The conceptual consequences have still to be developed.  
The public beyond politics in the emergent landscape may be found in what A. Trechsel terms the 
‘paparazzi democracy’, where any citizen can get to the stage of politics, digitally equipped to control 
decision makers and even to curb their autonomy.64 Information technology provides for means of 
participation and power control instruments that were unthinkable before the invention of the 
Internet.65 More generally the new information technologies allow for the self-organisation of people 
around the globe. The question is whether the space thereby created can be called public or whether it 
is not in a new way at least also a private space in according to H. Arendt. 
Conclusion  
From the analysis of the different drivers of transformation that affect both the state, its capacity to 
engage in law-making and provide enforcement institutions, as well as the resulting private law it 
becomes clear that re-thinking the public/private divide resembles an endless task. The vanishing 
public/private divide triggers a process of re-establishing the public as against the private, of re-
defining the responsibilities of the public and the forms of private ordering, which then lead again to 
an intermingling of the public/private. What we then get is an understanding of the public/private 
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Part II – How to trace the transformation(s) of private law 
This contribution provides an overview of the literature that can provide some conceptual categories 
and analytical tools for the tracing of the process of transformation of private law in the EU context 
from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. As indicated in Part I, a defining 
moment for current private law practice and scholarship was the state’s incorporation of private law 
both through the supply of private law rules, as well as of institutions for the enforcement of those 
rules. Under (1) we explore some of the reasons for the state’s incorporation of private law are 
discussed. To the extent that much contemporary writing emphasizes the tendency for private law-
making and law-enforcement to escape state control, we point to literature that has expressed 
scepticism about the relevance of the state incorporation of private law for private transacting 
behaviour (2). Some of this literature points to private legal regimes that govern transactions and 
resolve disputes for particular trading communities as evidence that there are preferred alternatives to 
the state supplied rules and institutions of private law. In light of such evidence, we examine the 
possible reasons for such opting out (3), and we ask whether such private regimes provide a template 
for a new kind of private law by examining the extent to which they are stable and reproducible to 
other contexts (4). As we will suggest, the drivers of transformation identified in Part I destabilize 
private legal regimes in similar ways in which they disrupt state-supplied private law. By way of one 
preliminary conclusion of this analysis, to the extent that there is a transformation of private law in the 
course of EU integration, it seems that neither a “grand” codification based on the national 
codifications of an earlier time, nor a multiplication of private legal regimes provide an adequate 
conception of the new European private law. 
State incorporation of private law 
As already noted in the earlier part to this contribution, a key process that frames both the common 
conception of private law and private law scholarship is the process through which the state became 
the key supplier (or at least endorser) of rules as well as institutions for the resolution of private 
disputes by enforcing those rules. There are a number of possible reasons for the state’s absorption of 
the law that governs private relationships and those could be classified according to the political, 
economic, symbolic, systemic and pedagogic objectives for State incorporation. 
First, the political objectives of the state’s promulgation or endorsement of private law have to do with 
both the establishment and the reinforcement of the political authority of the state. State authority is 
reinforced not only from the mere act of the state’s provision of private law rules (even if merely 
facilitative), but also in particular by the state acting as the principal (or even the only) supplier of 
dispute resolution and enforcement facilities. This in turn reduces the reliance on self-enforcement 
tools by private parties and may be treated as an aspect of the state monopoly on the use of coercive 
means of norm-enforcement. Moreover, the authority of the state is enhanced when state courts act as 
impartial tribunals that resolve disputes between private parties, according to state-sanctioned rules 
and are also in full control of the means of enforcement, particularly as compared to the prior legal and 
enforcement mechanisms based on status and power. 
Secondly, the economic objectives of the state, through market-building, are also aided by the state’s 
supply of private law rules and dispute resolution services. As both Saskia Sassen66 and James Scott67 
have demonstrated, states were instrumental in the building of markets and, as such, it could be said 
that market integration was a key objective to which state-supplied private law could contribute when 
compared to the fragmentation or localism that would result from continued reliance on purely local 
transactional regimes and sources of transactional trust. Thus, long before the EU’s claimed 
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instrumentalisation of private law, the supply of state private law could be viewed as one aspect of the 
removal of local obstacles to trade, which in turn bolstered the state itself. 
Thirdly, as Micklitz has argued, private law has come to be seen as an aspect of state symbolism as 
well.68 The symbolic consequences of national private law flowed precisely from the removal of 
fragmentation. The unification of territory and the build-up of the symbolism of the “nation” was 
embodied not only in the idea of a common culture or language, but also in common rules for the 
ordering of citizens’ daily lives. Unified private law could be viewed as another aspect of that unity 
that could be legitimated by the state as a reflection of the common customs of the national 
community.69 
Finally, there are also systemic and pedagogic objectives that the state can pursue by seeking to 
endorse and schematise private law rules and institutions in a way that makes the law “teachable” to 
the citizenry. The systematisation objective of state-incorporation of private law creates a mutually 
reinforcing interaction between the state and legal scholarship. Again, as Scott illustrates with 
reference to the emergence of forestry science70, the intersection of state and commercial interests led 
to the emergence and consolidation of scientific fields and scholarly disciplines that were of interest 
also to the state. The coherence and systematisation of the state-supplied private law is one of the 
sources of legitimacy for the law and for its supplier and it was precisely legal scholarship that could 
strive to produce such coherence or to systematise the law either ex ante or ex post.71 
Through the eyes of the state as an embodiment of a political, national or cultural community, unity 
and coherence in the law that governs private party interactions can be seen to go hand in hand. 
Moreover, systematisation and coherence can also be done for pedagogic purposes: a systematised law 
is easier to teach, both to law students and presumably to the population at large, thus enhancing the 
fiction that the laws under which they live are known or at least knowable to the governed. The 
symbiosis between the state and legal scholarships is notable in Letto-Vanamo’s retelling of the 
German story, where the legal scholars were instrumental in the production of the BGB and the 
debates that led up to it. But this symbiosis can also be detected in less obvious settings, such as in the 
US, through Langdell’s efforts (originally at Harvard Law School) to establish law as a science, by 
identifying common legal principles and rules deduced from cases of various US state jurisdictions, 
synthesizing and systematizing them and leading to the bottom up emergence of a “national” 
curriculum in the fundamental private law subjects, such as contract, property and tort. Later on, even 
legal realist scholars such as Karl Llewellyn or Grant Gilmore would become key actors in the 
“codification” of the uniform sales law in Article 2 of the UCC as one of a number of academically 
driven exercises in producing model uniform laws for adoption by US state jurisdictions. 
Scepticism about state supplied private law and institutions 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the process of state incorporation has resulted in the perceived dominance of 
state-supplied private law rules and enforcement institutions, particularly from the “internal” 
perspective of the legal profession as well as legal academia. Given that dominance, there has been a 
(perhaps surprising) convergence in the literature stemming from different disciplinary traditions 
describing the emergence (or persistence) of rules and institutions used to govern private relationships 
and resolve disputes in such relationships quite independent from state-supplied ones. Such scholarly 
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contributions paint a more general picture of private law either not falling within or escaping from 
state control and being enforced outside state-supplied institutions. 
Some of this rethinking of the importance of state supplied private law has come from within legal 
scholarship, some has been inspired by work done in other disciplines. Among the external criticisms 
we might include anthropologists’ studies of the maintenance of order, for example in colonial settings 
where positivist law was often transplanted by colonial rulers and yet despite this creation of a formal 
legal order, other forms of norm enforcement and dispute resolution persisted and were relatively 
more important. As Tamahana explains, by reference to the literature on colonial and post-colonial 
law, while the lawyers’ law in such settings often “had transplanted origins, and covered economic or 
government affairs or other instrumental uses of law”, other areas were covered by “customary or 
religious law”. Moreover the priority accorded to state law was only notional as “state legal 
institutions were relatively weak” and had a rather limited presence compared to that of other 
normative systems.72 
There were also criticism’s of the significance of both state endorsed rules in the governance of private 
transactions and of scholarly efforts at systematising such law. In “The Death of Contract”, Gilmore 
criticised the contract law principles of the Langdellian scholars as an “ivory tower abstraction” that 
lived in law schools and not the law courts.73 Along similar lines, Llewellyn argued “that the rules and 
precepts and principles which have hitherto tended to keep the limelight should be displaced and 
treated with severe reference to their bearing upon that area of contact - in order that paper rules may 
be revealed for what they are, and rules with real behavior correspondences come into due 
importance”74. While sceptical of the idea of contract law as a logically coherent system, these legal 
realist critics nonetheless believed that courts were important dispute resolution institutions for private 
disputes and, as such, important sources of private law norms and stabilizers of normative 
expectations.75 On this view, courts simply needed better information in performing their socially 
useful function than mere reliance on the (supposedly) logically coherent principles and abstractions 
extracted by classical legal scholars. 
More recent US literature, again from within private law scholarship, also put into doubt the 
significance of courts or, to be more precise, the ability to make courts better informed of the 
surrounding context so that they can act as effective dispute resolution mechanisms in governing 
private relationships. Thus, the work of Scott and Bernstein identifies groupings of traders (even in 
ordinary commodity markets) that have apparently sought to escape Article 2 of the UCC on the Sale 
of Goods altogether: by opting out and creating separate and largely self-sufficient legal regimes they 
demonstrate a preference of not relying on state endorsed law or state dispute resolution institutions at 
all. Such work followed in the footsteps of the more sociological and socio-legal work of authors like 
Macauley76 and Macneil77, who had pointed to the importance of informal norms and accommodation 
mechanisms – as opposed to legal rules and institutions - in governing the parties’ conduct in 
contractual relationships. Given such observations, Scott has pithily summarized the challenge as 
follows: “the central task in developing a plausible normative theory of contract law is to specify the 
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appropriate role of the state in regulating incomplete contracts”78 In arguing for a minimalist role of 
the state both in supplying private law rules and in filling contractual gaps ex post (presumably 
through courts), the work of these contract law scholars has also been buttressed by the work from 
various disciplinary traditions pointing to the creation of private order without state or even formal 
law.79 
Along similar lines, though through a different lens and responding to yet another set of developments, 
Teubner identified transnational legal phenomena, resulting from economic globalisation, that allow 
actors operating across national borders to escape local legal rules and institutions sometimes to go to 
other national institutions (through choice of law provisions) and sometimes to escape traditional legal 
institutions altogether, such as lex mercatoria, arbitration or the creative use of corporate forms by 
multinational corporations. 
The sum total of such contributions is to suggest that both communities that are deeply locally 
embedded and ones that are transnational could produce private order with relative success even 
without reference to or aid from state law or legal institutions. Such conclusions from various 
disciplinary and jurisdictional traditions leads us to at least two kinds of questions. One set of 
questions would focus on the extent to which the state-endorsed private law ever was a principal or 
even important source of default rules and enforcement institutions for private relationships. The 
symbolic and pedagogical purposes of state incorporation of private law identified above can be 
promoted even if such rules and institutions remain substantially irrelevant to private party 
arrangements. Was the private law then an overlay of rules that obscured all of the other modalities of 
structuring cooperation and resolving disputes? A second set of questions would focus on whether 
there are factors that have over time produced tendencies to change the form, role and function of 
private law or that have eroded its significance in structuring cooperation and resolving disputes. 
If we switch from a focus on private to a focus on public or administrative law, the literature discloses 
a transformation in the state and its modes of intervention in the performance of its regulatory 
functions. Perhaps paradoxically in light of the foregoing analysis, such transformations when 
observed from an administrative/regulatory law perspective seem to suggest an increasingly important 
role to be played by private law even in the traditional spheres of state regulatory activity. 
First, numerous authors have noted the growing appreciation of the limits of regulatory rule-making 
and a consequent shift away from detailed rules being made by directly democratically elected 
legislatures.80 While Ladeur focuses on the administrative act in civilian jurisdictions, Taggart traces a 
similar developments in common law jurisdictions. In the UK, for example, where parliament is said 
to be supreme and sovereign, filling out the key details of legislation has increasingly over time been 
left to the administration (a phenomenon the beginnings of which were noted as early as the 1930s). 
As Taggart points out, such outsourcing was not limited to organs of the public administration, but 
increasingly involved private parties either as sources of input in the rule-making or, more 
importantly, as a kind of delegated rule-maker themselves, reflected in the emergence of concepts such 
as self-regulation, private regulation or regulation by contract. 
Secondly, this development has been noted even in the regulated sectors of the economy, where the 
nature and importance of the public services supplied, as well as the relative absence of competitive 
forces as a discipline on market participants has traditionally suggested the replacement of private law 
                                                     
78 Robert Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 94: 847, 847, 
852 (2000). 
79 Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1991), but also Elinor 
Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, CUP 1990); Elinor 
Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems”, Science Vol. 325 no. 5939, 
pp. 419-422 (2009). 
80 Ladeur, above. 
The Transformation(s) of Private Law 
86 
by direct administrative controls. Writing about these sectors, Kearney and Merrill describe a “great 
transformation in regulatory law”. They characterize this “great transformation” in the US context as a 
shift away from direct controls over operators through tariff regulation (aimed at achieving public 
policy objectives such as equality and non-discrimination against certain users or localities) towards 
vertical disintegration of operators, the aim of promoting or strengthening of competition. Such a 
transformation should be characterized by growing reliance on competitive forces or competition law 
as a discipline on suppliers and on private law (contract, tort and property) mechanisms to govern 
relationships between suppliers and users. 
Thus, there has been an interesting conjunction in the literatures examining the significance of 
traditional private law and of state intervention. On the one hand, state intervention is increasingly said 
to be outsourced and the processes of privatization and liberalization of markets expected to replace 
direct regulatory interventions even in the more sensitive services sectors with relationships governed 
by private law. On the other hand, much of the literature exploring the relevance and direction of 
private law itself questions the importance of traditional state-supplied private law and institutions. 
This literature comes under the broad umbrella of “private law beyond the state”81, which discloses 
two dimensions of escape – private law beyond state institutions (i.e. even in the domestic context) 
and private law beyond the boundaries and jurisdiction of any one state (i.e. in the transnational 
context). Our purpose is to explore how the factors identified in the first section influence the form and 
function of private law and to speculate on the form that private law might take as a result. 
Reasons for opting out or staying out of state-endorsed rules? 
As a starting point, we might begin with the process of “re-privatisation” of private law, as described, 
for example, in Bernstein’s analysis of various private legal regimes of traders, who “opt out” of the 
publicly provided law and institutions. Presumably, the reason that they decide to opt out of the state 
supplied law and institutions lies in her assessment that the “institutions that create and administer” the 
“private legal system work extraordinarily well” allowing transactors to “maintain remarkably 
cooperative contracting relationships”.82  
Taking for the time being this assessment of the relative success of the private legal regime, the first 
question we might ask is what could be the reasons that such a legal regime could operate better than a 
state supplied one. One explanation might stem from peculiarities of the community that engages in 
cotton trading that Bernstein studied that enables these traders to operate such a private legal system 
which is an institutionally preferred solution to the state supplied private law. At the same time, given 
the proliferation of private trading (or ”silo” regimes to use the metaphor introduced) regimes that 
distance themselves from traditional public rule-making and rule-enforcing institutions described in 
the earlier part of this contribution, it could also be that the reasons are not peculiar to the cotton and 
diamond trading communities described by Bernstein. Specifically, trading communities might prefer 
private law regimes that are more proximate to them and self-sufficient.  
Proximity 
A key factor that could make such private legal systems a relative institutional success is the proximity 
or closeness to the transactors and the types of problems they encounter in transacting on a daily basis. 
We could say that the private law rules and institutions are more tailored to the transacting context and 
there seems to be some evidence of such a preference from Bernstein’s work. 
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Both the procedural and substantive rules that are applied by the arbitrators are tailored to the context 
in which traders operate: the proximity of the PLS to the traders reinforces its self-sufficiency. To take 
for example procedural rules, such as limitation periods or discovery rules; they reflect the traders’ 
need to resolve disputes quickly and their preference for some type of performance over other 
remedies, as well as not to reveal firm-specific information. This is also reflected in the rules on 
remedies and their calculation. The substantive rules are of a bright-line variety, thus avoiding broad 
standards such as reasonableness or suitability, again made possible by their tailoring to the industry 
context83: the repetitive and predictable nature of the transactions, the fact that even unpredictable 
events that might affect the crop (such as the weather or other factors) or a specific trader’s ability to 
perform are both foreseeable and commonly observable to all participants in the trade.  
Since the participants are also themselves the rule-makers in such a community, it means that the 
revision of the rules in light of their unsuitability or in light of changing circumstances can occur more 
or less immediately, in real-time or at least with minimum delay. This does not mean that there are no 
disagreements about the rules in such a community, but presumably such disagreements can be more 
easily proceduralised and contained given the tailoring of rules to problems and given another closely 
related feature of the PLS: namely that it is self-sufficient and its rules need not be applied to other 
trading contexts. 
Self-sufficiency 
The proximity of the PLS to the transactors also leads to its relative self-sufficiency. The efforts made 
to keep the rules current, to communicate the content of the rules to the participants and make them 
understand both the normative expectations created and how they are applied by the DR bodies allows 
this self-sufficient private legal system to operate largely in the background and yet to be an effective 
forum in cases of an impasse. On the limited set of issues that would not be easily verifiable to an 
independent arbitral tribunal, such as the grading of the quality of the cotton,84 it is the integrity and 
reputation of the supplier that is crucial, not only in supplying the contracted-for grade but also in 
acting cooperatively to find timely and adequate resolution in cases where they are unable to do so. 
This does not mean that trading communities have a preference for purely informal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms.85 The private legal system (PLS) described by Bernstein is not purely 
informal; it is made up of formal rules as well as dispute resolution institutions supplied by the 
relevant associations of traders. These institutions deliver formal decisions, which can more easily be 
made available and circulated to all the participants in the trade, given their salience to their daily 
activities and livelihoods.86 Such decisions create certain normative expectations and the institutions 
themselves are proactive in communicating the decisions, outcomes and normative expectations 
generated by the PLS. 
While the enforcement of the dispute resolution (DR) awards delivered by these institutions is 
generally also possible through the public system as arbitration awards, this is generally unnecessary. 
It is unnecessary because of the operation of informal forms of social pressure through ostracism or 
exclusion from the trading associations, which is sufficient for the losing party to comply. The 
prospect of continued maintenance of both social and economic relationships induces actors to both 
avoid going back on the commitments undertaken, to act cooperatively in resolving problems that 
arise, and to comply with the decisions of the formal DR bodies. 
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As Bernstein acknowledges, it is the informal and social mechanisms of cooperation and control, 
whereby actors seek to avoid gossip, ostracism and exclusion and to maintain their reputation as good 
and reliable traders, which plays the dominant “enforcement” role in the private legal system of the 
Southern cotton traders. Moreover, the suggestion is that the formal legal institutions cannot substitute 
the role played by the informal reputation mechanisms. In other words, the formal institutions of 
dispute resolution operate in the background, or alternatively the social forces that maintain 
cooperation can truly be said to operate in the shadow of the formal regime. The number of cases in 
which parties resort to the dispute resolutions is exceedingly small by comparison to the large number 
of transactions entered into.87 The formal PLS institutions are also apparently supported by their 
embeddedness in the industry: the adjudicators are themselves drawn from the community, thus not 
only are they intimately familiar with the transactions and issues that arise within them, but they are 
also subject to the gaze and social sanctions of the community to which they belong, rather than any 
procedural rules of conduct or formal appeal. 
A state-supplied “cotton code”? 
Taking into consideration the description of the workings of the private legal system and taking for the 
moment for granted Bernstein’s assessment that it provides a successful and effective legal regime, we 
might ask could the functions of the PLS be performed by the state supplied private law system?88 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the likely answer is that such a state-supplied code would not be able 
to replicate all the beneficial aspects of the private system for a few reasons. 
If the state supplied private law aims to be transversal, i.e. to apply across different sectors, the rules 
would not be able to be closely tailored to the transacting problems and needs of the particular 
community. To take one example, in some sectors traders might prefer performance, as they do in the 
cotton sector, in others, traders might prefer to obtain damages, since they can easily obtain alternative 
sources. Similarly if non-performance and harm in an industry is apparent quickly, short limitation 
periods will work and be preferred and not otherwise. One way in which legislators may typically deal 
with these problems is to draft broadly-based standards, which is precisely what unsettles normative 
expectations, opens up greater scope for interpretation such that resort to the courts becomes attractive 
to take advantage of the interpretive uncertainties. 
Moreover if state law-makers attempt to differentiate and enact special rules, such as a cotton traders’ 
private law code, a key constraint is the distance of state actors from rule-making, as well as the 
dispute resolution process to enforce the rules. If the rules are to be enacted by legislators and 
implemented through courts, given that they are not participants in the trading regime, they could be 
subject to strategic behaviour through lobbying and through partial disclosures, whereby actors might 
seek to affect the content of the rules or the way they are applied to their own advantage in a way that 
may be impossible or untenable in the transactors’ own interdependent social and economic world of 
high mutual observability. 
For similar reasons, state supplied private law is unlikely to be as widely disseminated and understood 
among the participants. In the cotton trade, as described by Bernstein, traders do not need lawyers to 
understand the rules, nor to write them. Therefore, processes of “translation” are completely avoided.89 
This is also what allows the background rules to be nimble: participants in the trade can relatively 
quickly respond to identified inadequacies in the rules and then seek to disseminate quickly and 
stabilise new normative expectations within the community. 
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Given the nature of the industry and the deep enmeshment of all participants in the trade, in social 
relations, in dispute resolution, the combined effect of the informal cooperation mechanisms and the 
background formal system is to make as much of the conduct observable to everyone and to avoid 
misunderstandings. In the regime as described, all the different mechanisms of sustaining cooperative 
behaviour, as classified by Elster90, work simultaneously and in mutually supportive ways. Making 
non-cooperative conduct observable to both the social and economic world a trader inhabits means 
that it can trigger social norm enforcement (through social condemnation and opprobrium), as well as 
withdrawal of cooperation due to quasi-moral norms of reciprocity or as punishment for defection 
affecting the deviating actor’s incentives through future economic gains. Moreover, the entanglement 
of the social and economic worlds, as well as the historical practice of passing on the trade within the 
family means that these norms become internalised as actor preferences to act honourably, or to act 
reciprocally, or to not go back on their word or deliver poorer quality cotton (it matters little how it is 
characterised) at least vis-à-vis those they perceive to share such norms with. In other words, the code 
of norms becomes inseparable from their identity. 
Stability, reproducibility and the drivers of transformation 
From the perspective of the transformation of private law, one question that arises is whether given the 
apparent success, such a PLS could offer a template for the elaboration of a hybrid private-regulatory 
law (particularly in light of the description of the “silos” in the previous section with their own rules, 
as well as DR mechanisms). Some authors in the American literature91 but also beyond,92 see the these 
kinds of PLS as models or templates for the contextualization of private contract law to different 
transactional settings. There are two possible objections to this argument. The first is to question 
whether the success of PLS in governing transactions and creating normative expectations as reported 
by authors such as Bernstein is more apparent than real, or whether it fails to take into account 
externalities and dysfunctions obscured from view. The second possible objection is to take the claim 
that these regimes are successful for granted, but to ask whether a PLS, such as the one described by 
Bernstein, would be stable and whether it would be reproducible in other settings. For the time being 
we take up this second line of inquiry, particularly through the lens of the effect of the “drivers of 
transformation” identified above on the PLS. 
On the issue of stability, Bernstein observes that the cotton industry regime she details is quite long 
standing, that it has existed “for over a century”93, or “since the mid-1800s” in that time “surviving 
widespread social change … and substantial changes in the background legal regime”94. As such, it 
would be fair to say that it is not that the cotton traders have “opted out” of the regnant UCC state-
supplied regime95, but that in fact they never opted in. This also suggests that a state supplied regime 
made up largely of default rules can allow the emergence or maintenance of such a regime, assuming 
it does not create a sufficient temptation for traders to try to strategically use the court’s distance 
which seems to be another kind of defection that the tight community need not worry about. 
The longevity of the system is evidence in favour of its stability and resilience. Yet Bernstein herself 
identifies a number of potential destabilising forces to the PLS in the cotton industry and shows how 
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the (self-sufficient) system can aim and manage to contain such forces by (re)integrate them into the 
regime.  
Economic integration: incorporating external actors 
The presence of external actors in the trading relationships suggests that the regime is not entirely self-
sufficient, which is what makes the formal and informal norm enforcement mechanisms mutually 
supportive, and this is an obvious threat to the stability of the PLS. One example of such regime non-
self-sufficiency can stem from the financing of transactions, when such financing comes from external 
sources. Yet in the cotton trading regime described by Bernstein, financing also depends on the 
commercial reputation of the trader within the community. Thus Bernstein suggests that the lion share 
of transactions was “financed by one of three banks”, with merchant banking being “personal” and 
bankers aiming to “become intimately connected with the merchant’s character, background, 
experience and conservatism”96. Not only is there any incorporation of financial actors into the system, 
but also there is an internal “implicit” industry bankruptcy regime which increases the likelihood that 
“intra-industry debts” would “eventually be repaid”, further embedding the actors (including financial 
actors) in the system and reducing incentives for end-game opportunism.97 
Traders also engage with other actors external to the regime in a world of increasing integration, both 
within and beyond the boundaries of one nation state. Again, to maintain self-sufficiency various 
attempts and strategies are reported to incorporate such external actors by extending the regime.  
One such strategy is to limit trade with external actors to be conducted through a domestic agent who 
is embedded and part of the self-sufficient legal regime. This has benefits for external actors since they 
can themselves tap into the rich information base available, including about the capabilities and 
reputations of local actors.98 This can extend both the formal and at least some informal mechanisms 
(transmission of reputation information) to external actors. 
While trading with more distant partners may mean that social and communal bonds will be 
considerably weaker, the institutions of the self-sufficient legal regime can respond in ways that seek 
to replicate such bonds more widely. Thus, Bernstein reports that the cotton associations have 
“sponsored a variety of activities designed to re-create and maintain the types of interconnected 
business and personal relationships”, including sponsoring events that stimulate personal interaction 
not only among traders, but also their families, in that way broadening and extending the sources of 
reputation information and gossip networks which act as informal support for trade.99 
When the group becomes larger and more distant and disparate, however, it becomes more difficult for 
trust-relevant information to spread purely through direct mutual observation and informal 
mechanisms such as gossip or ostracism. Thus, the cotton associations develop also “more formal 
methods for transmitting reputation information” such as circulars to members and information 
bureaus100. These are supported by an “active trade press” which covers industry events, including 
based on information from the banks about their industry customers.101 
                                                     
96 Id, 1747-48. 
97 Id, 1738-39 n.72. 
98 Id, 1766 n.173. 
99 Compare this to the literature on the importance of epistemic communities as a source of convergence in various fields of 
EU law. Eg, van Waarden, F. and M. Drahos, ‘Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition 
Policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9: 913 (2002); Vauchez, A., ‘Euro-lawyering, Transnational Social 
Fields and European Polity-Building’ in A. Vauchez and B. de Witte (eds) Lawyering Europe European Law as a 
Transnational Social Field (Oxford, Hart, 2013). 
100 Id, 1752. 
101 Id, 1753. 
Hans-W. Micklitz and Yane Svetiev 
91 
If we move from the purely local, to the increasingly globalized context of the contemporary cotton 
trade, the picture becomes far more complex. Authors who have examined in detail the transformation 
of the cotton trade going into the 21st century have underscored the importance of the governance of 
quality standards in the context of economic globalization and technological change.102 
Managing technological change 
Technology can have different types of influences on the group of traders and on the viability and 
stability of a PLS. 
Some effects are already apparent in the above discussion. Changes in transportation technology that 
lower costs can make it viable to trade with more distant parties. At the same time changes in 
dissemination and transportation technologies can make it possible for reputation and other trust 
relevant information to be more readily disseminated to such parties. 
Moreover, some even more disrupting influences of technological change on the PLS are already 
hinted at by Bernstein. Thus, she notes the potential disrupting effects on the PLS of the introduction 
of an instrument, which objectively grades the quality of the cotton (“high volume instrument”). Given 
the high level of subjectivity of the quality grading of the cotton makes quality one of the least 
contractible features in these transactions, which is precisely what necessitates reliance on the informal 
trust mechanisms through the value of the reputation or the use of ostracism. The availability of any 
type of technology which provides an objective assessment of quality makes it possible to extend the 
group of traders substantially, making informal trust and reputation less relevant at least in this 
dimension of the contracting relationship. 
Technological change disrupts the self-sufficiency of the regime in other ways as well. It introduces 
other actors (the producers, operators and servicers of the new technologies), as well as other issues 
that have to be provided for either in formal contracting documents or in the background default rules 
of contract or tort law. In the concrete example, the reliability of the machine grading technology is 
one obvious issue, as well as the allocation of the responsibility for losses in cases of grading failure. 
Here again, the strategy may be to either integrate these issues and actors into the PLS rules or 
alternatively to rely on publicly supplied defaults. 
Technological change can influence the chosen forms of business organisation as well. Thus, 
Bernstein reports that the quality grading instrument in the cotton industry was originally employable 
only for large-scale transactions, which might induce changes in the forms of business organisation. 
The private regime based on private rules and informal mechanisms emerged in a context of small 
family run or privately held firms, often passed on from one generation to the next, where learning the 
trade, the normative expectations of the community were coterminous with the development of one’s 
identity so that firms could be more or less identified with individuals. More complex institutional or 
organisational arrangements make purely informal personal bonds quite difficult due to problems of 
delegation within organisations, and the consequent problem of the attribution or characterisation of 
conduct of individual actors.103 Are the employees of such firms subject to the same social pressures 
and incentives as their owners? A tendency towards larger firms may increase the relevance of the 
interaction of the corporate law regime with whatever private law system, and that reliance on 
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corporations can have its own consequences for the form and function of the private law of 
transactions. Similarly, if the technology becomes cheaper and more widely available the trend could 
be reversed, which means any rules developed to deal with this problem would come under pressure to 
accommodate further changes. 
Changes in technology can trigger other changes in production methods, such as the employment of 
“just in time inventory methods”104, which de-emphasise reliance on inventories. At the same time 
puts additional stress on relationships with suppliers making seamless supply of the correct inputs 
even more important and reducing the relational flexibility that can be extended to them. This could 
result in pressures to integrate or consolidate, or as Deffains and Winn report, the development of 
direct channels of communication as between different firms’ production systems, leading to other 
private law issues, such as those related to electronic contracting.105 
In the absence of personal bond trust in such settings, can state-supplied private law institutions supply 
such trust as an alternative? Here again, Deffains and Winn’s account suggests some scepticism. They 
recount the EU’s efforts at the establishment of an electronic signatures regime as a mode of resolving 
the trust problems in electronic and distance contracting and the fact that this project was largely 
judged to be a failure. By the time the technical knowledge was gathered, a solution developed and 
translated into rules acceptable to all participant jurisdictions, the technology and the privately 
supplied mechanisms of trust had already advanced further. Again it seems that private parties had no 
reason to opt-into this state-supplied regime and stayed out of it. 
This effect of technological change on the conduct of transactions in markets and the consequent 
ability of the state to supply either facilitative or mandatory rules to govern or regulate such 
transactions is nowhere more evident than in the capital or financial market. In seeking to distinguish 
the contemporary situation from earlier stages of relative capital mobility, Sassen identifies as a key 
factor “the transformative impact of the new information and communication technologies, 
particularly computer-based technologies”106. The key effects of such digitization include the 
“accelerated growth of finance”, the “electronic linking of markets”, the “sharp rise in innovations”, 
all of which combine to produce an “increased complexity of operations” and to facilitate the further 
“linking of different financial markets.”107 In particular, digitization technologies introduce in 
financial markets properties such as instantaneous transmission, interconnectivity and speed. The 
digitization of financial instruments in turn can lead to decentralised access by a much larger number 
of participating investors.108 Such processes pose challenges for the state, by both reducing the 
effectiveness of its macroeconomic policy levers,109 but also on its ability to facilitate and regulate the 
transactions themselves, so as to either tax them, let alone to offer protections to weaker or less 
knowledgeable parties. But at the same time, the effect of such technologies is to disembed financial 
actors from the private trading orders, such as the one described by Bernstein. Some of the 
dysfunctions in financial markets of recent years might reflect precisely this growing self-sufficiency 
or disembedding of the sector (for which the concentration of financial actors in a few key centres 
around the globe, as described by Sassen, is an apt metaphor).  
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Civil society 
Civil society – or the safeguarding of the public interest beyond organised mass politics - can also both 
support certain templates of private law-making and enforcement and put transformative pressures on 
them. One key effect of civil society is on the inclusion (or exclusion) of actors, values/perspectives 
and considerations both in private legal regimes and in state political processes for law-making or 
judicial processes of law enforcement. 
In the PLS reported by Bernstein, for example, civil society organisations or groups can from one 
point of view be seen as a supportive force buttressing the private legal regime. In the most close-knit 
version of the private legal regime, civil society, economic life and intimate relations are closely 
interlinked so as to be almost indistinguishable. If the informal forces of social trust have to extend 
beyond the highly observable context of the close-knit community living in the same street or town, 
civil society organisations and engagement formats can provide the opportunity to extend the 
intermingled social and economic worlds of the transactors to other domains in their lives. Thus 
festivals, clubs (including for “wives” and families), even trade-related media can be spaces that 
supply heightened mutual observability, in turn enhancing social norms and reciprocity-based 
enforcement mechanisms for the norms of the private regime. The civil society organisations provide 
spaces and formats where information can be shared about transactions and transactors and where 
gossip or ostracism can be meted out against defectors.  
On another view, however, civil society can also disrupt these regimes to the extent that civil society 
groups that buttress the PLS are based on exclusionary notions of social identity and solidarity. 
Explaining the significance of an “annual civic cotton carnival”, Bernstein cites sources that the 
carnival was sustained by the “business and social elite” many of whom were “cotton men”. However, 
it became subject to “charges of class and racial elitism”, and gradually these kinds of clubs and events 
dissolved in the aftermath of the civil rights movement in the American south, as they came to be seen 
as the “embodiment” of the region’s “social, economic and racial divisions”. 
This brings us to the theme of inclusion and exclusion. Both organized politics and civil society 
beyond organized politics can exclude certain groups, interests and perspectives from the processes of 
rule-making and rule-enforcement, as well as provide channels for the incorporation of those excluded 
voices. 
It is worth noting that in the cotton private legal regime described by Bernstein, it is not the relative 
equality of bargaining power that ensures a relatively laissez faire regime functions apparently 
smoothly for all involved: there are considerable differences in size as well as situational bargaining 
power (through hold up opportunities) that could be exploited by contracting parties. Instead it is all of 
the mechanisms of making conduct widely observable, together with some broadly defined 
commonality of interest in keeping the economic and social world going that are crucial and avoid the 
need for excessive protective intervention through mandatory rules110. Yet both the PLS and the civil 
society associations that undergird it embody the region’s social, economic and racial divisions. It may 
well be that the regime works because it systematically excludes certain groups and perhaps also 
perpetuates their discrimination or even exploitation. 
Similar effects of civil society can be seen in the transformation of the state supplied private law, from 
(the ideology of) the largely facilitative, default rule based contract law to one that must become more 
attuned to concrete problems in contracting relationships, including information, power and economic 
asymmetries. Civil society movements in western democracies, such as the consumer movement to 
take one prominent example, emphasized the disparity of power or information in contracting 
relationships also focused on the ways in which those relationships were different and in need of 
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special rules, which are more protective and intrusive. Such movements sought changes in state law to 
their aid. The extent to which such efforts were a success in substance rather than form is a question of 
a large and voluminous literature on both sides of the Atlantic, but as Bernstein has elsewhere argued 
formal mandatory protective ex ante rules or ex post remedies that favour weaker parties in themselves 
may not be sufficient, as they either raise prices for them or can otherwise lead to their exclusion as 
contracting parties.111 Whether civil society movements could have sought to instead protect weaker 
members of society by embedding them into limited regimes of high observability and a broad 
identification of a common framework objective is also a difficult counterfactual question; in the 
context of the mass political mobilisation of the time, producing a change in the law seemed like a 
more immediate and immediately tangible result.112  
Civil society, group identities and bonds of social trust 
Exclusive civil society organisations that stem from or match onto existing trader groups can bolster 
group identity and bonds of social trust. Bernstein’s collocutors often refer to trust and honour in their 
business transactions as an indelible characteristic of the “southern man” and cotton trader. In doing 
so, the collocutors invoke the idea of the common cultural basis of trust and of social norms, which 
also can support the argument that private law norms themselves are a reflection of pre-existing 
common community norms and bonds. As outlined in the first section of the paper, this belief has held 
considerable sway and has been used throughout the period of the consolidation of the nation states, 
leading to sustained efforts at homogenisation as a key aspect of community building, despite the 
considerable evidence of trading, exchange and cooperation in more pluralistic environments.113 
Note however that it is difficult in a context such as a cotton-trading regime in a particular locality, as 
the one described by Bernstein, to say which came first, commerce or cultural and social bonds114. It 
seems just as plausible that whatever social bonds existed, even if minimal or weak to start off with, 
were developed and strengthened by the intermingling of the social and economic worlds of the 
transactors,115 giving them helpful learned heuristics and habits even for going through life, helpfully 
restricting their autonomy and choice, including the option of pursuing opportunistic conduct.116 
Maintaining the self-sufficiency of the regime, apart from the apparent exclusion of the un- or 
underrepresented groups in the locality, can also have negative effects for the transactors themselves 
because this implicates the exclusion of other relevant knowledge or opportunities for collaboration: a 
self-sufficient regime may also be self-limiting in the face of competitive pressures. As Van Hoecke 
argues “the higher the systemic autonomy, the lower the autonomy as to content”. By opting out of 
outside knowledge or restricting such interaction, transactors can become exceedingly good at current 
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practices, but have no knowledge to confront radically different environments as suggested by the 
literature on disruption in business strategy.117 
It seems clear that having an exclusive private law system aggravates this effect, but perhaps an even 
more important question is whether a more generalist private law, such as the state supplied one, 
would help such groups disrupt themselves? On the one hand, it provides them access to knowledge, 
such as through court precedents or generalist lawyers, about transactional practices in other sectors. 
On the other hand, this is not real-time information and it is translated through the eyes and needs of 
lawyers and the timetables of courts, therefore its salience would be questionable, particularly if we 
assume that transactors seek to keep transactions running seamlessly, rather than turning them into 
legal disputes. This may lead us to think about the role of other actors, including the role of civil 
society or even the state administration in this process of dissemination of good or just alternative 
practices, but this is a question for another day. 
The drivers of transformation and the net effect 
The foregoing problems and issues created by the drivers of change turn out to be potent forces of 
instability in the trading relationships supported by the private legal regime. Similar factors have been 
explored in the literature on Internet governance that focuses on the creation and regulation of groups, 
including groups of traders, via the Internet.118  
Tying it to the themes explored above, we could say that the Internet radically reduces cost of 
interacting and transacting even with parties at great distances from each other, who might be 
completely unknown to each other and share no pre-existing community bonds of trust. Such 
interactions among private parties pose the question about the form and function of private law in 
governing those interactions: do we need either a social basis or a state-supplied private law to be able 
to transact in such an environment. 
The tentative answer appears to be that neither is strictly necessary. The literature on Internet 
governance suggests that communities can be created even among very disparate members, starting 
from health support fora focused on specific illnesses119 to social production collectives120 and the 
internet can provide a platform for the organisation of civil society groups across national borders and 
with explicitly political ambitions.121 From a private law perspective, it is relevant that such groups – 
even when their objective is not economic – endeavour to create and communicate normative 
expectations, by engaging in joint rule-making and rule-revision. In such processes of private rule-
making, classical democratic criteria, such as majority voting, do not appear to be universally applied; 
in fact it seems they are rarely used, opting instead for mechanisms of repeated deliberation that aims 
to bring almost everyone on-board (what Caliess and Zumbansen might call a “rough consensus”122).  
Moreover, both in rule-making and in dispute resolution, even if a formal group administrator has the 
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technological capacity to impose a solution hierarchically, such opportunities are not exercised as they 
are perceived to be illegitimate, perhaps because such administrators are not invested with any special 
mark of authority and perhaps because the costs of further communication and deliberation appear to 
be low. There being neither pre-existing identity nor authority, Akrich and Meadel suggest that it is 
precisely the process of rule-making and rule-revision about their interactions that gives such 
communities their identity, even if their membership is inherently highly heterogeneous. Moreover, 
such communities appear to be effective at the goals that they identify for each other, whether it be the 
production of social value (such as Wikipedia),123 or – even if sometimes dystopically – in 
communicating information and influencing the behaviour of participants. 
We might well ask what is it that ensures members’ compliance with the rules elaborated in such 
groups given the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms? One answer that appears from various 
accounts of online governance suggests that the high observability of interactions via the online 
platforms plays a role, which means that different forms of opprobrium and ostracism can be 
created.124 At the same time, given that members are not consigned to such groups either by birth or 
some other mark of identity, exit is easy. When there exist many potential transactors or other parties 
with whom to engage, there is less incentive to try to make things work in the current group. Precisely 
such tendencies towards exit and further tailoring can also produce excessive fragmentation, as shown 
by Elkin-Koren in her study of content licensing approaches for user-generated content on the 
Internet.125 She also astutely notes the problems and limitations associated with such fragmentation in 
“private law”, including lowering interoperability, lessening access to disruptive information and 
inhibiting the pedagogic function of a coherent legal regime.  
Conclusions 
 
This contribution provides a review of some of the literature that examines processes of norm-making 
and norm-enforcement within different communities that largely operate independent of State 
structures or institutions. Some of the contributions suggest that notwithstanding the efforts of state 
legislators and legal scholars to produce magnificent legal edifices, sometimes these can turn out to 
have few if any normative consequences for the ordering and governance of private relationships. 
Both in transnational but also in domestic contexts, parties can frequently opt out of the state-supplied 
private dispute resolution fora because they can write rules and resolve disputes more effectively or 
more expeditiously otherwise.  
To speculate towards an extension to the European setting, at least two consequences may follow from 
this broad overview of the literature.  
The first consequence is for the likely future of European private law. Namely, we might not be 
particularly optimistic about the likely future normative relevance of a legislatively endorsed code, 
drafted at great distance from transactors, by a group of legal academics seeking to identify 
commonalities from the already highly abstracted private law regimes of the Member States. Scholars 
like Legrand might say that such a task is impossible without doing violence to the variety in national 
traditions or the common law more specifically. But scholars of transacting behaviour might also say 
that the result could turn out to be irrelevant. The fact that in its latest reincarnation the proposal has 
been termed an optional instrument perhaps simply reflects nothing else than a deep concession that 
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state-supplied private law is always, in some sense, optional. The EU legislator might find that not 
many decide to opt in if the law does not correspond to their problems. 
The second consequence may be about the EU and its role in the Europeanisation of private law. 
Excluding the unsuccessful codification exercise above, the EU interventions have been piecemeal and 
instrumentally-motivated, giving the EU acquis the famous “Jack-in-the-box” quality, as described by 
Wilhelmson.126 Whatever the original motivations of such interventions, they have had unforeseen and 
unforeseeable ripple effects, producing various experiments of a hybrid nature in both dispute 
resolution mechanisms and procedures and in the embedding of private regime rule-making into 
alternative (in the sense of non-legislative) but still publicly-minded structures or processes. As argued 
in the first part, however, many of these structures and processes are relatively opaque not only to the 
EU citizen, but also to scrutiny by civil society and by the scholarly community. Codification efforts 
may only further obscure this profound diversity and on-going experimentation. It seems there is little 
need for ex ante coherence in the form of further codifications and a burning need for ex post 
coherence by way of monitoring. 
These contributions provide some preliminary thoughts and analytical categories that might be useful 
for the analysis and tracing of the process of transformation of private law and the drivers for that 
process, which is the question to which we intend to turn next by reference to the empirical material 
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